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I. INTRODUCTION
A specter is haunting the law of contracts. The doctrine of
promissory estoppel has evolved from relatively modest beginnings
as a "consideration substitute" in donative promise cases1 to a
force that threatens to engulf a major portion of contract law.2 In-
* Associate Professor and Chairman of Business Law, Indiana University Graduate
School of Business. B.A., 1966, Indiana University;, J.D., 1969, Indiana University School of
Law.
1. See infra notes 251-60 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 306-11 and accompanying text.
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deed, some commentators have suggested that promissory estoppel
is evolving into a separate theory of recovery, independent of con-
tract law.3 To the extent that this evolution continues, the future
of many traditional contract rules, such as the parol evidence rule,
is doubtful.
4
Regardless of whether promissory estoppel ultimately achieves
the status of an independent theory or merely continues its evolu-
tion within the parameters of contract law, the historical course of
the reliance principle's expansion exhibits such significant momen-
tum that the thoughtful observer must speculate about likely fu-
ture candidates for the doctrine's debilitating ministrations.5 The
parol evidence rule, at first glance, seems to be such a candidate
for many reasons. The parol evidence rule has confused" and dis-
satisfied7 legal scholars for a long time; for example, Professor Wig-
more condemned the rule as "the most discouraging subject in the
whole field of evidence."' Bringing the rule within estoppel's do-
main could simplify the application of the rule,' and legal scholars
should appreciate anything that could clarify and rationalize its
application. Furthermore, that promissory estoppel already has
made substantial incursions into the province of the Statute of
Frauds 0 may portend a similar role for promissory estoppel in the
parol evidence context. Many similarities exist between the Statute
and the rule1" and many of the same arguments that justify the use
of estoppel to circumvent the Statute s are equally applicable to
justify the use of estoppel to bypass the parol evidence rule.13
Few cases to date have explored the possible interaction be-
tween promissory estoppel and the parol evidence rule.1 4 This Arti-
3. For an exhaustive discussion of this possibility, see Metzger & Phillips, The Emer-
gence of Promissory Estoppel as an Independent Theory of Recovery, 35 RUTGERS L. REv.
472 (1983). See also infra notes 295-308 and accompanying text.
4. See infra note 434 and accompanying text.
5. One commentator describes promissory estoppel as "perhaps the most radical and
expansive development of this century in the law of promissory liability." Knapp, Reliance
in the Revised Restatement: The Proliferation of Promissory Estoppel, 81 COLUM. L. Rav.
52, 53 (1981).
6. See infra notes 15-25 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 162-202 and accompanying text.
8. 9 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS
AT COMMON LAW § 2400, at 3 (3d ed. 1940).
9. See infra notes 583-87 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 354-435 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 521-30 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 347-48 & 377-419 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 532-37 & 545-64 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 438-518 and accompanying text.
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cle attempts to explain why so few cases have explored this inter-
action, and discusses both the likelihood and the desirability of a
significant intrusion by promissory estoppel into the parol evidence
rule's domain. First, however, this Article necessarily focuses upon
the parol evidence rule itself, the evolution of the promissory es-
toppel doctrine in general, and the doctrine's development as a de-
vice for circumventing the strictures of the Statute of Frauds.
H. THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
The parol evidence rule long has been "the source of endless
confusion in contract law."' 5 As Thayer noted eight decades ago,
"[f]ew things are darker than this, or fuller of subtle difficulties."' 6
Little has occurred in the ensuing years to gainsay the veracity of
Thayer's observation. Even the rule's name is somewhat mislead-
ing.17 "Parol" misleads because most formulations of the rule in-
clude within its scope written as well as oral terms.'8 While the use
of the word "evidence" in the rule's title and in some judicial
statements about the rule'9 may suggest that the rule is an eviden-
tiary rule, legal scholars generally agree that the parol evidence
rule is actually a rule of law. 20 Finally, some commentators have
questioned whether "a maze of conflicting tests, subrules, and ex-
ceptions" 2' is a "rule" at all, especially in light of the number of
exceptions to its operation 22 and the uncertainties surrounding
15. Note, The Parol Evidence Rule: Is It Necessary?, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 972, 972
(1969).
16. J. THAYER, A PRELMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 390 (1898).
17. "The term 'parol evidence rule' is something of a misnomer for it does not deal
exclusively with parol, is not a rule of evidence, and at least in the minds of some, is not
even a rule." Wallach, The Declining "Sanctity" of Written Contracts-The Impact of the
Uniform Commercial Code on the Parol Evidence Rule, 44 Mo. L. REv. 651, 651 (1979). See
also Murray, The Parol Evidence Rule: A Clarification, 4 DuQ. L. REv. 337, 343 (1965-
1966).
18. Murray, supra note 17, at 343. For a discussion of various formulations of the rule,
see infra notes 61-69 and accompanying text.
19. "Because judges, in reserving a question of fact to themselves couched the process
in rules which sounded like rules of evidence, the term 'evidence' is part of the title of the
rule which only serves to add to the mystery surrounding it." Murray, supra note 17, at 343.
20. See, e.g., J. CALAmAm & J. PERILLO, CoNTRAcTs § 3-5 (2d ed. 1977); 9 J. WIGMORE,
supra note 8, § 2400, at 4 (3d ed. 1940); Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol
Evidence Rule, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 161, 189 (1965).
21. Sweet, Contract Making and Parol Evidence: Diagnosis and Treatment of a Sick
Rule, 53 CORNELL L. REv. 1036, 1036 (1968).
22. The number of recognized exceptions to the rule "raises doubts about its status as
a 'rule' at all." See Note, supra note 15, at 972. For a discussion of the exceptions to the
rule, see infra notes 124-51 and accompanying text.
1983] 1385
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
both its definition and application.2"
The rule's appellation, the variance among the numerous for-
mulations of the rule, and the observed tendency of the courts to
manipulate the rule to avoid the harsh results that otherwise may
flow from its strict application2 all undoubtedly have contributed
to the fog of uncertainty surrounding the rule. The primary source
of confusion, however, lies with misapprehensions concerning both
the nature of the policies that the rule intends to serve and those
policies' relative merit.2 5 An inquiry into the rule's underlying pol-
icy bases necessarily must preface any explication of the rule in its
various forms. This inquiry is particularly important in assessing
the degree to which using promissory estoppel to circumvent the
rule may hinder attainment of the rule's underlying policy
objectives.
A. The Policy Bases of the Rule
Scholars have traced the historical origins of the parol evi-
dence rule to "a primitive formalism which attached mystical and
ceremonial effectiveness to the carta and the seal."2 The rule may
have survived the disappearance from our law of other vestiges of
formalism because a written contract furnishes more reliable evi-
dence of the terms of an agreement than does the parties' oral tes-
timony, which may be the product of faulty memory, wishful
thinking, or outright prevarication. A major function of the rule,
23. "Those who question whether the parol evidence rule is really a rule at all seem to
feel that certainty of definition and application are required before something can be la-
beled a 'rule,' and the parol evidence rule tends to lack both." Wallach, supra note 17, at
651. For a discussion of the rule's various formulations, see infra notes 61-69 and accompa-
nying text. For a discussion of the inconsistencies in the application of the rule, see infra
text accompanying notes 120-23, 130, 149 & 153-61.
24. See infra notes 153-61 and accompanying text.
25. Professors Calamari and Perillo attribute the mystery surrounding the rule to a
"basic disagreement as to the application of the . . . rule and as to the best method of
ascertaining the intention of the parties-the process of contractual interpretation." J.
CALAmARI & J. PEmLLO, supra note 20, § 3-1. They further observe that- "The cases and
treatises of the contract giants tend to conceal this conflict. While frequently masking disa-
greement by using the same terminology, Professors Williston and Corbin are often poles
apart in the meaning they attach to the same terms." Id. Calamari and Perillo attribute this
polarity of opinion to "conflicting value judgments as to policy issues that are as old as our
legal system and that are likely to continue as long as courts of law exist." Id.
26. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 211, at 430 n.4 (1954); see
also 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 2426.
27. See, e.g., Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64 COLUM.
L. REV. 833, 846 (1964) ("[T]he written instrument is a more reliable expression of the
meaning of their contract than one party's not disinterested memory of his or the other
1386 [Vol. 36:1383
1983] PAROL EVIDENCE RULE 1387
therefore, is the prevention of fraud or perjury. 28 This rationale,
however, does not explain the application of the rule to written
evidence of alleged terms that are not contained in the parties'
final written contract.29 This rationale also fails to explain the spe-
cial role that the judge plays in parol evidence cases. The judge
initially decides whether the rule excludes certain evidence. Why
should jurors, whom courts rely upon to determine truth in a wide
variety of legal contexts, lack the ability to determine truth relia-
bly in matters of parol evidence?
Thus, while special devotion to the written word may have
provided the origin of the parol evidence rule, the pervasive atti-
tude that judges provide the best protection against perjured testi-
monys° probably has been the reason for its continued viability.3 1
A distrust of the jury as a reliable mechanism for divining truth3 2
underlies the parol evidence rule. Left to their own devices, jurors
may favor underdogs by relying upon alleged oral terms,33 thereby
deciding the case in a manner calculated to avoid a perceived in-
justice.3 4 Jurors also may lack the sophistication needed to deal ef-
party's prior oral utterances."); see also Kupka v. Morey, 541 P.2d 740, 747-48 n.9 (Alaska
1975); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 210, at 428; J. WHn= & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-9 (2d ed. 1980); Sweet, supra note 21,
at 1036; Note, supra note 15, at 982.
28. See, e.g., Kupka v. Morey, 541 P.2d 740, 747-48 n.9 (Alaska 1975); Masterson v.
Sine, 68 Cal. 2d 222, 227, 65 Cal. Rptr. 545, 548, 436 P.2d 561, 564 (1968); Patterson, supra
note 27, at 846; Note, supra note 15, at 982.
29. The rule "would seem to lose much of its force if the prior expression is written.
The prior writing is not unchanged [sic] at the time of trial any more than the subsequent
writing." Murray, supra note 17, at 342; see also Farnsworth, "Meaning" in the Law of
Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939, 958 (1967). One scholar, however, notes that the vast majority
of decided cases involve alleged oral terms. Wallach, supra note 17, at 651.
30. "If the parol evidence doctrine is to be administered chiefly by juries and not by
judges, its special protection for written transactions fades." C. MCCORMICK, supra note 26,
§ 216, at 441-42; see also Note, supra note 15, at 982-83.
31. Professor McCormick argued that the formalist attributes of the rule had "a spe-
cial survival value-the escape from the jury-which led the judges to retain for writings the
conception that they had a sort of magical effect of erasing all prior agreements." C. Mc-
CORMICK, supra note 26, § 211, at 430 n.4.
32. "[L]awyers have a strong distrust of the judicial process, especially the jury, as a
means of ascertaining the truth." Sweet, supra note 21, at 1049; see also Wallach, supra
note 17, at 653 n.9.
33. Professor Sweet notes that juries may "favor the underdog who rarely has the
writing on his side." Sweet, supra note 21, at 1050. See also C. MCCORMICK, supra note 26,
at § 210 ("[Wlhen an issue arises involving choice between a writing and an alleged oral
agreement, usually the one who sets up the spoken against the written word is economically
the underdog.").
34. "If the jury is directed to bring in a general verdict (i.e. for the plaintiff or for the
defendant), it may in doing so exercise its views of jury equity and thus impair the reliabil-
ity of written instruments." Patterson, supra note 27, at 837. Professor McCormick similarly
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fectively with complex commercial transactions involving numer-
ous alleged oral and written contract terms.3 5 Although under
modern rules of procedure a judge may either overrule a jury's de-
cision or decide the case himself when the proffered evidence rea-
sonably supports only one conclusion, a judge may be unwilling to
do so.36 According to this view, the major service that the rule per-
forms3 7 is to allow judges to "strike down at the outset claims of
oral variants on the writing, variants which the judge believes
never were entered into but are fabrications, designed or
unconscious. ' 'ss
Fears concerning the unreliability of oral testimony and the
inadequacies of the jury as a device for divining the truth, how-
ever, do not fully explain the sanctity that the parol evidence rule
affords written agreements. Legal scholars note that the parol evi-
dence rule is a rule of form,39 and, therefore, performs the "chan-
neling" function common to rules of form40 by encouraging con-
tracting parties to embody the terms of their agreement in a
proper writing. 1 Under this view, courts deny enforcement of parol
terms merely "because the parties have not used the proper
form."'1 2 Rules of form embody certain assumptions about the rela-
observed: "The average jury will, other things being equal, lean strongly in favor of the side
which is threatened with possible injustice and certain hardship by the enforcement of the
writing." C. MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 210, at 428.
35. "At an early date it was felt (and the feeling strongly remains) that writings re-
quire the special protection that is afforded by removing this issue from the province of
unsophisticated jurors." J. CALAMARI & J. PERuO, supra note 20, § 3-2, at 100. See also 9 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 2426, at 86.
36. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 216, at 440.
37. Other services of the rule include allowing trial judges to avoid issues concerning
the agents' authority, the vagueness of oral agreements, and the relevance of oral conditions.
Sweet, supra note 21, at 1050.
38. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 216, at 440. As Professor Sweet noted, "[I]f a trial
judge doubts that an asserted agreement ever took place, ruling on the basis of the parol
evidence rule avoids commenting on the evidence, instructing on the weight and burden of
proof, or granting a new trial. It also avoids branding the witness a liar." Sweet, supra note
21, at 1051. See also Wallach, supra note 17, at 653 (Trial judges who exclude evidence
under the aegis of the rule do so either to protect the writing or to prevent less than credible
evidence from reaching the jury.).
39. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-3, at 108 ("Since (and even
before) the common law had its genesis, there has been a deeply-felt belief that transactions
will be more secure, litigation will be reduced, and the temptation to perjury will be re-
moved, if everyone will only use proper forms for his transactions.").
40. See infra notes 402-03 & 407-11 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
channeling function in the Statute of Frauds context.
41. See Sweet, supra note 21, at 1036; Wallach, supra note 17, at 653; Note, supra
note 15, at 982.
42. Sweet, supra note 21, at 1050.
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tive reliability of formal versus informal transactions;" perhaps
more importantly, however, the law perceives rules of form as ad-
ding stability to commercial transactions.'" Thus, by protecting the
integrity of written contracts the parol evidence rule may provide
the predictability and certainty necessary for the efficient conduct
of business.45 The special role that the judge plays in parol evi-
dence cases arguably is consistent with this view because jurors
may not appreciate sufficiently the need for stability and certainty
in commercial dealings. 4'6 A related subsidiary argument that com-
mentators often advance in conjunction with this business effi-
ciency rationale for the rule notes that the rule allows principals to
control unauthorized commitments by their agents through the use
of integration clauses in their contracts.47
Finally, another body of thought exists that attaches signifi-
cantly less importance to writings qua writings. Under this view,
the parol evidence rule is nothing more than a particularized ver-
sion of the basic contractual interpretation rule which stipulates
that later final expressions of intent prevail over earlier tentative
expressions of intent.4' Two major differences exist between the
parol evidence rule and the more general rule of interpretation.
43. On this point Sweet makes the following observation:
A rule of form assumes that parties generally follow formal rules. The absence of
proper form indicates it is unlikely that the agreement was made. Also, a rule of form
assumes that witnesses will lie or forget facts if it is to their advantage to do so. Such a
rule assumes people have poor memories and that litigation is an inefficient method of
ascertaining facts.
Id. at 1053.
44. See supra note 39.
45. The Minnesota Supreme Court in 1924 observed that
[w]ithout that rule there would be no assurance of the enforceability of a written con-
tract. If such assurance were removed today from our law, generally disaster would
result, because of the consequent destruction of confidence, for the tremendous but
closely adjusted machinery of modem business cannot function at all without confi-
dence in the enforceability of contracts. They must not be reduced to the innocuous
character of a mere "scrap of paper."
Cargill Comm'n Co. v. Swartwood, 159 Minn. 1, 7, 198 N.W. 536, 538 (1924). See also Hol-
ton v. Bivens, 9 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (Callaghan) 836, 838 (Okla. Ct. App. 1971) ("Every per-
son should have the right to rely upon written contracts. Allowing testimony of oral agree-
ments in contradiction thereto can only result in confusion concerning reliability of the
writing.").
46. Sweet, supra note 21, at 1036.
47. Id. at 1050, 1057. For a discussion of merger clauses and their effects, see infra
note 189 and accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., J. CALwmu & J. PERLLO, supra note 20, § 3-2; 3 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 574 (rev. ed. 1960); Farnsworth, supra note 29, at 958; Murray, supra note 17,
at 338; Comment, The Parol Evidence Rule: A Conservative View, 19 U. Cm. L. Rav. 348,
348 (1952).
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The parol evidence rule only applies when the parties' final expres-
sion of intent is in written form, while the general rule of interpre-
tation applies regardless of the final expression's form." Further-
more, under the general rule of interpretation the jury determines
whether the parties intended their last expression to supersede
prior expressions, while under the parol evidence rule the trial
judge makes this determination."
Under this view the primary purpose of the rule is to prevent
courts from interpreting earlier, tentative agreements or negotia-
tions as part of an integrated writing that the parties actually in-
tended as the final expression of their agreement.51 Thus, accord-
ing to this view the rule's justification is based upon the finality of
the parties' written agreement.5 2 Courts exclude oral or written
53
terms extraneous to such a writing not because doubt exists con-
cerning the terms' reliability, but rather because the terms are ir-
relevant, since the parties superseded them in the final integrated
writing. 4
This last view of the rule-the rule as insurer that the final
expression of intent governs-seems to be currently in vogue.55
49. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-2, at 99-100 (emphasis in original).
50. Id. at 100.
51. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 210, at 428.
52. "[A]fter the parties have discussed and negotiated the terms of the transaction
and have agreed on the terms by signing an instrument embodying them, all prior utter-
ances have become discarded by the final act. . . which is the sole expression of their final
promises and expectations." Patterson, supra note 27, at 846.
53. The policy of "finality applies to prior written as well as oral utterances." Patter-
son, supra note 27, at 846 (emphasis in original). Professor Murray, however, expresses some
reservations on this issue:
The rule exists to afford special protection to subsequent written expressions of agree-
ment when the parties intend such expressions to be complete and final. Whether the
parties intended this result in a particular case is a question of fact which is decided by
the trial judge ...because juries cannot be trusted to accord proper weight to the
writing over prior oral expressions. Stating the purpose and operation of the rule in
this fashion, it is difficult to clearly apply it when the prior expression is written. If
juries would not accord proper weight to a final writing over a prior writing, perhaps
the reason for the rule remains even where both expressions are written. Otherwise, the
question of fact involved should be decided as are other questions of fact.
Murray, supra note 17, at 342-43.
54. Professor Wigmore observed that when a judge decides to apply the parol evidence
rule to the parties' agreement "he does not decide that the excluded negotiations did not
take place, but merely that if they did take place they are nevertheless legally immaterial."
9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 2430, at 98 (emphasis in original). When the judge decides
that the rule does not apply "he does not decide that the negotiations did take place, but
merely that if they did, they are legally effective, and he leaves to the jury the determina-
tion of fact whether they did take place." Id. (emphasis in original).
55. See, e.g., id. § 2425, at 75-76; Sweet, supra note 21, at 1036.
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This view has influenced both the Uniform Commercial Code's
version of the rule5 and the position of the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts.57 Nonetheless, the other rationales, especially the
greater relative reliability of written versus oral expressions of in-
tent, remain important justifications for several reasons. First, the
major dispute in most parol evidence cases does not concern
whether the contracting parties intended the writing to supersede
alleged prior expressions of their intent, but whether the parties
ever actually agreed to the prior expressions.5 Second, although
many courts discuss the ascertainment of intent, they often use
language which suggests that they are barring parol evidence be-
cause of its unreliability.59 Last, the influence of ideas relating to
the special significance of writings is probably the best explanation
for those formulations of the rule that take a more restrictive view
of the critical process by which courts may ascertain best the par-
ties' intent to integrate their agreement into a final writing.60
B. The Parol Evidence Rule: Formulations, Exceptions, and
Applications
While the essence of the parol evidence rule is clear, signifi-
cant disagreement exists about the rule's various intricacies. Pro-
fessor Murray explains the gist of the rule as follows: "When the
parties to a contract embody the terms of their agreement in a
writing, intending that writing to be the final expression of their
agreement, the terms of the writing may not be contradicted by
56. See infra notes 99-106 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 107-15 & 131 and accompanying text.
58. As Professor McCormick noted:
Seldom from the case does one gain the impression that the dispute is really over
whether an admitted oral agreement was intended to be superseded by the writing.
Where the adversary's position is to be gleaned from the report, which is surprisingly
seldom, it appears most often that he denies that any such oral counter-agreement was
ever entered into.
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 216, at 440. If Professor McCormick is correct, and intui-
tively he seems to be, then much of the recent concern with the rule as a device for effectu-
ating the intent of the parties, however laudable that objective may be in terms of avoiding
some of the obvious unfairness that results when courts treat the rule as a rule of form, may
be largely misplaced. If the true function of the rule remains one of helping determine
whether the parties ever entered into the alleged parol agreements, then conclusions about
the rule's utility as a device in aiding the truth-seeking process should influence opinions
about the desirability of the rule's continued viability.
59. Sweet, supra note 21, at 1048.
60. For a discussion of the polarity between Williston's and Corbin's views on this
subject, see infra notes 78-98 and accompanying text.
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evidence of any prior agreement."' Whether the rule applies to all
prior agreements, regardless of whether they are in written or oral
form is a topic of debate. Professors Corbin"' and Williston,e3 tak-
ing the majority position, answer in the affirmative. Statements of
the rule, however, exist that limit its application to prior oral
agreements." Furthermore, while scholars unanimously agree that
the rule applies to alleged agreements made prior to the writing,
but not to alleged agreements made subsequent thereto, 5 disagree-
ment exists about the proper treatment of agreements allegedly
made contemporaneously with the writing.6 Professor Williston 7
and the Uniform Commercial Code' treat contemporaneous oral
terms like prior terms, but treat contemporaneous written terms as
part of the integrated writing. Professor Corbin, on the other hand,
argues that terms are either prior or subsequent, and deems the
use of the word "contemporaneous" to be an obfuscation of the
integration issue.6 9
Further and more serious disagreement arises during actual
application of the rule to particular fact situations, and concerns
61. Murray, supra note 17, at 337.
62. See 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 48, § 573, at 357, for the following statement of the
rule:
When two parties have made a contract and have expressed it in a writing to which
they have both assented as the complete and accurate integration of that contract,
evidence, whether parol or otherwise, of antecedent understandings and negotiations
will not be admitted for the purpose of varying or contradicting the writing.
Id. (emphasis added).
63. "Briefly stated, this rule requires, in the absence of fraud, duress, mutual mistake,
or something of the kind, the exclusion of extrinsic evidence, oral or written, where the
parties have reduced their agreement to an integrated writing." 4 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 631, at 948-49 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1961) (emphasis added).
64. See, e.g., Sweet, supra note 21, at 1036 ("The parol evidence rule determines the
provability of a prior or contemporaneous oral agreement when the parties have assented to
a written agreement."). Professor McCormick premises the entire discussion of the rule on
its applicability only to prior oral agreements. See C. McCORMICK, supra note 26, §§ 210-22.
65. See, e.g., J. CALAMA1i & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-6, at 113-14; J. WHIrr & R.
SUMMERS, supra note 27, § 2-9, at 78; Sweet, supra note 21, at 1042.
66. J. CALAmAUi & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-2, at 100.
67. 4 S. WILLISTON, supra note 63, § 628, at 913-15, § 631, at 952-53; see also J.
CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-2, at 100-01.
68. U.C.C. § 2-202 (1977) provides in part:
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties agree or which
are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final expression of their
agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein may not be contradicted
by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement ....
Id. (emphasis added). See also J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 27, § 2-10, at 78-79;
Wallach, supra note 17, at 665.
69. 3 A. CoRBIN, supra note 48, § 577, at 400-01; see also J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO,
supra note 20, § 3-2, at 101; Murray, supra note 17, at 337 n.3.
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the issues of the "finality" and "completeness" of a contract. Fre-
quently, the "overriding issue in parol evidence disputes" 70 is
whether the parties intended the written document to be a final
and complete statement of their agreement, or a final statement of
a part of their agreement, or perhaps nothing more than a memo-
randum not intended to be a final expression of their agreement at
all.' '71 The issue of "finality" is crucial because the rule does not
apply to tentative or preliminary writings.7 2 Scholars generally
agree that parties may introduce any relevant evidence on the
question of whether the parties intended the writing to be final.
7 8
While the question of finality often is cast as a question of law
since the trial judge makes the determination, the question actu-
ally concerns an interpretation of intention, and thus is a question
of fact.1 4
The question of completeness is of paramount importance be-
cause courts generally draw a distinction between writings that are
a partial integration of the parties' agreement and writings that are
a total integration of the agreement. Courts characterize as total
integrations those writings that they determine to be both final
and complete. Thereafter, evidence of any prior agreements may
not contradict or supplement the totally integrated writing. 5
Courts characterize as partial integrations those writings that are
final but incomplete. Evidence of prior agreements may not contra-
dict such writings, although evidence of consistent additional
terms may supplement such incomplete writings.7 6 The issue of
completeness, like the issue of finality, is a question of law in the
sense that the trial judge decides the issue.
The method that courts employ in determining whether a
writing is complete is the subject of an intense conflict, with
Professors Williston and Corbin heading the two sides of debate.
Both scholars agree that the "intent" of the parties should be the
70. Wallach, supra note 17, at 655.
71. Id.
72. J. CALAmARI & J. PEmLo, supra note 20, § 3-2, at 101.
73. See, e.g., id.; 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 48, § 588, at 528-29.
74. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-2, at 101-02.
75. Id. § 3-2, at 101.
76. Id.; see also 4 S. WILISTON, supra note 63, § 636; Sweet, supra note 21, at 1038.
Corbin agrees in substance but would abandon the term "partial integration" on the ground
that parties rarely intend incomplete writings to be final. 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 48, § 581,
at 441. See infra notes 119-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of the confusion sur-
rounding the terms "contradict" and "consistent" in partial integration cases.
77. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-2, at 103.
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determinative element, 78 but the two use "intent" in very dissimi-
lar ways."9 Williston stresses the appearance of the writing as de-
terminative in discerning the parties' intent;80 he argues that the
consideration of extrinsic evidence in determining the parties' in-
tent emasculates the parol evidence rule."' According to Williston,
if the writing includes a merger clause (also called an "integration"
or "entire contract" clause),8 2 then the writing is per se a total in-
tegration unless (1) the writing is obviously incomplete, (2) the
merger clause is the product of fraud or mistake, or (3) other rea-
sons exist that justify setting the contract aside.8 s If no merger
clause exists and the writing is obviously incomplete on its face or
only addresses the obligations of one party, the parties may intro-
duce consistent additional terms.8 4 If, however, the writing is ap-
parently complete on its face, despite the absence of a merger
clause, a court will treat it as a total integration unless the prof-
fered additional terms are such as might "naturally and nor-
mally"85 be made but not included in a written contract by simi-
larly situated parties.8 8 Parties always may prove the existence of
"collateral" contracts, which are separate agreements supported by
separate consideration, despite the apparent completeness of a
particular writing.8 7 Scholars have criticized Williston's approach
78. See 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 48, §§ 573-96; 4 S. WILLISTON, supra note 63, § 633.
79. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-3.
80. Wallach, supra note 17, at 659. In this respect the Williston approach resembles
the now-defunct "four corners" doctrine. Id. For a general discussion of the "four corners"
doctrine, see id. at 656-57.
81. See 4 S. WILLISTON, supra note 63, § 633, at 1014. Determining the parties' intent
through consideration of extrinsic evidence emasculates the rule because the existence of a
collateral oral agreement conclusively indicates a partial integration, leaving as the only is-
sue whether the parties made the alleged agreement. This issue presents a question of fact
for the jury and, thus, eliminates the special protection that the trial judge should give the
writing. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-3, at 104.
82. For a discussion of merger clauses and their general operation in parol evidence
cases, see generally J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 27, § 2-12; Sweet, supra note 21, at
1037, 1045; Wallach, supra note 17, at 677-78; Comment, The "Merger Clause" and the
Parol Evidence Rule, 27 TEx. L. REv. 361 (1949).
83. 4 S. WILLISTON, supra note 63, § 633, at 1014, § 634, at 1017-20; see also J.
CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-3, at 104.
84. 4 S. WILLISTON, supra note 63, § 633, at 1014-15, §§ 636, 645; see also J. CALAMARI
& J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-3, at 105.
85. See Wallach, supra note 17, at 658. This test also is known as the "reasonable
man" test. Id.; see also C. MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 216, at 441.
86. See 4 S. WILLISTON, supra note 63, 33 638-39; see also J. CALwAlI & J. PERILLO,
supra note 20, § 3-3, at 105.
87. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-3, at 105; C. MCCORMICK, supra note
26, § 211, at 431; Sweet, supra note 21, at 1038.
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and its emphasis on the writing because that approach treats the
parol evidence rule as a rule of form;"8 such treatment subordi-
nates the true intent of the parties to their legally presumed
intent.
Corbin argues that a court can never determine the true intent
of the parties by confining its attention to the parties' writing.89 He
clearly expressed his scorn for the Willistonian approach:
Since the very existence of an "integration" . . is dependent on what the
parties thereto say and do, (necessarily extrinsic to the paper instrument) at
the time they draw that instrument "in usual form," are we to continue like a
flock of sheep to beg the question at issue, even when its result is to "make a
contract for the parties," one that is vitally different from the one they made
for themselves?'"
Corbin thus plainly is concerned with ascertaining the true intent
of the parties to the writing:91 did the parties subjectively agree
that the writing was a complete statement or merely a partial
statement of their contract?9 2 A trial court adopting the Corbin
approach would look at all available extrinsic evidence to divine
the parties' true intent on the integration issue;93 it would test the
admissibility of a proffered parol term "solely by the credibility of
the party seeking to introduce the term. '94 Corbin's emphasis on
the true intent of the parties, however, "emasculates the tradi-
tional parol evidence rule"9 5 by depriving the trial judge of the "ju-
dicial trump card"' afforded by the more traditional approaches
that allow a judge to exclude suspect evidence from the jury with-
out appearing to rule on its credibility. 7 Consequently, the Corbin
approach largely eliminates the "rule of form" aspects of the rule
by denying writings the special treatment that the Willistonian ap-
proach affords them.98
88. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-3, at 108. Courts following the
Willistonian approach see the essential purpose of the parol evidence rule as protecting the
integrity of written contract. Id. § 3-3, at 107.
89. "[I]t can never be determined by mere interpretation of the words of a writing
whether it is an 'integration' of anything, whether it is 'the final and complete expression of
the agreement' or is a mere partial expression of 'the agreement.'" 3 A. CoRBIN, supra note
48, § 581, at 442.
90. Id. § 582, at 463.
91. See J. CALAMAM & J. PER LLO, supra note 20, § 3-3, at 106.
92. See Wallach, supra note 17, at 663.
93. See id. at 644.
94. Id.
95. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-3, at 106 n.45.
96. See Wallach, supra note 17, at 665.
97. See id.; see also supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
98. Wallach, supra note 17, at 664.
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Despite the criticism that the Corbin approach emasculates
the parol evidence rule, Corbin's arguments clearly have influenced
recent formulations of the rule and have resulted in a general shift
favoring attempts to ascertain the parties' true intent on the inte-
gration issue. For example, the Uniform Commercial Code's ver-
sion of the rule significantly increases the chances that the trier of
fact will consider evidence of extrinsic terms.9 9 The Code suggests
that partial integration is the norm100 by initially focusing on
whether the writing was "intended by the parties as a final expres-
sion of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included
therein .... "101 A court will bar evidence of consistent additional
terms only when it "finds the writing to have been intended also as
a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agree-
ment. ' 10 2 Furthermore, a court will deem the writing "complete
and exclusive" and bar evidence of additional terms only if the
court finds that the purported additional terms "if agreed upon,
. . . would certainly have been included in the document."10 3 This
standard for a complete integration is much narrower than Willis-
ton's "naturally and normally" test.1 04 The Code also allows evi-
dence of course of dealing, course of performance, and usage of
trade to explain or supplement the terms included in the writ-
ing,105 even when this evidence appears to contradict apparently
unambiguous terms in the writing.106
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts likewise reflects the
influence of Corbin's ideas.10 7 It provides that "a writing which in
view of its completeness and specificity reasonably appears to be a
complete agreement ... is taken to be an integrated agreement
unless it is established by other evidence that the writing did not
99. See id. at 666-67.
100. Id. at 666; see also J. CALYXAs & J. PERmLO, supra note 20, § 3-7.
101. U.C.C. § 2-202 (1977) (emphasis added); see also Wallach, supra note 17, at 666.
Note also the Code's emphasis on the parties' intent. U.C.C. § 2-202 comment 2 further
exemplifies this emphasis by stating that the object of the parol evidence process is to find
"the true understanding of the parties as to the agreement ...... Id. (emphasis added).
102. U.C.C. § 2-202(b) (1977).
103. U.C.C. § 2-202 comment 3 (1977) (emphasis added); see also J. CALAMARIU & J.
PERLLO, supra note 20, § 3-7, at 115; J. WHrrE & R. SuMMRs, supra note 27, § 2-10, at 79-
80; Wallach, supra note 17, at 667-68.
104. Wallach, supra note 17, at 668.
105. U.C.C. § 2-202(a) (1977).
106. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-7, at 115; J. WHr= & R. SuM-
msan, supra note 27, § 2-10, at 85-87; Wallach, supra note 17, at 665-66.
107. J. CALAMAR & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-3, at 109.
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constitute a final expression."1 8 The Restatement rejects the no-
tion that the writihig itself can "prove its own completeness '"' 09 and
notes that "wide latitude must be allowed for inquiry into circum-
stances bearing on the intention of the parties." 110 A court must
determine the parties' intent to integrate by looking at "all rele-
vant evidence,"' including usages of trade, course of dealing, and
course of performance; 2 even the presence of a merger clause is
not conclusive on the integration issue.113 If the alleged omitted
term is one that "in the circumstances might naturally be omitted
from the writing," a court will deem the writing a partial integra-
tion. 4 That an omission "does not seem natural," however, will
not prevent its admission "unless the court finds that the writing
was intended as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms
of the agreement." 15
The clear thrust, then, of both the Restatement (Second)1 6
and the Code 17 is to add momentum to what Williston himself
perceived as the modern trend "toward increasing liberality in the
admission of parol agreements." 1 8 By increasing the likelihood
that courts will hold writings to be partial integrations rather than
complete integrations, these more liberal formulations of the rule
not only provide a formal rationale for the admission of terms
inadmissible under form-oriented versions of the rule but also pro-
vide an increased opportunity for sub rosa judicial behavior aimed
at producing "just" results at the expense of consistent application
of the rule. Judges confronted with alleged terms that they believe
are genuine may admit such terms by finding that the parties in-
tended their writing to be only a partial integration of their agree-
ment, regardless of the writing's facial completeness. 9 Of course,
108. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 209(3) (1981).
109. Id. § 210 comment b.
110. Id.
111. Id. § 209 comment c; see id. § 210 comment b.
112. Id. § 209 comment a.
113. Id. § 209 comment b; see id. § 216 comment e.
114. Id. § 216(2)(b). A comment to this section observes that if "the omission seems
natural in the circumstances, it is not necessary to consider further the questions whether
the agreement is completely integrated and whether the omitted term is within its scope,
although factual questions may remain." Id. at comment d.
115. Id. at comment d ("[T]here is no rule or policy penalizing a party merely because
his mode of agreement does not seem natural to others.").
116. See J. CALAmAm & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-3, at 111.
117. See Wallach, supra note 17, at 666-67.
118. 4 S. WILLISTON, supra note 63, § 638, at 1045.
119. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 212, at 432-33.
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only such terms as are "consistent" with the writing are admissi-
ble, and terms which "contradict" terms in a partial integration
are never admissible.120 Whether a proffered extraneous term con-
tradicts a term contained within the writing, hoviever, is a diffi-
cult 12 ' and perhaps misleading 22 question, which itself provides
fertile ground for judicial legerdemain. Courts in numerous recent
cases have admitted evidence of extraneous terms on the grounds
of "consistency" when any meaningful application of the consis-
tency standard would dictate a different result.1
23
A brief examination of the numerous judicially-created excep-
tions to the rule's operation gives further evidence of the modern
trend toward liberality in applying the parol evidence rule and of
the confusion and inconsistency surrounding its application. 24 For
example, courts generally agree 125 that the parol evidence rule does
not apply to proof that the contract which a writing represents is
subject to a condition precedent. 2 The courts, however, should
distinguish between conditions precedent to the formation of a
contract and conditions precedent to the performance of a con-
tract. 27 Courts should admit on its own merit, rather than as an
exception, evidence that the failure of a condition precedent pre-
vented the formation of a contract since the rule only applies when
a court determines that a complete or partial contract exists. 28 On
120. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
121. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 27, § 2-10, at 81-84; Sweet, supra note
21, at 1038.
122. Professor Wigmore suggested that the only sensible inquiry concerning this as-
pect of the integration question is whether the proferred term is "additional" to the writing
in the sense that it addresses issues not touched upon in the writing. Any additional term
arguably contradicts previous terms. Parties hardly would seek to introduce extraneous
terms that would have no effect on their obligations under the writing. 9 J. WIGMORE, supra
note 8, § 2430.
123. See, e.g., Bunge Corp. v. Recker, 519 F.2d 449 (8th Cir. 1975); Hunt Foods &
Indus. v. Doliner, 26 A.D. 2d 41, 270 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1966); Recreatives, Inc. v. Travel-On
Motorcycles Co., 29 N.C. App. 727, 225 S.E.2d 637 (1976). See Wallach, supra note 17, at
669-70, 674-76, for a discussion of these cases.
124. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-3, at 110, for the allegation that
the genesis of at least some of these exceptions is "[d]issatifaction with rigid application" of
the rule.
125. Some courts, however, refuse to recognize the condition precedent exception on
the ground that such conditions "are a type of contract term and arguably should be subject
to some type of restriction on admissibility if not found in the written agreement." Wallach,
supra note 17, at 654.
126. See J. CALAmARi & J. PERmLO, supra note 20, § 3-4, at 111-12; C. MCCORMICK,
supra note 26, § 221, at 449-50.
127. See J. CALAMiAu & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-4, at 112 n.4.
128. See 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 48, § 589, at 530-32; Broude, The Consumer and the
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the other hand, the parol evidence rule should apply to conditions
precedent to the performance of a contract; a party should be al-
lowed to prove such conditions only if the writing is a partial inte-
gration and the alleged conditions merely supplement, rather than
contradict, the writing.129 Of course, any condition precedent is ar-
guably inherently inconsistent with a facially unconditional writ-
ing. Nevertheless, cases exist in which courts have admitted as
consistent conditions that plainly were "contradictory" under any
reasonable construction of the term.130 In addition, the Restate-
ment (Second) plainly rejects the "consistency" standard as it ap-
plies to conditions.131
Parties also may avoid the strictures of the parol evidence rule
by raising a variety of defenses attacking the validity of the under-
lying agreement that the writing represents. These defenses in-
clude most traditional contract defenses and constitute "a complex
set of subrules and exceptions that equals the parol evidence rule
itself in unevenness of application and confusion."13 2 Courts may
admit evidence which shows that the contract lacks considera-
tion,13 is illegal,13 4 or is voidable due to fraud, duress, undue influ-
ence, or mistake.1 3 5 Of these exceptions, the most important--not
only because significant disagreement exists concerning the scope
of the exception, but also because the exception serves as a con-
venient entree for judicial manipulation of the rule"' 6-is the ex-
ception for fraud.137 Indeed, the fraud exception could become "an
Parol Evidence Rule: Section 2-202 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 1970 DuKE L.J. 881,
891.
129. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-4, at 112; Sweet, supra note 21,
at 1040.
130. See, e.g., Williams v. Johnson, 229 A.2d 163, 166 (D.C. 1967) (allowing admission
of a condition precedent in the face of a merger clause). For a discussion of Williams and
other similar cases, see Broude, supra note 128, at 891-99.
131. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 217 comment b (1981).
132. Sweet, supra note 21, at 1039.
133. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-4, at 112; Sweet, supra note 21, at
1040.
134. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-4, at 112; C. MCCORMICK, supra
note 26, § 221, at 451.
135. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-4, at 112; C. MCCORMICK, supra
note 26, § 221, at 450-51; Sweet, supra note 21, at 1039.
136. Some scholars argue that "to circumvent the rule fraud has been found and refor-
mation has been granted in situations where these concepts are not ordinarily deemed appli-
cable." J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-3, at 110. See also Childres & Spitz,
Status in the Law of Contract, 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 26 n.118 (1972) (collecting cases in
which courts have expanded the fraud and mistake defenses to admit terms under the ex-
ception to the rule).
137. J. WHiTE & R. SUMMERs, supra note 27, § 2-11. But cf. Sweet, Promissory Fraud
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exception that swallows up the entire parol evidence rule."'3 8 Al-
though some authorities only allow proof of fraud in the execu-
tion 139 of a contract to contradict the writing, 40 a party generally
may show proof of fraud in the inducement' 4 ' even though such
proof contradicts an integration. 2 Authorities disagree about
whether to allow proof of promissory fraud141 to contradict an
integration.4
Finally, another means of access for parol evidence and source
of disagreement about the scope of the rule is the generally ac-
cepted principle that the rule does not apply to evidence aimed at
interpretation of a writing, as long as such evidence does not vary,
add to, or contradict the writing.145 This principle in effect stipu-
lates that such parol evidence is inadmissible only if the written
terms are plain, clear, and unambiguous. 4 Authorities have criti-
cized this corollary to the rule on the grounds that language is in-
herently ambiguous1 47 and that courts which profess to find the
language of a writing clear and unambiguous, of necessity, are en-
and the Parol Evidence Rule, 49 CALIF. L. REv. 877 (1961) (To term the admission of evi-
dence of fraud as an "exception" to the rule is erroneous because the rule only applies to
valid contracts.).
138. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 27, § 2-11.
139. Fraud in the execution of a contract relates to deception concerning the contents
of a writing. Sweet, supra note 137, at 888.
140. Id. at 887-88.
141. Fraud in the inducement exists when one party, by false representations, induces
the other party to enter the contract. Id. at 888.
142. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-4, at 112 n.77; 3 A. CORBIN, supra
note 48, § 580.
143. Promissory fraud consists of making a promise without intending to perform. J.
CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-4, at 112 n.77.
144. Some jurisdictions have held that a party may not prove the existence of a prom-
ise which contradicts an integration on a theory of promissory fraud. Id. A majority of juris-
dictions, however, now treat the making of promises without intent to perform as the
equivalent of a misrepresentation of fact and, thus, treat such misrepresentations like fraud
in the inducement. Id. § 9-19, at 286-87; Sweet, supra note 137, at 888-89.
145. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 26, §§ 217-20; J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra
note 27, § 2-11, at 89; Sweet, supra note 21, at 1041.
146. See Farnsworth, supra note 29, at 959.
147. "The very concept of plain meaning finds scant support in semantics, where one
of the cardinal teachings is the fallibility of language as a means of communication." Id. at
952. See Young, Equivocation in the Making of Agreements, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 619, 632
n.57 (1964), for this discussion:
Ambiguity in the sense of vagueness is the usual carte d' entrge for parol evidence, but
ambiguity in this sense is a matter of degree: "as all language will bear some different
meanings, some evidence is always admissible; the line of exclusion depends on how far
the words will stretch, and how alien is the intent they are asked to include."
Id. (quoting Eustis Mining Co. v. Beer, Sondheimer & Co., 239 F. 976, 985 (S.D.N.Y. 1917)).
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gaging in an exercise in interpretation. 148 Numerous examples of
judicial confusion about, and manipulation of, this corollary ex-
ist.149 Nonetheless, Corbin has argued that the parol evidence rule
should not apply to evidence aimed at issues of interpretation
since a court cannot know whether proffered evidence supplements
or contradicts a writing and, hence, is admissible under the rule
until it ascertains the meaning of the terms contained in the writ-
ing.1 50 Both the Restatement (Second)'5' and the Uniform Com-
mercial Code' 2 embrace Corbin's position and thereby signifi-
cantly broaden the admissibility of parol evidence offered under
the pretext of aiding the interpretive process.
Given the foregoing catalog of confusion, disagreement, and
judicial manipulation, some observers of the parol evidence rule
believe that a significant dichotomy often exists between the reali-
ties of the rule's operation and its various official formulations.
148. When a court makes the often repeated statement that the written words are
so plain and clear and unambiguous that they need no interpretation. . . it is making
an interpretation on the sole basis of the extrinsic evidence of its own linguistic experi-
ence and education, of which it merely takes judicial notice.
Corbin, supra note 20, at 189.
149. According to Corbin,
[tjhere are many court decisions, made by highly respected courts, that are inconsistent
with the repeated rule. If extrinsic evidence is admitted without objection, the trial
court is never reversed for considering it in the process of interpretation. There are
many cases, practically never subjected to criticism, in which the court has considered
extrinsic evidence as a basis for finding that the written words are ambiguous; instead
of ambiguity admitting the evidence, the evidence establishes the ambiguity. Learned
judges have often differed as to whether the written words are ambiguous, each one
sometimes asserting that his meaning is plain and clear. All that any court has to do in
order to admit relevant extrinsic evidence is to assert that the written words are ambig-
uous; this has been done in many cases in which the ordinary reader can perceive no
ambiguity until he sees the extrinsic evidence.
Id. at 161-62.
150. Id. at 188-90.
151. RESTATE zNT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 212 comment b (1981) provides:
It is sometimes said that extrinsic evidence cannot change the plain meaning of a writ-
ing, but meaning can almost never be plain except in a context. Accordingly, the rule
stated in Subsection (1) (on interpretation of integrated agreements] is not limited to
cases where it is determined that the language used is ambiguous. Any determination
of meaning or ambiguity should only be made in the light of the relevant evidence of
the situation and relations of the parties, the subject matter of the transaction, prelimi-
nary negotiations and the statements made therein, usages of trade, and the course of
dealing between the parties.
152. The actual Code provisions expressly consider only evidence relating to course of
performance, usage of trade, or course of dealing. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying
text. U.C.C. § 2-202 comment 1(c) (1972), however, says that "[t]his section definitely re-
jects" any requirement that "a condition precedent to the admissibility" of such evidence
"is an original determination by the court that the language used is ambiguous."
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Professors Calamari and Perillo observe that: "It would ... be a
mistake to suppose that the courts follow any of these rules
blindly, literally or consistently. As often as not they choose the
standard or rule that they think will give rise to a just result in the
particular case." 153 A study of the application of the parol evidence
rule, then, must attempt to pinpoint the factors that influence ju-
dicial perception about the "justice" of a particular result. One
commentator avers that "the proponent of the oral agreement will
be permitted to prove it if the trial judge thinks it likely that the
agreement was made and if there are no cogent reasons why it
should not be enforced."'" Unfortunately, since judicial manipula-
tion of the rule varies from judge to judge, the outcome of any
particular parol evidence case remains difficult to predict:
Although the outcome of a case is often correct because courts, as a rule, have
a good sense of fairness, there are cases that simply come out wrong. There
are non-result-oriented judges who mechanically follow cases phrasing the
Rule in its traditional form. Other judges, believing the Rule expresses a
sound judicial policy, may refuse to admit the testimony of the oral agree-
ment even if they believe the agreement took place and was intended to
stand.
155
Perhaps the most interesting suggestion about the realities of
the rule's operation-a suggestion that emerges from a study of
149 parol evidence cases'51e-is that an examination of the status of
the parties to the contract and the nature of their contract better
explains decisions in parol evidence cases than does the rule it-
self.1 57 The authors who conducted the study found that the
courts' application of the rule in cases concerning "informal" con-
tracts or contracts involving an abuse of the bargaining process va-
ried greatly from the application of the rule in cases involving "for-
mal" contracts.158 The authors classified as "formal" any contract
in which sophisticated parties "negotiated fairly and in detail"'
and deemed "informal" any contract between unsophisticated par-
153. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-14.
154. Sweet, supra note 21, at 1045.
155. Id. at 1046. For a discussion of a case in which a court excluded evidence of
extrinsic terms despite convincing proof of the terms' existence, see infra notes 437-39 and
accompanying text.
156. Professors Childres and Spitz conducted the study. See Childres & Spitz, supra
note 136.
157. See generally id.
158. "Precisely those factors regarded as decisive in excluding alleged oral understand-
ings in the formal contracts category were ignored by the courts when deciding cases involv-
ing informal contracts." Id. at 17.
159. Id. at 4.
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ties.160 The authors concluded that
the rule functions effectively, indeed one can almost say it only functions, in
cases assigned to the "formal contracts" category. In cases involving informal
contracts, the parol evidence rule was almost always avoided, and where the
court chose not to circumvent the rule, its decision was based on the credibil-
ity of proffered evidence, not its admissibility. As for cases in our third cate-
gory-those involving an abuse of the bargaining process-the cases indi-
cated that the parol evidence rule had no application at all with regard to the
aggrieved party.1 '
C. The Parol Evidence Rule: Criticisms and Suggestions for
Improvement.
Commentators frequently have assailed the inconsistency typi-
fying the parol evidence rule's application and the confusion and
disagreement about its underlying policy foundations. The parol
evidence rule, scholars note, is difficult to apply consistently be-
cause it is riddled with exceptions'62 and is not sufficiently self-
executing.03 The result is a rule that encourages litigation,6 "ad-
versely affect[s] both the counseling of clients and the litigation
process,"'6 5 and hurts the administratioA of justice. 6 6
Questions concerning the validity of the basic assumptions
upon which the rule obstensibly is premised have fueled the criti-
cal attack against the rule. Many feel that supporters of the rule
have exaggerated the extent to which courts would fall prey to per-
160. Id.
161. Id. at 7.
162. See Note, supra note 15, at 974.
163. The rule is not sufficiently self-executing because it does not contain any internal
test for determining the finality and completeness of a writing. Consequently, courts and
commentators are free to devise conflicting tests. Id. at 973.
164. "When any rule of law is riddled through with exceptions and applications diffi-
cult to reconcile, it is believed that litigation is stimulated rather than reduced." J.
CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-3, at 110-11.
165. Sweet, supra note 21, at 1036. Professor Sweet argues that "[t]he different poli-
cies behind the rule have varying degrees of persuasiveness in different fact situations. The
ceaseless flow of parol evidence opinions and the refusal of courts to give the real reasons for
their decisions contribute to litigation prediction difficulties." Id. at 1044.
166. As Sweet notes:
The administration of justice also suffers because of the parol evidence rule. Almost
every parol evidence case involves lengthy and often fruitless bickering on the part of
the attorneys. Much time is spent trying to unravel the intricacies of the rule. In addi-
tion, because the rule is phrased in admissibility terms, there is a substantial chance of
a reversal of trial court decisions because the rule is often as misunderstood by appel-
late courts as by trial courts.
Id. at 1047; see also Hale, The Parol Evidence Rule, 4 OR. L. REV. 91, 91 (1925) (describing
the rule as a "positive menace to the due administration of justice").
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jured testimony absent the rule. 6 " At any rate, fear of perjury does
not justify refusing to enforce the parties' entire agreement., De-
tractors of the rule further point out that modern juries are better
educated than their predecessors' 6 9 are subject to more significant
controls,170 play a lesser role in dispute settlement,' 7 ' and decide
issues of credibility in many important contexts. 72 Thus, a pri-
mary justification of the rule-the rule as a jury control de-
vice 17 -may be unsupportable.
Indeed, the merits of each of the myriad justifications offered
in support of the rule are debatable. Critics answer the argument
that the rule allows judges the convenience of excluding untrust-
worthy evidence without branding witnesses as liars,' 74 by arguing
that the price paid for this convenience is too high.1' 5 They
counter the assertion that the rule affords a degree of certainty to
written contracts which is necessary to the efficient conduct of bus-
iness,17 by observing that the assumption that businessmen need
such certainty is untested. 77 Besides, the critics note, the numer-
ous ways of avoiding the rule and the various ways in which courts
apply the rule operate to decrease the reliability of written con-
tracts."7 8 In any event, detractors feel that courts should
167. See supra notes 27-38 and accompanying text.
168. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-3, at 109-10.
169. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 216, at 441-42; J. WHirT & R. SUMMERS,
supra note 27, § 2-9, at 77-78.
170. See J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 27, § 2-9, at 77-78; Sweet, supra note 21,
at 1056; Note, supra note 15, at 987.
171. See Sweet, supra note 21, at 1054 & n.79.
172. Professor Sweet questioned whether parol evidence cases would prove any more
difficult for the jury to decide than cases concerning construction accidents, consumer inju-
ries, or gift tax cases-all areas in which the jury exercises great control. See Sweet, supra
note 21, at 1055; see also J. WHrTE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 27, § 2-9, at 75-76; Note,
supra note 15, at 985.
173. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
175. As Professor Sweet pointed out, "[p]roper issues may be missed or ignored, and
the real reasons for the decision may not be given" when judges exclude evidence from the
outset. Sweet, supra note 21, at 1057.
176. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
177. "Like most of the law's basic assumptions this one has never been tested by any
survey of the actual effects in business of the presence or absence of such assurance." See C.
MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 210. Indeed, as Professor McCormick notes, "[p]erhaps the
special protection [afforded by the rule] is no longer needed. The telephone, and the urgent
call for high speed in certain types of important transactions, such as security trading, have
accustomed businessmen to rely upon word of mouth, and dispense with the safeguard of
writing." Id. § 216, at 441-42.
178. "Because it is impossible to forecast whether or not the facts of a given transac-
tion will come within one of the exceptions or various tests of the rule, the assumption that
1404
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subordinate the goal of certainty to the goal of effectuating the
parties' actual intentions in entering into their agreement. 17 9 Addi-
tionally, critics argue that the rule's emphasis on the reliability of
written evidence is misplaced because writings may be forgeries or
otherwise inaccurate.180 They further argue that viewing the rule as
a rule of form" 1 is an unsatisfactory justification for its existence,
since the rule really has not performed the "channeling" function
that rules of form supposedly accomplish. 8 2 Finally, critics note
that treating the parol evidence rule as a rule of form, in some
cases, can extend unjustifiably the scope of the Statute of
Frauds. 83
For the purposes of determining whether the parol evidence
rule is a likely candidate for the ministrations of promissory estop-
pel, the most significant criticisms of the rule attack the rule's po-
tential for working injustice. People do enter parol agreements that
they do not include in their written agreements. To the extent that
the rule operates to bar proof of such agreements, it frustrates the
true intentions of the parties8 4 and results in courts enforcing a
contract to which neither party agreed. 85 In many instances, a
the rule is indispensable to business stability is specious." Note, supra note 15, at 983.
179. For example, Professor Sweet questions the priority of the rule's objectives:
How clear is the need to protect writings from gullible or soft hearted juries or judges?
In an era dominated by adhesion contracts, inequality of bargaining power and the
pervasive use of liability limitations and exculpations, such commercial certainty
should be subordinate to the protection of reasonable expectations. The law should be
more concerned with protecting the actual agreement of the parties than with protect-
ing [a] written agreement that appears to constitute the entire agreement.
Sweet, supra note 21, at 1056.
180. See, e.g., J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 27, § 2-9, at 77-78.
181. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
182. Indeed, "[d]espite the long existence of the parol evidence rule, contracts which
are partially written and partially oral are not uncommon." Note, supra note 15, at 983. The
same author also observes that "informal business transactions between friends or long-time
business associates are likely to involve 'understandings' between the parties that are not
reduced to writing." Id.; see also Sweet, supra note 21, at 1036, 1047.
183. Since the Statute of Frauds never has required the entire agreement to be ex-
pressed in the memorandum, the treatment of the parol evidence rule as a rule of form
effectively extends the scope of the Statute. See Sweet, supra note 21, at 1054. On the
"channeling" function of rules of form, see infra notes 402-03 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text; see also Sweet, supra note 21, at
1058; Wallach, supra note 17, at 653; Note, supra note 15, at 974.
185. One observer notes that
[s]ince parties do make oral agreements outside their written contract and do use
words in other than the usual sense, the exclusion of this evidence by the parol evi-
dence rule may force upon the parties a contract that they never intended to make.
Thus, because the parol evidence rule may exclude as much truthful testimony as it
does perjurious testimony, the rule constitutes a major source of injustice in contract
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party may rely on oral assurances that the writing's failure to re-
flect accurately all the terms of the agreement is "no problem."186
The tendency of the rule to favor unduly the party relying on the
writing1 7 may operate particularly to the detriment of consumers,
who may be unable to understand the terms of the contract even if
they actually read them.18 In any event, consumers are unlikely to
understand the significance of technical devices such as merger
clauses that they are likely to encounter in standardized form
contracts.8 9
A plethora of proposed alternatives or modifications to the pa-
rol evidence rule has arisen from the stinging criticism surrounding
the rule. Some commentators conclude that the most expeditious
way of overcoming the numerous difficulties that the rule poses is
simply to discard the rule as a relic of the past that has outlived its
original purposes and causes more problems than it solves.
190
Given the rule's long existence, such a resolution is unlikely,1 91 al-
though as Justice Holmes once observed:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was
laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds
upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply
persists from blind limitation of the past.1 92
Others propose less drastic means than complete abrogation for re-
ducing the dilemmas associated with the rule's operation. They
suggest that the party standing on the writing bear the burden of
proving its completeness and finality, 98 or that the rule operate as
law.
Note, supra note 15, at 974-75 (emphasis added). See also supra note 90 and accompanying
text.
186. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 210, at 428 n.6.
187. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 27, § 2-9, at 770-78.
188. "In most [consumer] situations, it is unlikely that the buyer will understand the
terms of the writing even if he could and did read them." Broude, supra note 128, at 906.
189. Professor McCormick notes that
[i]n certain types of relatively standardized transactions, particularly in the sale to con-
sumers of appliances such an [sic] automobiles, air-conditioners, tractors, and televi-
sion sets, it is customary for the standard preprinted form of contract or order blank to
include a clause, frequently in fine print, providing that there are no promises, warran-
ties, conditions or representations not appearing in the writing. Seldom are these provi-
sions actually read by the purchaser and even less often would he understand their
effect upon the statements and promises made by the salesman.
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 222.
190. See Note, supra note 15, at 976, 987-88.
191. "The rule ... has existed so long that its total abandonment is not likely even if
it could be shown that it is not needed." Sweet, supra note 21, at 1059.
192. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897).
193. See J. WHITE & R. SUMmErs, supra note 27, § 2-9, at 78.
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a rebuttable presumption that the writing is inclusive and final-a
presumption that a party may challenge by clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary. 1 4 Another alternative proposal is that
the rule only apply to truly integrated agreements'9" and that the
courts recognize that the number of such agreements is relatively
small.196 Some commentators have added further qualifications to
this proposal: that courts use the rule only to strike down prior
terms that directly contradict the writing,19 7 that they never use
the rule to strike down contemporaneous terms, 198 and that when
the Statute of Frauds requires written evidence of the parties'
agreement courts discard the rule entirely in favor of an inquiry
into whether a memorandum sufficient to satisfy the Statute exists.
The last qualification would leave to the jury the issue of whether
the parties indeed made the proferred prior oral agreement.199 Fi-
nally, some authorities suggest that the manner of the rule's appli-
cation should vary depending upon whether the contract in ques-
tion is "formal,"200 "informal, ' '2°1 or involves an abuse of the
bargaining process.
202
The likelihood of the parol evidence rule's continued existence
in some form or other forces consideration of whether the doctrine
of promissory estoppel properly can play a part in ameliorating
194. See Hale, supra note 166, at 122; Sweet, supra note 21, at 1061; Note, supra note
15, at 986.
195. See Sweet, supra note 21, at 1059-60, 1063. Professor Sweet says that the hall-
mark of such a contract is that the parties wrote it carefully and methodically. Sweet offers
numerous criteria for determining the existence of such a contract. Id. at 1063-67.
196. See id. at 1064.
197. See id. at 1061.
198. See id.
199. Id. at 1054.
200. See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text. Professors Childres and Spitz
suggest that the rule should find its fullest application to "formal" contracts, but even in
such cases they feel that its application should vary depending upon the nature of the prof-
fered agreement. Childres & Spitz, supra note 136, at 7-12.
201. See supra note 160 and accompanying text. Regarding "informal" contracts, the
Childres and Spitz study concludes that
[t]he reasonable expectations of the parties at the time of entering these transactions
can be reached only by shaping the parol evidence rule to an informal model, not by
forcing the informal contract to abide by a rule designed for keenly negotiated, formal
transactions. And shaping the rule for informal transactions seems to us to require
ignoring it.
Childres & Spitz, supra note 136, at 17.
202. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. In situations in which one party has
abused the bargaining process, Childres and Spitz conclude that "[a]ny person who alleges
inferior bargaining position or an abuse of bargaining power should and usually does get his
evidence to the trier of fact." Childres & Spitz, supra note 136, at 24.
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both the confusion and the potential for injustice associated with
the rule. The resolution of this issue, however, first requires an ex-
ploration of the promissory estoppel doctrine's evolution in gen-
eral, and, in particular, its evolution as a device for circumventing
the Statute of Frauds.
I. PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL-THE EVOLUTION OF THE DOCTRINE
The "bargain" theory of consideration,203 which developed
during the nineteenth century20 served to limit a promisor's liabil-
ity by denying promisees recovery for detrimental, but unbar-
gained-for, reliance on a promise.205 Courts applying this doctrine
often reached seemingly unfair results.20 6 Early twentieth century
jurists, for a multiplicity of reasons, 207 afforded more protection to
a promisee's reliance interests than their predecessors were willing
to grant.208 These jurists countered the classic response that reli-
203. According to bargain theory, the consideration given on one side of a contractual
obligation must be the "price" of the consideration given on the other side of the agreement.
G. GILMoRE, Tim DEATH OF CoNTRACT 19-21 (1974). Justice Holmes formulated the classic
statement of the bargain idea:
[I]t is the essence of a consideration, that, by the terms of the agreement, it is given
and accepted as the motive or inducement of the promise. Conversely, the promise
must be made and accepted as the conventional motive or inducement for furnishing
the consideration. The root of the whole matter is the relation of reciprocal induce-
ment, each for the other, between consideration and promise.
0. HoLus, THE COMMON LAW 230 (1963).
204. The "bargain theory" arguably did not even exist prior to the nineteenth century.
See G. GLMmoRE, supra note 203, at 19-21; see also Farnsworth, The Past of Promise: An
Historical Introduction to Contract, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 576, 577 (1969). On the develop-
ment of "pure" or "classical" contract theory in the nineteenth century, see generally L.
FRImAN, A HISTORY OF AmUmcAN LAW 244 (1973) and M. HoRwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION
OF AMmCAN LAw 160 (1977).
205. G. GILMORE, supra note 203, at 19-21.
206. See, e.g., Thorne v. Deas, 4 Johns. 84 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809) (denying the part-
owner of a sailing ship any recovery on the "gratuitous" promise of another part-owner to
secure insurance to cover the vessel on its ill-fated voyage).
207. For a detailed exposition of the socio-historical considerations relating to this
shift in judicial stance and their relevance to the evolution of "modern" contract law in
general and promissory estoppel in particular, see Metzger & Phillips, Promissory Estoppel
and the Evolution of Contract Law, 18 AM. Bus. L.J. 139, 141-58 (1980).
208. See Summers, The Doctrine of Estoppel Applied to the Statute of Frauds, 79 U.
PA. L. Rxv. 440, 448 (1931). Professor Summers argued that "the analytical and historical
schools of the past century have given way to the philosophical and sociological schools of
the present and morality has re-asserted itself in the law." Id.; see also Note, C & K Engi-
neering Contractors v. Amber Steel Co.: Promissory Estoppel and the Right to Trial by
Jury in California, 31 HASTiNGS L.J. 697, 711-12 (1980) (Promissory estoppel's extension of
liability for promises that induce reliance is consistent with other changes in modern con-
tract law that also recognize fairness as a substantive basis of contractual liability.); infra
note 213.
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ance upon gratuitous promises is unreasonable by simply noting
the common occurrence of such reliance. 209 They argued, further-
more, that the bargain theory ignored the promisor's role in induc-
ing the reliance.21 0 Allowing individuals who had made promises to
avoid all responsibility even though the promisors knew the
promises likely would induce reliance by others would countenance
a manifest injustice. Their search for a flexible doctrinal device to
"do justice" in reliance cases led these early twentieth century ju-
rists to principles of equity in general,
2 11 and equitable estoppe212
in particular.1 3
209. See Seavey, Reliance Upon Gratuitous Promises or Other Conduct, 64 HARv. L.
Rav. 913, 924-25 (1951).
210. See Henderson, Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Contract Doctrine, 78
YALE L.J. 343, 373 (1969); Seavey, supra note 209, at 925 ("[One who makes a promise
intending not to keep it misrepresents his intent and, as in other cases of deceitful misrepre-
sentation, it should not be a defense that the defendant succeeded in taking advantage of
the plaintiff's credulity.").
211. Chancellors of courts of equity traditionally had acted as the "keeper of the
king's conscience," and equity had long served to mitigate the sometimes harsh results that
otherwise would flow from the strict application of statutes or common law rules. L. FRIED-
MAN, supra note 204, at 22.
212. G. GILMORE, supra note 203, at 63-64. Equitable estoppel, or estoppel in pais, was
a well-established outgrowth of the familiar equitable maxim that "he who has committed
inequity shall not have equity." Annot., 56 A.L.R.3d 1037, 1040-41 (1974). Professor Pome-
roy outlined the classic elements of equitable estoppel:
1. There must be conduct-acts, language, or silence-amounting to a representation
or a concealment of material facts. 2. These facts must be known to the party estopped
at the time of his said conduct, or at least the circumstances must be such that knowl-
edge of them is necessarily imputed to him. 3. The truth concerning these facts must
be unknown to the other party claiming the benefit of the estoppel, at the time when
such conduct was done, and at the time when it was acted upon by him. 4. The con-
duct must be done with the intention, or at least with the expectation, that it will be
acted upon by the other party, or under such circumstances that it is both natural and
probable that it will be so acted upon .... 5. The conduct must be relied upon by the
other party, and, thus relying, he must be led to act upon it. 6. He must in fact act
upon it in such a manner as to change his position for the worse ....
3 J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 805, at 191-92 (5th ed. 1941) (empha-
sis in original). Scholars also have expressed the equitable estoppel test in terms of whether
the promisor's conduct inducing reliance was "unconscionable." See L. VOLD, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF SALES § 15, at 93 & n.62 (2d ed. 1959).
213. As Professor Gilmore noted,
[rany judges . . . were not prepared to look with stony-eyed indifference on the
plight of a plaintiff who had, to his detriment, relied on a defendant's assurances with-
out the protection of a formal contract. However, the new doctrine [the bargain theory
of consideration] precluded the judges of the 1900 crop from saying, as their predeces-
sors would have said a half-century earlier, that the "detriment" itself was "considera-
tion." They had to find a new solution, or at least, a new terminology. In such a situa-
tion the word that comes instinctively to the mind of any judge is, of course, "estoppel"
G. GILMORE, supra note 203, at 63-64.
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By preventing a person "from denying or asserting anything to
the contrary of that which by the person's own deeds, acts, or rep-
resentations, has been set forward as the truth," equitable estoppel
protected individuals relying on that party's representations.214
Equitable estoppel in its original form, however, insufficiently pro-
tected reliance interests because of certain evidentiary require-
ments. Early statements of the doctrine required the plaintiff to
prove that the defendant had actual fraudulent intent.215 Although
courts had reduced this requirement by the end of the nineteenth
century and forced plaintiffs to prove only a misrepresentation
that would "work a fraud" on them,216 a more significant limitation
remained. Traditionally, equitable estoppel applied only to misrep-
resentations of present or past facts.217 Equitable estoppel, there-
fore, was theoretically inapplicable to cases in which the promisor's
representations consisted solely of a promise of some future per-
formance.2 18 This "fact/promise" distinction was patently artifi-
cial219 and undoubtedly produced unjust results.220 Therefore, that
"a rule of promissory estoppel would develop in recognition of the
applicability of the estoppel principle to promises" was
"inevitable.
, 221
While Williston apparently was the first to use the designation
"promissory estoppel, '2 2 2 the historical origins of the doctrine lie
214. Annot., 56 A.L.R.3d 1037, 1041 (1974).
215. See Note, Statute of Frauds-The Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel and the Stat-
ute of Frauds, 66 MICH. L. REV. 170, 174 n.21 (1967).
216. See Note, Part Performance, Estoppel, and the California Statute of Frauds, 3
STAN. L. Rav. 281, 290 (1951).
217. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 210, at 376; Seavey, supra note 209, at 914.
218. See, e.g., Bank of America v. Pacific Ready-Cut Homes, Inc., 122 Cal. App. 554,
562-63, 10 P.2d 478, 482 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1932); Fiers v. Jacobson, 123 Mont. 242, 251,
211 P.2d 968, 972-73 (1949); In re Estate of Watson, 177 Misc. 308, 317, 30 N.Y.S.2d 577,
586-87 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
219. Promises concerning the future are difficult to distinguish from statements of
present or past fact, since "every statement of the future includes some statement of present
facts." See Seavey, supra note 209, at 922-23. The difficulty arises because "statements con-
cerning the future and ... promises [both] involve representations as to the present state
of mind of the speaker." Id. at 914. As Lord Bowen noted: "[Tihe state of a man's mind is
as much of a fact as the state of his digestion." Edgington v. Fitzmaurise, 29 Ch. D. 459, 483
(1885).
220. Affording protection to promisees who rely on misrepresentations of fact while
denying protection to promisees who rely on promises seems inherently unjust. See Seavey,
supra note 209, at 914.
221. Henderson, supra note 210, at 376.
222. Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Requirements and Limitations of the Doctrine, 98
U. PA. L. REv. 459, 459 n.1 (1950) (citing 1 S. WILLISTON, THE LAw OF CoNmArs § 139, at
308 (1st ed. 1920)).
1410 [Vol. 36:1383
1983] PAROL EVIDENCE RULE 1411
in a much earlier series of cases. Dean Boyer's masterful article on
the doctrine's origins223 pointed to several classes of cases in which
turn-of-the-century courts, by a variety of judicial devices-for in-
stance, by finding non-existent "bargains"--protected the promis-
ees' unbargained-for reliance, which they could not have protected
by strict application of classical contract principles. Dean Boyer
convincingly demonstrated that promissory estoppel principles af-
forded the clearest explanation for such judicial machinations.224
Dean Boyer also found historical support for promissory estoppel
principles in cases concerning gratuitous bailments,221 5 gratuitous
agency,2 2 6 waivers, 22 7 rent reductions, 228 and promises of bonuses
and pensions.229 Finally, he found numerous cases purporting to
apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel in instances in which the
doctrine's traditional elements simply were not present.230 The
223. Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Principle From Precedents: Parts I & II, 50 MICH.
L. REv. 639, 873 (1952).
224. For example, Boyer noted that in charitable subscriptions cases many courts en-
forced promisors' pledges when charitable organizations acted in reliance upon the pledges.
Id. at 644-46. While courts did this under a variety of guises, most often by trying to trans-
form the parties' relationship into a "bargain" of some sort, no bargain actually existed in
these cases under traditional contract principles. Id. at 646-49. In cases concerning oral
promises to make gifts of land, numerous courts enforced such promises-despite the ab-
sence of bargained-for consideration and the promisor's failure to satisfy the Statute of
Fraud's writing requirement-when the promisee (who was often the promisor's child) had
taken possession and had made substantial improvements to the property. See, e.g., Greiner
v. Greiner, 131 Kan. 760, 293 P. 759 (1930); Evenson v. Aamodt, 153 Minn. 14, 189 N.W. 584
(1922); Seavey v. Drake, 62 N.H. 393, 394 (1882); Reid v. Reid, 115 Okla. 58, 241 P. 797
(1925). In such cases courts surmounted the absence of bargained-for consideration problem
either by treating the promise as an executed gift or by finding that the promisee's expendi-
tures in reliance amounted to "consideration" for the promisor's promise. See Boyer, supra
note 223, at 657-62. In reliance situations courts circumvented the Statute of Frauds in the
same way they did situations involving the equitable doctrine of part performance, which
technically was applicable only to oral contracts to sell land and not to gratuitous oral
promises to deliver title. See id. at 656.
225. See, e.g., Coggs v. Bernard, 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (1703); Wheatley v. Low, 79 Eng.
Rep. 578 (1623); see generally Boyer, supra note 223, at 665-74.
226. See, e.g., Maddock v. Riggs, 106 Kan. 808, 190 P. 12 (1920); Barile v. Wright, 256
N.Y. 1, 175 N.E. 351, 245 N.Y.S. 899 (1931); Elam v. Smithdeal Realty & Ins. Co., 182 N.C.
599, 109 S.E. 632 (1921); see generally Boyer, supra note 223, at 873-83.
227. See, e.g., Zarthar v. Saliba, 282 Mass. 558, 185 N.E. 367 (1933); Parish Mfg. Corp.
v. Martin-Parry Corp., 293 Pa. 422, 143 A. 103 (1928); see generally Boyer, supra note 223,
at 888-92.
228. See, e.g., William Lindeke Land Co. v. Kalman, 190 Minn. 601, 252 N.W. 650
(1934); see generally Boyer, supra note 223, at 892-98.
229. See, e.g., Langer v. Superior Steel Corp., 105 Pa. Super. 579, 161 A. 571 (1932),
rev'd on other grounds, 318 Pa. 490, 178 A. 490 (1935); see generally Boyer, supra note 223,
at 883-88.
230. See, e.g., Ricketts v. Scothorn, 57 Neb. 51, 77 N.W. 365 (1898).
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California Supreme Court significantly advanced this tendency to
broaden the application of equitable estoppel when in Seymour v.
Oelrichs231 the court barred an employer-promisor's Statute of
Frauds defense to a ten-year oral employment contract because of
the employer's oral promise to reduce the contract to written form.
Additional support for the promissory estoppel principle came
in a series of cases that the New York Court of Appeals decided
during Justice Cardozo's tenure. In these cases the court took an
"expansive" view of contract; 32 the court found "consideration"
when none really existed under "bargain" principles,233 supplied
missing contractual terms,23 4 implied promises in the absence of
express promises,23 5 and enforced charitable pledges in part on
promissory estoppel grounds.3 8 In each of these cases the court
protected the reliance interests of promisees in situations in which
strict application of classical contract principles would operate to
deny recovery.
The widespread de facto and de jure recognition of promis-
sory estoppel motivated the authors of the Restatement of Con-
tracts to grant the doctrine formal recognition in section 90:237 "A
promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce ac-
tion or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the
part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbear-
ance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of
the promise."28 The language of section 90 represents a clear de-
parture from the traditional elements of equitable estoppel.2 39 A
promisee's reliance on a "promise" triggers the operation of section
90 without the promisee showing any misrepresentation of fact.40
Nonetheless, the section covers only promises likely to induce reli-
231. 155 Cal. 782, 106 P. 88 (1909). For a discussion of the case, see infra notes 356-61
and accompanying text.
232. See G. GiLMoRE, supra note 203, at 62, for a discussion of these cases.
233. See, e.g., De Cicco v. Schweizer, 221 N.Y. 431, 117 N.E. 807 (1917).
234. See, e.g., Cohen & Sons, Inc. v. Lurie Woolen Co., 232 N.Y. 112, 133 N.E. 370
(1921).
235. See, e.g., Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214 (1917).
236. See, e.g., Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua Bank, 246 N.Y. 369, 159 N.E.
173 (1927).
237. See G. GiLmMoP, supra note 203, at 63-64, for an account of the incorporation of §
90 into the Restatement. Gilmore contends that Professor Corbin essentially forced the
other authors to include § 90 by citing the numerous cases in which the courts imposed
promissory liability in the absence of bargained-for consideration. Id.
238. RESTATEmENT OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932).
239. See supra note 212.
240. See supra notes 217-20 and accompanying text.
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ance of a "definite and substantial character." Courts determine
the definiteness and substantiality of reliance from the viewpoint
of the promisor's reasonable expectations at the time the promise
was made.24 1 Whether, given the circumstances then known to him,
the promisor reasonably should have expected the promise to in-
duce significant reliance is the issue for the court's determination.
While this objective test focuses on the promisor, section 90 analy-
sis also inherently involves an inquiry into the reasonableness of
the promisee's reliance.2"2 Even given the existence of such a prom-
ise, section 90 only applies when the promisor's statements result
in significant reliance. Furthermore, the reasonableness inquiry
necessarily includes a judgment about the fairness of the result the
promisee seeks.24 ' The section specifically articulates this latter
consideration in its insistence that enforcement of a promise is
proper only when "injustice" would result from nonenforcement.
While this element expressly focuses only on the effect that nonen-
forcement will have on the promisee,2 " the court impliedly consid-
ers the promisor's position in determining whether his promise was
likely to induce substantial reliance by the promisee.4 5
Express recognition of the promissory estoppel principle in
section 90, however, was not sufficient to effect an immediate in-
corporation of the newly articulated doctrine into the general body
of law. For example, a few relatively recent cases exist in which the
court required proof of elements properly associated with equitable
estoppel before applying promissory estoppel principles.24 6 Some of
these cases may result from judicial confusion2 47 or conserva-
241. See Boyer, supra note 222, at 461.
242. Plainly, the courts rarely, if ever, would hold a promisor to "reasonably expect"
unreasonable reliance by his promisee. A comment to the Restatement (Second) version of
§ 90 notes that "the reasonableness of the promisee's reliance" is a factor for courts to
consider in determining whether enforcement of the promisor's promise is necessary "to
avoid injustice." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 comment b (1981).
243. See Boyer, supra note 222, at 475. A court is unlikely to believe that enforcement
of a promise is necessary to avoid injustice if the reliance upon it has been insubstantial. Id.
244. See id. at 485.
245. See supra note 241 and accompanying text. Arguably, a court could justify any
hardship that it imposed on the promisor by enforcing his promise since the promisor
should have foreseen the promisee's reliance. See Boyer, supra note 222, at 461-62, 485.
246. See, e.g., Sacred Heart Farmers Coop. Elevator v. Johnson, 305 Minn. 324, 232
N.W.2d 921 (1975); Skillman v. Lynch, 74 S.D. 212, 50 N.W.2d 641 (1951); see also Hender-
son, supra note 210, at 377 n.192 (collecting cases).
247. See Note, Estoppel and the Statute of Frauds, 26 KAN. L. REv. 327, 329-30
(1978) ("The two doctrines [equitable and promissory estoppel] are . . . so similar that




tism,24s but many undoubtedly reflect legitimate judicial concerns
about the potential effects of the doctrine's application. After all,
in classical contract doctrine, gratuitous promises were among
those least deserving of judicial protection.249 Some of the judicial
resistance that promissory estoppel has encountered may stem
from judicial doubts concerning the reasonableness of unbar-
gained-for reliance in bargain situations. 50
This latter concern for the unbridled use of the reliance doc-
trine in bargain contexts played at least a sub rosa role in the first
major restraint that the courts imposed on the application of sec-
tion 90-the inapplicability of the section to cases involving "com-
mercial" (bargained for) promises. Judge Learned Hand's 1933
opinion in James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Brothers, Inc.2 51 firmly es-
tablished this restraint for the next quarter-century. Judge Hand
concluded that promissory estoppel did not apply to promises or
offers contemplating a bargained-for exchange; such promises
would become enforceable only when the promisee gave the bar-
gained-for consideration. Promissory estoppel, he reasoned, would
not apply in such situations because it applied only to purely
"donative" promises for which the promisor never had anticipated
receiving any exchange of consideration.52
While this restricted view of promissory estoppel found histor-
ical support in the gratuitous promise cases in which courts first
applied the doctrine's principles253 and in the knowledge that such
cases were apparently the sole concern of the authors of the Re-
statement when they drafted section 90,25 several considerations
conspired to extend promissory estoppel beyond its role as a "con-
248. "The failure of the courts to adequately distinguish promissory estoppel from ei-
ther equitable estoppel or part performance is due to the fact that equitable estoppel and
part performance are much more established in the law, and courts are loath to establish
new exceptions." Note, Promissory Estoppel as a Means of Defeating the Statute of
Frauds, 44 FORDHAM L. RPv. 114, 120 n.53 (1975).
249. See Henderson, supra note 210, at 346.
250. See id. at 360.
251. 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933). The James Baird case concerned a subcontractor-
defendant seeking to revoke its bid to supply materials for a construction project on the
grounds of an alleged mistake after the plaintiff general contractor relied upon the subcon-
tractor's bid by incorporating it into the general contractor's own bid on the prime contract.
For a more complete discussion of James Baird, see Boyer, supra note 222, at 491-93.
252. 64 F.2d at 346.
253. • See supra notes 224-29 and accompanying text.
254. See Henderson, supra note 210, at 345 ("The proceedings leading to the drafting
of Section 90... evidence concern solely with justifiable detrimental reliance on promises
for which no agreed equivalent has been asked or tendered.").
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sideration substitute" in donative promise cases.255 Section 90's
language e56 did not-either expressly257 or implicitly25 5-bar the
principle's application in the bargain context. Furthermore, and
perhaps most importantly, injustice was as predictable a conse-
quence of reliance in the bargain context as it was in situations
concerning donative promises.259 These factors, and the inherently
expansionist nature of the reliance principle,260 combined to make
the eventual extension of promissory estoppel into the bargain
context a foregone conclusion. Promissory estoppel finally entered
into the bargain context in another subcontractor bid case, Dren-
nan v. Star Paving Co.261 In Drennan, Chief Justice Traynor
bridged the gap between the donative promise and bargain realms
by first implying a promise on a subcontractor's part not to revoke
its bid due to the general contractor's foreseeable and unavoidable
reliance on it, and then by invoking section 90 to prevent the revo-
cation of this implied subsidiary promise.8 2 The result in Drennan
since has gained general acceptance in the courts63 and received
the official sanction of the Restatement (Second).2 "
Another major source of judicial resistance to promissory es-
255. See J. CAL~mu & J. PERmLO, supra note 20, § 6-7; see also Note, Promissory
Estoppel and the Statute of Frauds in California, 66 CALiF. L. Rav. 1219, 1222-23 (1978).
256. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
257. See Boyer, supra note 222, at 492.
258. See id.; see also Note, Promissory Estoppel, Equitable Estoppel and the Farmer
as a Merchant: The 1973 Grain Cases and the U.C.C. Statute of Frauds, 1977 UTAH L. Rv.
59, 82 ("To say that reliance can serve as a basis for enforcing gratuitous promises does not
exclude the use of reliance to enforce promises in other contexts.").
259. "Injustice can result where a gratuitous promise is given in connection with a
commercial transaction as easily as it can in the instance of a charitable subscription."
Boyer, supra note 222, at 492-93.
260. Observers have argued that the reliance principle and the bargain theory of con-
sideration are not only inherently contradictory, but also ultimately may be mutually exclu-
sive. See G. GIMoRE, supra note 203, at 61 ("The one thing that is clear is that these two
contradictory propositions cannot live comfortably together: in the end one must swallow
the other up.").
261. 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958). A few cases prior to Drennan departed from
the James Baird rule, but without the influential effect of Justice Traynor's decision in
Drennan. See, e.g., Robert Gordon, Inc. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 117 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1941);
Northwestern Eng'g Co. v. Ellerman, 69 S.D. 397, 10 N.W.2d 879 (1943).
262. 51 Cal. 2d at 414, 333 P.2d at 760. For a fuller analysis of Drennan, see Hender-
son, supra note 210, at 355-56.
263. See, e.g., Lyon Metal Prods., Inc. v. Hagerman Constr. Corp., 391 N.E.2d 1152,
1154-55 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979); E.A. Coronis Assocs. v. M. Gordon Constr. Co., 90 N.J. Super.
69, 216 A.2d 246 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1966); see also Note, supra note 208, at 713
(Promissory estoppel "has grown from a rule which originally was thought to cover only
purely gratuitous promises to a rule potentially applicable in commercial dealings.").
264. See RzSTATEm&NT (SEcoND) OF CoNTRACTs § 87(2) & illustration 6 (1981).
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toppel stemmed from the fear that, in some cases, the doctrine
might work an unfair hardship on promisors. 6 5 This fear largely is
due to the uncertainty in determining the proper measure of dam-
ages in promissory estoppel cases. Courts generally agree that
promissory estoppel will not support recovery when quantum me-
ruit recovery of a promisee's restitution interest alone266 would
prevent injustice. The justification for this stance is attributable to
the traditional rule that equitable relief is available only when no
adequate remedy at law exists267 and to the notion that no further
enforcement of a promisor's promise is necessary to avoid injustice
if the court fairly can place the promisee in status quo.265 Often,
however, a restitutionary recovery will be inadequate because the
value to the promisor of the promisee's reliance will be signifi-
cantly less than the promisee's losses resulting from his reliance.2
In such situations courts generally fully enforce the promisor's
promise and award expectation damages 27 0 even though the raison
d'etre of promissory estoppel is to protect promisees' reliance in-
terests. 271 Section 90, which makes promises that meet its criteria
"binding" and tries to avoid injustice through the "enforcement of
the promise,"2 2predictably supports the award of expectation
damages. Fully enforcing the promisor's promise also is consonant
with the traditional view that promissory estoppel is essentially
contractual in nature, serving to provide the missing elements
needed to create a binding contract.27 3 Traditionally, courts view
265. See Boyer, supra note 222, at 489; Note, supra note 255, at 1245; infra notes 278-
81 and accompanying text.
266. A promisee's restitution interest is equal to the value his reliance has conferred
upon the promisor. See Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46
YALE L.J. 52, 53-54 (1936).
267. See Note, Equitable Estoppel and the Statute of Frauds in California, 53 CALns.
L. REV. 590, 601 (1965).
268. See Boyer, supra note 222, at 485.
269. See id. at 486.
270. Expectation damages attempt to put plaintiffs in the position that they would be
in if the defaulting party had performed the contract. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 266,
at 54.
271. A promisee's reliance interest equals the value of his actual change in position in
anticipation of the promisor's performance. The objective that granting a reliance-based re-
covery serves is to return the promisee to the position he was in before the promisor made
his promise. Id.
272. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
273. See, e.g., Note, supra note 248, at 126 (Promissory estoppel's role as a "considera-
tion substitute" theoretically justifies an expectation award.). Williston apparently believed
that an expectation award was the only proper measure of recovery in promissory estoppel
cases. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 266, at 64 & n.14.
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reliance damages as a creature of tort law27 4 while they view resti-
tutionary or expectation awards as contractual remedies.7 6 Finally,
in some cases a reliance-based award would not compensate ade-
quately the promisee for his injuries, '7  while full enforcement of




The "all or nothing" approach to damages in promissory es-
toppel cases-granting full expectation recovery to promisees at
one end of the spectrum while restricting promisees at the other
end to a restitutionary recovery-undoubtedly can produce unjust
results.278 For example, if the value of the promisor's full perform-
ance greatly exceeds the promisee's reliance losses, then injustice
will result since the promisor experiences more harm from full en-
forcement than the promisee encounters from non-enforcement.7 9
This potential for injustice suggests that a reliance-based recovery
may be more appropriate in some promissory estoppel cases;
s°
several courts that have disregarded the traditional damage theory
employ such a situation-sensitive approach.8 1
The conceptual difficulties associated with awarding full ex-
pectation damages in promissory estoppel cases are especially ap-
parent in the recent and highly controversial extension of promis-
sory estoppel into the context of contract • negotiations.
Traditionally, courts would enforce only genuine promises by using
promissory estoppel principles.282  Indefinite 2 8  or illusory28
4
promises, scholars felt, were improper subjects for the doctrine's
274. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 266, at 90 n.61. Fuller and Perdue conclude,
however, that reliance always has been an element of contract damages. Id. at 89-96.
275. See id.; see also Note, supra note 255, at 1245.
276. See Note, supra note 248, at 128-29.
277. Boyer, supra note 223, at 664.
278. See Boyer, supra note 222, at 487.
279. See id. at 489.
280. See id. at 497.
281. For example, the Wisconsin Supreme Couit has concluded that "[w]here damages
are awarded in promissory estoppel instead of specifically enforcing the promisor's promise,
they should only be such as in the opinion of the court are necessary to prevent injustice.
Mechanical or rule-of-thumb approaches to the damage problem should be avoided." Hoff-
man v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 26 Wis. 2d 683, 701, 133 N.W.2d 267, 276 (1965); see also
Goodman v. Dicker, 169 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W.2d 93, 97
(Tex. 1965).
282. See Spooner v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 47 Wash. 2d 454, 287 P.2d 735 (1955); see
also Henderson, supra note 210, at 361.
283. See, e.g., Perlin v. Board of Educ., 86 IlM. App. 3d 108, 114, 407 N.E.2d 792, 798
(1980); Malaker Corp. Stockholders Protective Comm. v. First Jersey Nat'l Bank, 163 N.J.
Super. 463, 479, 395 A.2d 222, 230 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978); Boddy v. Gray, 497
S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
284. See, e.g., 1A A. CoRBN, CORBmN ON CONTRACTS § 201 (1963) (Section 90 does not
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application because a promise capable of enforcement did not exist
in either situation. Clearly, application of promissory estoppel
principles to such cases would depart from promissory estoppel's
more traditional "consideration substitute" role. Furthermore,
such an extension of the doctrine would be inconsistent with the
traditional principles of offer and acceptance. The primary thrust
of these principles is "to guarantee parties seeking an exchange ex-
tensive freedom to express, or to refuse to express, a willingness to
be bound, 2 85 and "to insure that, in most instances, obligation at-
taches only when it has been deliberately undertaken. '2 26 Nonethe-
less, given the tendency of twentieth century jurists to seek "just"
results, 28 7 the general trend "toward a fuller and wider securing of
interests and hence toward a wider and fuller enforcement of
promises, "2' s and the ease of application of the broadly formulated
reliance principle of section 90,29 that courts ultimately applied
promissory estoppel principles in the negotiation context is not
surprising.
The most famous example2 90 of promissory estoppel's exten-
sion into the area of contract negotiations is the Wisconsin Su-
apply to illusory promises since reliance can not transform such a promise into a true
promise.).
285. Henderson, supra note 210, at 357.
286. Id. at 358.
287. See supra notes 207-13 and accompanying text.
288. See Pound, Consideration in Equity, 13 ILL. L. REV. 667, 679 (1918).
289. See Henderson, supra note 210, at 353-54. Professor Henderson notes that
[b]ecause of the flexibility which results from the generalized phrasing of the doctrine,
many courts have apparently concluded that cases can be decided more easily by the
use of promissory estoppel than by consideration rules .... The broad language of
Section 90 also enables courts to avoid struggling with the more unintelligible aspects
of consideration doctrine, such as the so-called requirement of 'mutuality of obligation.'
Id.
290. For another example of the doctrine's extension into the negotiation context, see
Wheeler v. White, 385 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964), rev'd, 398 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. 1965).
In Wheeler the court allowed a plaintiff, who tore down an existing rental property in reli-
ance upon the defendant's promise either to secure financing for improvements upon the
plaintiff's real property or to provide the financing himself if none was availablo from third
parties, to recover damages based on his reliance losses. The court based its decision on
promissory estoppel despite the defendant's argument that the plaintiff's promise was too
indefinite to be enforceable-an argument that both the trial court and the intermediate
appellate court had accepted. See also Associated Tabulating Servs., Inc. v. Olympic Life
Ins. Co., 414 F.2d 1306, 1310-11 (5th Cir. 1969); Hunter v. Hayes, 533 P.2d 952, 953 (Colo.




preme Court's Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc.291 decision. The
plaintiff in Hoffman sought a Red Owl franchise store and, in reli-
ance on the defendant's promise that it ultimately would grant a
franchise, sold his bakery at a loss, bought a small grocery to gain
experience in the grocery business, moved his family, and bought
an option on a site for the franchised store. The parties never con-
summated the proposed deal. When Hoffman filed suit Red Owl
argued that no contract existed between the parties because the
parties never reached agreement on the essential terms governing
the proposed franchise relationship. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
concurred with Red Owl's argument that the parties had not cre-
ated a contract in the traditional sense of the term, but allowed
Hoffman to recover a reliance-based award 92 under the theory of
promissory estoppel. In the process, the court observed that "it
would be a mistake to regard an action grounded on promissory
estoppel as the equivalent of a breach-of-contract action," 93 and
noted that nothing in the language of section 90 required a prom-
ise serving as the basis of promissory estoppel to be "so compre-
hensive in scope as to meet the requirements of an offer."'
The above-quoted language from Hoffman certainly suggests
that promissory estoppel may be evolving into a theory of recovery
independent of contract 295-a proposition with profound implica-
tions for rules of form such as the parol evidence rule.2 ' Numerous
observers have argued that the reliance principle properly resides
outside the framework of contract; these observers have character-
ized it as a creature of tort law,297 as a separate theory of recovery
distinct from tort or contract,29 8 as a hybrid between tort and con-
291. 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965). For more extensive discussions of Hoff-
man, see Henderson, supra note 210, at 358-60, and Note, Contracts: Reliance Losses:
Promissory Estoppel as a Basis of Recovery of Breach for Agreement to Agree, Hoffman v.
Red Owl Stores, Inc., 51 CORNELL L.Q. 351 (1966).
292. See supra note 281.
293. 26 Wis. 2d at 698, 133 N.W.2d at 275.
294. Id.
295. See Henderson, supra note 210, at 359. Henderson, however, later concludes that
promissory estoppel is contractual in nature. Id. at 378.
296. See infra note 434 and accompanying text.
297. Professor Seavey notes that
[e]stoppel is basically a tort doctrine and the rationale of ... [§ 90] is that justice
requires the defendant to pay for the harm caused by foreseeable reliance upon the
performance of his promise. The wrong is not primarily in depriving the plaintiff of his
promised reward but in causing the plaintiff to change position to his detriment.
Seavey, supra note 209, at 926.
298. See Beale, Gratuitous Undertakings, 5 HARv. L. Rav. 222, 225 (1891); Note,
Promissory Estoppel-The Basis of a Cause of Action Which is Neither Contract, Tort or
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tract,299 and as an "anti-contract"300 doctrine that "may ultimately
provide the doctrinal justification for the fusing of contract and
tort in a unified theory of civil obligation." ' 1 Other Hoffman ex-
planations, however, continue to place the promissory estoppel
doctrine within the traditional contract framework. Arguably,
Hoffman merely allows the reliance that promissory estoppel pro-
tects to "substitute for" the offer and acceptance which traditional
contract theory requires, in the same way that reliance substituted
for consideration in the early donative promise cases.302 Some com-
mentators have asserted that Hoffman represents an extension of
the concept of "good faith"303 beyond the performance and en-
forcement areas and into the context of contract negotiations.
304
Allowing promissory estoppel to impose liability in the absence of
the definite expressions of mutual intent to contract, which have
been the sine qua non of classical contract liability, however,
weakens the argument that the situation involves contract law in
the traditional sense of that term.30 5 Furthermore, support for the
proposition that promissory estoppel is evolving into a non-con-
tractual theory of recovery appears in several post-Hoffman cases
that seem to treat estoppel as a basis of liability independent of
Quasi-Contract, 40 Mo. L. REv. 163 (1975).
299. See Shattuck, Gratuitous Promises-A New Writ?, 35 MICH. L. REv. 908, 942
(1937).
300. See G. GILMORE, supra note 203, at 61.
301. Id. at 90.
302. See Metzger & Phillips, supra note 207, at 173. Of course, since the application of
promissory estoppel to donative promise cases dispenses with the element of bargain, even
this limited application of promissory estoppel is a departure from traditional contract doc-
trine. See Annot., 115 A.L.R. 152, 154 (1938).
303. Authorities have recognized expressly the "good faith" requirement in § 1-203 of
the Uniform Commercial Code and in § 205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.
Both of these provisions, however, concern good faith in the performance or enforcement of
contracts; the provisions do not consider expressly good faith in contract formation. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTs § 205 comment c (1981).
304. See Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195, 223 (1968); see also Fuller, Consider-
ation and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REv. 799, 811 (1941).
305. See Metzger & Phillips, supra note 207, at 186. For a case in which promissory
estoppel serves as a substitute for a proper acceptance, see N. Litterio & Co. v. Glassman
Constr. Co., 319 F.2d 736, 738-40 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
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contract laws "a and in the nontraditional approach to damages that
some promissory estoppel casess07 and the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts305take.
Regardless of the outcome on the independent theory debate,
two observations about the promissory estoppel doctrine seem un-
deniable. First, promissory estoppel has developed well beyond its
origins and, in doing so, has gone well beyond classical contract
theory. Second, the expansionist nature of the reliance principle
and the general tendency of modern courts to seek "just" results
suggest that further expansions of the promissory estoppel princi-
ple are likely. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts certainly
has encouraged wider acceptance of the various applications of
promissory estoppel. The new version of section 90,09 for example,
deletes the requirement that the reliance be of a "definite and sub-
stantial character."310 Instead, a comment to the new section 90
expressly directs courts to consider, among other things, the rea-
sonableness of the promisee's reliance,311 its substantiality in rela-
tion to the remedy he seeks, the formality surrounding the prom-
ise's formation, and the extant evidence of the promise's existence
306. See, e.g., Debron Corp. v. National Homes Constr. Corp., 493 F.2d 352 (8th Cir.
1974). In Debron a contractor's acceptance varied the terms of a subcontractor's bid. The
contractor voluntarily dismissed the contract portion of its claim before trial and the court
allowed it to proceed solely on its estoppel claim. The court held that promissory estoppel
could serve as the basis for a separate cause of action in which proof of all of the elements
required in a breach of contract action would be unnecessary. See id. at 357; see also Allen
v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 606 F.2d 84, 87 (5th Cir. 1979); Northwestern Bank of Com-
merce v. Employers' Life Ins. Co. of Am., 281 N.W.2d 164 (Minn. 1979).
307. See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
308. See infra notes 315-17 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, the drafters of the
Restatement (Second) apparently still view promissory estoppel as a contract law doctrine.
The drafters include § 90 under the heading "Contracts Without Consideration," and a
comment to the section notes that "[a] promise binding under this section is a contract.
." REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF CoNTAcTs § 90 comment d (1981).
309. RESTATEMENT (ScoNND) OF CONRACTS § 90 (1981) provides:
(1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action to forbear-
ance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action
or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the prom-
ise. The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.
Id. For a complete discussion of this new version of § 90, see generally Knapp, supra note 5.
310. See supra note 238 and accompanying text. One authority suggests that the
drafters deleted this language to accommodate partial enforcement of promises in promis-
sory estoppel cases. See Knapp, supra note 5, at 58.
311. This concern about the reasonableness of the promisee's reliance was already an
inherent part of the original section's requirement that the promisor foresee the likelihood
of definite and substantial reliance upon his promise. See supra note 242 and accompanying
text.
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in deciding whether to grant enforcement.312 In addition, the new
section 90 adds no requirement that the promise inducing reliance
be so definite as to be enforceable as a contract, despite the stir
that Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores created.13 Indeed, an illustration
accompanying the new section expressly sanctions the Hoffman re-
sult. 14 More importantly, by expressly stating that the remedy
under the section "may be limited as justice requires, ' 31 5 the draft-
ers specifically have sanctioned an award of reliance-based dam-
ages in promissory estoppel cases when such an award is necessary
to avoid injustice to promisors.318 The drafters thus have removed
a significant stumbling block to broader judicial acceptance of the
reliance principle.1 7
IV. PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AND THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
A. The Statute of Frauds
The British Parliament passed the original Statute of
Frauds"" when the law of contract was in its infancyS 9 and when a
primitive law of evidence excluded the testimony of persons with
an interest in the outcome of the case.320 Since the evidentiary rule
prevented even parties to the case from testifying, a significant
danger existed that the courts would impose contract liability on
defendants for contractual obligations to which they never had as-
sented. 21 That courts of the era had minimal control over jury ver-
dicts and jurors were free to disregard the evidence and rule in
accordance with their own knowledge of the facts exacerbated this
danger.3 22 Thus, Parliament sought to achieve two goals when it
passed the original Statute in 1677:323 the protection of defendants
312. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 comment b (1981).
313. See supra notes 291-304 and accompanying text.
314. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 comment d, illustration 10 (1981).
315. See supra note 309.
316. See supra notes 278-79 and accompanying text. A comment to the section, how-
ever, indicates that while "relief may sometimes be limited to restitution or to damages or
specific relief measured by the extent of the promisee's reliance," "full-scale enforcement by
normal remedies is often appropriate." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 comment
d (1981).
317. See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
318. An Act for Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries, 1677, 29 Car. 2, ch.3.
319. Summers, supra note 208, at 441.
320. 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 387-89 (1924).
321. Summers, supra note 208, at 441; see also Willis, The Statute of Frauds-A Le-
gal Anachronism, 3 IND. L.J. 427, 430 (1928).
322. 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 320, at 388.
323. See generally Costigan, The Date and Authorship of the Statute of Frauds, 26
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from perjured testimony3 24 and the placement of a "curb [on] the
power of the juries. 3 25 The means that Parliament chose to attain
these ends was a writing requirement for certain classes of contrac-
tual obligations. 26
Almost from its inception, scholars have subjected the Statute
to virulent criticism. These detractors have argued that the Statute
generates as many "frauds and perjuries" as it prevents.32 7 They
also have castigated the Statute as the source of endless litiga-
tion. 28 Commentators also frequently suggest that modern devel-
opments in the law of contracts3 29 and evidence,330 when combined
with the substantial control that modern courts can exercise over
jury verdicts,3 31 have eclipsed the major reasons for the Statute's
enactment and have rendered it a proper subject for repeal.3 2
The most telling complaints about the Statute's operation,
however, have focused on its potential for working injustice. The
parties to an oral agreement within the ambit of the Statute may
be ignorant of the Statute's existence or of its relevance to their
transaction. 33 Their consequent failure to reduce their agreement
HARV. L. REV. 329 (1913) (noting the uncertainty surrounding the authorship and the date
of enactment of the Statute). For an amusing account of one of the early cases that reput-
edly moved Parliament to take action, see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 27, § 2-1.
324. See Summers, supra note 208, at 441.
325. See id. at 458; see also Costigan, supra note 323, at 343.
326. The most important types of obligations requiring written evidence were con-
tracts concerning an interest in land (except leases not exceeding three years in length),
promises by an executor or administrator to answer for a decedent's debts out of his per-
sonal estate, promises by persons to pay for the debts of another, contracts made on consid-
eration of marriage, bilateral contracts not capable of execution within one year of their
making, and contracts for the sale of goods of a value exceeding ten pounds. See generally 6
W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 320, at 384-87.
327. See, e.g., Child v. Godolphin, 21 Eng. Rep. 181 (1723); Stephen & Pollock, Sec-
tion Seventeen of the Statute of Frauds, 1 L.Q. REV. 1 (1885); Sunderland, A Statute for
Promoting Fraud, 16 COLUM. L. REV. 273 (1916).
328. "There is no other statute that has been the source of so much litigation." J.
SMITH, THE LAW OF FRAUDS 327 (1907).
329. See Willis, supra note 321, at 431.
330. Some authorities have characterized § 17 of the original Statute [the sale of goods
provision] as "a relic of times when the best evidence on such subjects was excluded on a
principle now exploded." Stephen & Pollock, supra note 327, at 6.
331. Professor Willis notes that "with the control exercised by the courts over juries in
modern times the danger that juries will hold people liable on promises they never made is
better protected by such court control than by a Statute of Frauds." Willis, supra note 321,
at 430. Cf. supra notes 169-73 and accompanying text (parol evidence context).
332. Justice Stephen, speaking of the sale of goods provision of the original Statute,
observed that "it should be thrown out of the window. . . the 17th section should be re-
pealed, and the cases upon it be consigned to oblivion." Stephen & Pollock, supra note 327,
at 5.
333. Justice Stephen noted that, despite the Statute's long tenure, "[i]n the great
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to written form, therefore, may operate to preclude proof of the
bona fide agreement that they actually made.334 Indeed, defen-
dants in modern times use the Statute to defend against agree-
ments that they voluntarily assumed much more frequently than
they use it to disprove fictitious agreements that perjurious plain-
tiffs fabricate.3 s5 These negative effects of the Statute have gener-
ated suggestions that the Statute's writing requirement is ill-suited
to its avowed purpose of preventing fraud336 and that courts should
utilize other, more satisfactory, devices in grappling with the evi-
dentiary problems inherent in oral agreements.37
The Statute, while it retains considerable vitality, has not
emerged unscathed in the face of such continuing criticism. Recent
versions of the Statute, in particular section 2-201 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, have made significant attempts at reducing its
potential for fraud," 8 and courts have reacted to the Statute's po-
tential for injustice by carving out numerous "exceptions" to its
operation 3 9 under the guise of statutory "interpretation." Such ju-
mass of cases the contracting party is as unconscious of the existence of the Statute of
Frauds as of the pressure of the atmosphere." Id. at 3.
334. See Willis, supra note 321, at 539; see also Stephen & Pollock, supra note 327, at
3.
335. Professors White and Summers note that
[t]he possibility that plaintiffs [might] conjure up forged writings and perjured oral
contracts out of whole cloth is unreal. These plaintiffs would be most unlikely to sur-
vive cross-examination, motions for directed verdict, and a jury's own scrutiny. But the
possibility that defendants might get out of actual contracts simply for lack of a signed
writing is not unreal at all.
J. WHTE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 27, § 2-8, at 74; see also Note, supra note 267, at 591.
For a classic judicial response to such a use of the Statute, see Chief Judge Campbell's
statement in Sivewright v. Archibald, 20 L.J.Q.B. (n.s.) 529, 536 (1851):
I regret to say that the view which I take of the law in this case compels me to come to
the conclusion that the defendant is entitled to our judgement, although the merits are
entirely against him; although, believing that he had broke his contract, he could only
have defended the action in the hope of mitigating the damages, and although he was
not aware of the objection on which he now relies till within a few days before the trial.
336. "A true 'means to an end' surely should not serve commonly as a means to dis-
serve that end. . . . Yet, centuries of experience and tons of case law testify that a statute
of frauds can be an instrument of perjury and fraud." J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note
27, § 2-8, at 74.
337. See, e.g., Summers, supra note 208, at 464 (hold plaintiffs seeking to prove the
existence of oral contracts to the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof); Note,
supra note 267, at 609 (require defendants to deny the existence of an oral contract under
oath as a precondition of raising the Statute as a defense).
338. Corbin, The Uniform Commercial Code-Sales; Should It Be Enacted?, 59 YALE
L.J. 821, 829 (1950). For a detailed exposition of this aspect of § 2-201, see Metzger &
Phillips, Promissory Estoppel and Section 2-201 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 26 ViLL.
L. REV. 63, 69-74 (1980-1981).
339. These exceptions include the part performance doctrine, quasi-contract, fraud,
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dicial incursions on the Statute's province have been so substantial
that one legal historian claimed that "[i]n one sense, the statute of
frauds [is] hardly a statute at all. It [is] so heavily warped by 'in-
terpretation' that it [has] become little more than a set of com-
mon-law rules, worked out in great detail by the common-law
courts. 8 40 The courts also have engaged in some rather questiona-
ble feats of judicial legerdemain when strict construction of the
Statute would produce injustice.34 1 Given this history of judicial
circumvention of the strictures of the Statute and the inexorable
advance of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, 42 courts' incorpo-
ration of promissory estoppel into the judicial arsenal of devices
designed to circumvent the Statute was inevitable.
B. Promissory Estoppel and the Statute of Frauds
The equitable doctrine of part performance was the first judi-
cially-created exception that courts employed to circumvent the
Statute of Frauds' operation.3 43 This initial equitable intrusion into
the Statute's domain was consistent with equity's traditional role
of preventing the harsh operation of statutes.34 4 Courts of equity
also commonly enforced oral contracts that were within the scope
of the Statute in cases involving outright fraud on the theory that
the supreme duty of equity was to prevent fraud.3 " When cases
arose that did not involve fraud, but in which denial of an oral
the imposition of constructive trusts, the "joint obligor" rule, the "main purpose" rule, equi-
table estoppel, and promissory estoppel. See Note, supra note 248, at 115-16.
340. L. FRDmAN, supra note 204, at 246-47.
341. See, e.g., Summers, supra note 208, at 442. Summers notes that
[h]ow many unjust suits have been prevented as a result of the statute cannot be esti-
mated, but the reports are filled with cases where just claims have been defeated by its
operation. This has resulted in a distorting of the statute, in order to prevent injustice,
into the most inconceivable meanings, so that cases might be ruled to fall without its
provisions.
Id.
342. See supra notes 203-317 and accompanying text.
343. See Costigan, supra note 323, at 344. According to Professor Costigan,
[t]he statute's framers were thoroughly familiar with the part-performance problem,
and the decisions which shortly after the passage of the Statute of Frauds settled the
law that part-performance would make the oral contract for the sale of land enforcea-
ble in chancery, notwithstanding the statute, are conclusive evidence that its framers
never intended the statute to prevent the giving of equitable relief in the part-perform-
ance cases.
344. Id. See Summers, supra note 208, at 447.
345. See, e.g., Wakeman v. Dodd, 27 N.J. Eq. 564 (1876). In such cases courts justified
the circumvention of the Statute by arguing: "relief is afforded in equity because of the
fraud, and not by virtue of the contract." Id. at 565 (dictum).
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promise's enforceability because of its failure to comply with the
Statute's writing requirement would impose severe hardships on
the promisee, equity courts began to employ the doctrine of equi-
table estoppel34e to defeat the Statute. Courts justified equitable
estoppel's use in Statute of Frauds cases by noting that "the invo-
cation of the statute would allow the perpetration of a moral
fraud, 3 47 and that the prevention of such an inequitable use of the
Statute would "be an aid in the ultimate function of the statute in
preventing fraud."
' 48
Equitable estoppel's utility as a device for protecting a prom-
isee's reliance interests stemming from promises within the scope
of the Statute suffered because of the doctrine's application only to
misrepresentations of fact.4 " This limitation confined early appli-
cations of estoppel in the Statute of Frauds context to situations in
which the promisor either had made misrepresentations concerning
facts that would obviate the need for a writing, 50 or had repre-
sented that the promisor had executed a writing sufficient to sat-
isfy the Statute. 51 The artificiality of the fact/promise distinc-
tion3 52 and the manifest injustice that often flowed from its
operation3 53 eventually would cause courts to apply the emerging
doctrine of promissory estoppel to Statute of Frauds cases.
At the turn of the century Statute of Frauds cases began to
appear in which courts that purported to apply equitable estop-
pel3 54 deviated significantly from that doctrine's traditional ele-
ments.3 55 Perhaps the most important of these cases was the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's decision in Seymour v. Oelrichs.356
346. See supra notes 212-14 and accompanying text for a discussion of equitable
estoppel.
347. See Summers, supra note 208, at 446.
348. Id. at 447. Summers and others have argued that the part-performance doctrine,
in reality, was nothing more than a limited variant of equitable estoppel. Id. The two doc-
trines clearly overlap and numerous examples exist of judicial confusion concerning their
proper application. See Note, supra note 216, at 282-83 & nn.11-15.
349. See supra notes 217-18 and accompanying text.
350. See Note, supra note 267, at 595.
351. See Edwards, The Statute of Frauds of the Uniform Commercial Code and the
Doctrine of Estoppel, 62 MARQ. L. REv. 205, 215 (1978).
352. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
353. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
354. See, e.g., Kingston v. Waiters, 16 N.M. 59, 113 P. 594 (1911) (seller orally prom-
ised to extend future payment date of debt); Perkiomen Brick Co. v. Dyer, 187 Pa. 470, 41
A. 326 (1898) (purchaser orally agreed to subscribe to stock).
355. See supra note 212 for the traditional elements of equitable estoppel.
356. 156 Cal. 782, 106 P. 88 (1909). The plaintiff in Seymour, a police captain, gave up
secure employment, including pension rights and the right to a "good cause" discharge, in
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Although purporting to base its decision on equitable estoppel, 57
the Seymour court actually estopped the surviving defendants
from asserting their Statute of Frauds defense because of their an-
cillary promise to reduce the parties' agreement to writing.3
5 8
Promissory, rather than equitable estoppel, more appropriately ex-
plains the Seymour result, based as it is upon plaintiff's reliance
on the defendant's promise and not upon any misrepresentation of
fact.35 9 Nonetheless, the court in Seymour understandably attrib-
uted its holding to equitable estoppel since the legal community
neither formally nor informally had recognized the doctrine of
promissory estoppel 60
Courts subsequently broadened the Seymour "ancillary prom-
ise" exception to equitable estoppel's misrepresentation of fact re-
quirement to include, among other things, promises by the defen-
dant not to use the Statute as a defense. 81 Courts justified the
circumvention of the Statute of Frauds in "ancillary" promise situ-
ations on two theoretical grounds. First, the courts wanted to pre-
vent "frauds" upon promisees who relied upon oral promises.
3 2
Second, the courts defeated the Statute only indirectly since they
used estoppel to enforce the ancillary promise, which was not
within the Statute's scope, rather than the underlying promise,
which was within the Statute's ambit.3 63 However circuitous their
logic, the courts ultimately were able to enforce promises that the
Statute otherwise rendered unenforceable. Appropriate attribution
of the Seymour result to promissory estoppel principles would not
occur until the holding of the case gained official sanction of the
Restatement of Contracts in 1932.64
reliance upon a ten-year oral contract to serve as a property manager for the defendants. He
alleged that one of the defendants, who later died while traveling in Europe, orally had
promised to reduce the agreement to writing upon his return. Id. at 792, 106 P. at 93. Since
the parties could not perform the contract within one year of its making, it fell within the
ambit of the California Statute of Frauds. Id. at 786, 106 P. at 90.
357. See id. at 800, 106 P. at 96.
358. Id. at 799-800, 106 P. at 96.
359. See Summers, supra note 208, at 454.
360. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
361. See, e.g., Zellner v. Wassman, 184 Cal. 80, 86-87, 193 P. 84, 87 (1920).
362. See, e.g., Seymour v. Oelrichs, 156 Cal. at 797-800, 106 P. at 94-96.
363. See Note, supra note 248, at 117; Note, supra note 258, at 74.
364. See RzSTATEMENT OF CONRACTS § 178 comment f (1932). Comment f provides:
Though there has been no satisfaction of the Statute, an estoppel may preclude objec-
tion on that ground in the same way that objection to the non-existence of other facts
essential for the establishment of a right or a defense may be precluded. A misrepre-
sentation that there has been such satisfaction if substantial action is taken in reliance
on the representation, precludes proof by the party who made the representation that
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Nothing in the language of section 90 of the original Restate-
mentas"-the general section sanctioning promissory estop-
pel-suggested that promissory estoppel should enjoy any broader
application in Statute of Frauds cases. Some modern courts ac-
cordingly continue to limit the use of promissory estoppel in Stat-
ute of Frauds cases to factual situations concerning ancillary
promises.s66 Commentators have suggested that the reluctance of
such courts to extend the application of promissory estoppel be-
yond cases involving ancillary promises may be attributable to
fears that such an extension could result in the complete abroga-
tion of the Statute.6 7 Exactly how much protection the Statute
affords promisors even in jurisdictions recognizing only the ancil-
lary promise exception remains in doubt. A perjurer attempting to
prove the existence of an oral agreement otherwise within the am-
bit of the Statute seemingly could assert the existence of a ficti-
tious promise to reduce the alleged agreement to written form and
thus vitiate any residual protection the Statute affords.
Nevertheless, limiting promissory estoppel to the ancillary
promise context potentially works great injustice upon the belea-
guered promisee. For one thing, such a limitation forgets that a
promisee who relies on an underlying promise to perform exper-
iences as great an injury if a court refuses to enforce the promise as
a promisee who relies on an ancillary promise to put the agreement
in writing.368 More importantly, in most ancillary promise cases the
promisee more likely is relying on performance of the underlying
agreement than upon the ancillary promise. Not until the Califor-
it was false; and a promise to make a memorandum, if similarly relied on, may give
rise to an effective promissory estoppel if the Statute would otherwise operate to
defraud.
Id. (emphasis added).
365. See supra note 238 and the accompanying text.
366. See, e.g., 21 Turtle Creek Square, Ltd. v. New York State Teachers' Retirement
Sys., 432 F.2d 64, 65-66 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955 (1971) (applying Texas
law); Tiffany, Inc. v. W.M.K. Transit Mix, Inc., 16 Ariz. App. 415, 420-21, 493 P.2d 1220,
1225-26 (1972).
367. See Note, supra note 255, at 1229.
368. Commentators have argued that the ancillary promise rubric often has served to
mask the true policy basis for circumventing the Statute's operation in such cases:
It is appropriate for modern courts to cast aside the raiments of conceptualism which
cloak the true policies underlying the reasoning behind the many decisions enforcing
contracts that violate the Statute of Frauds. There is certainly no need to resort to
legal rubrics or meticulous legal formulas when better explanations are available. The
policy behind enforcing an oral agreement which violated the Statute of Frauds [is] a
policy of avoiding unconscionable injury ....
McIntosh v. Murphy, 52 Hawaii 29, 35, 469 P.2d 177, 180 (1970).
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nia Supreme Court's decision in Monarco v. Lo Greco,69 however,
did a court explicitly recognize this.3 70 Although the Monarco court
adhered to the precedent set in Seymour by purporting to base its
decision on equitable estoppel, 7 ' the doctrine they actually ap-
plied is promissory estoppel. 7 2 Several post-Monarco decisions
recognizing the general proposition that reliance on oral promises
can operate to circumvent the Statute regardless of the existence
of an ancillary promise correctly have characterized the animating
principle underlying their decisions as promissory estoppe
3 73
Courts also have used promissory estoppel to circumvent the Uni-
form Commercial Code's Statute of Frauds requirement, 3 7  al-
though the extant cases on point manifest considerable judicial
confusion on the subject.
7 5
Although the judicial tendency to circumvent the Statute of
Frauds via promissory estoppel is apparently well-established and,
indeed, seems to be gaining momentum, this Article would deceive
if it failed to acknowledge the considerable resistance that the doc-
trine has encountered in the Statute of Frauds context. One obsta-
369. 35 Cal. 2d 621, 220 P.2d 737 (1950). In Monarco the court enforced an oral prom-
ise two parents made to their son that they would leave him the bulk of their property at
their death. In reliance on this promise the son remained at home and worked on the family
farm for twenty years. Although defendants made no ancillary promise to reduce the agree-
ment to written form or to refrain from raising the Statute as a defense, the court concluded
that estoppel appropriately could exist when a promisor induces the promisee's reliance by
promising to perform his part of their oral agreement. The court observed that "[in reality
it is not the representation that the contract will be put in writing or that the statute will
not be invoked, but the promise that the contract will be performed that a party relies upon
when he changes his position because of it." Id. at 626, 220 P.2d at 741. The court analyzed
prior decisions and concluded that whenever unconscionable injury or unjust enrichment
would result from enforcement of the Statute, "the doctrine of estoppel . . . applied
whether or not plaintiff relied upon representations going to the requirements of the statute
itself." Id. at 625, 220 P.2d at 741. The Monarco court characterized earlier cases refusing to
apply estoppel as doing so either because a restitutionary remedy would compensate ade-
quately the promisee or because no unconscionable injury would result from nonenforce-
ment of the agreement. Id. at 623-24, 220 P.2d at 740.
370. A few cases decided in the interim between Seymour and Monarco, however, evi-
denced some considerable judicial stretching of the ancillary promise requirement in the
quest for fair results. See Note, supra note 216, at 293-94.
371. 35 Cal. 2d at 625, 220 P.2d at 740.
372. See supra notes 359-60 and accompanying text. But see Note, supra note 255, at
1221-22 (describing Monarco as allowing proof of detrimental reliance sufficient to establish
promissory estoppel to serve as the basis for an equitable estoppel). The Note's contrary
position results from the author's view that promissory estoppel traditionally has functioned
only as a consideration substitute. See id. at 1222-23.
373. See, e.g., McIntosh v. Murphy, 52 Hawaii 29, 36-37, 469 P.2d 177, 181 (1970);
Alpark Distrib., Inc. v. Poole, 95 Nev. 605, 607-08, 600 P.2d 229, 230-31 (1979).
374. U.C.C. § 2-201 (1977).
375. See Metzger & Phillips, supra note 338, at 91-96.
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cle to the recognition of promissory estoppel as a legitimate device
to circumvent the Statute has been judicial fears that observers
would charge courts with usurping legislative power.3 76 This con-
cern, however, ignores several important facts. First, equity always
has had the power to mitigate the harsh operation of statutes.
3 7
Second, the Statute has from its inception been the object of equi-
table intervention;s7' indeed, one prominent historian of the Stat-
ute has argued that its authors never intended the Statute to apply
to the courts of equity. 7 9 Last, the usurpation argument fails to
consider the judiciary's primary role in shaping the Statute.35 0
The usurpation argument against recognition of promissory
estoppel as a legitimate means around the Statute recently has re-
surfaced with particular vigor in the discussion of section 2-201 of
the Uniform Commercial Code. In the discussion, opponents of the
widespread recognition of promissory estoppel in Statute of Frauds
cases have coupled the usurpation argument with arguments pre-
mised on the familiar, though often discounted, 8 ' maxim of statu-
tory construction: Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.3 82 The
major thrust of this combined attack is that, since the drafters of
the Code specifically enumerated several methods38 3 of avoiding
376. See, e.g., Tanenbaum v. Biscayne Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 190 So. 2d 777, 779
(Fla. 1966).
377. See supra note 344 and accompanying text.
378. See supra notes 343 & 345-48 and accompanying text.
379. The judges who framed the Statute of Frauds were so anxious to tie the hands
of juries and so possessed by the idea that the statute would not apply ex proprio
vigore to chancery cases that they neglected to be as explicit in the wording of the
statute as they should have been.
Costigan, supra note 323, at 344-45.
380. See supra notes 339-40 and accompanying text.
381. See Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARv. L. REv. 863, 873-74 (1930), for the
following observation:
The rule that the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another is in direct contra-
diction to the habits of speech of most persons. To say that all men are mortal does not
mean that all women are not, or that all other animals are not. There is no such impli-
cation, either in usage or in logic, unless there is a very particular emphasis on the
word men. It is neither customary nor convenient to indicate such emphasis in statutes,
and without this indication, the first comment on the rule is that it is not true.
Id. (emphasis in original). See also National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672,
676 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
382. Enumeration of specific items impliedly excludes all others. See United States v.
Robinson, 359 F. Supp. 52, 58-59 (S.D. Fla. 1973) (interpreting wiretap authorization
statute).
383. See U.C.C. § 2-201(2)-(3) (1977). These methods include the use of merchants'
written confirmations, the manufacture of goods not suitable for sale to others in the regular
course of business, an admission by the party against whom enforcement is sought that a
contract for sale was made, and the prior acceptance of, coupled with either payment for or
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the section's writing requirement,1 4 the drafters impliedly pre-
cluded avoidance by any other manner, including estoppel. 5 ' This
view is incorrect for various reasons ss The most important of
these is that section 1-103 of the Code expressly provides that
"[u]nless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the
principles of law and equity, including ... the law relative to...
estoppel. . . shall supplement its provisions. "387 This section ap-
plies prospectively as well as retrospectively,38 8 and, therefore, can
serve as a vehicle for incorporating into Code decisions legal devel-
opments that occur after the Code's enactment.
3 8 9
Another, more important obstacle to the recognition of prom-
issory estoppel as a legitimate means of circumventing the Statute
is the fear of numerous courts that such recognition would result in
the Statute's complete abrogation.390 This fear, however, is un-
founded. While promissory estoppel would permit proof of some
oral agreements that the Statute otherwise would preclude the
Statute would remain applicable both to wholly executory
promises within its scope and to oral promises that have induced
reliance insufficient to trigger application of estoppel.3 91 Further-
more, although allowing estoppel to intrude into the Statute of
Frauds context certainly will diminish some protection that the
Statute otherwise affords contracting parties, substantial contro-
versy exists over whether the Statute truly offers any significant
protection. Given the Statute's numerous judicially created excep-
tions,a9 a dishonest plaintiff conceivably could "frame" a contract
receipt of, the goods in issue.
384. See U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (1977).
385. See C.R. Fedrick, Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 552 F.2d 852, 858 (9th Cir. 1977)
(Duniway, J., concurring); Cox v. Cox, 292 Ala. 106, 111, 289 So. 2d 609, 613 (1974); C.G.
Campbell & Son, Inc. v. Comdeq Corp., 586 S.W.2d 40, 41 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); see also
Edwards, supra note 351, at 218.
386. See Metzger & Phillips, supra note 338, at 97-99 (fully discussing why the Code's
enumeration does not preclude other methods of avoidance).
387. U.C.C. § 1-103 (1977).
388. "What the section [1-103] invites is not limited to law which exists as of the date
of particular enactments of the Code." Summers, supra note 304, at 197 n.9.
389. Specifically, courts, under § 1-103, appropriately may incorporate the express rec-
ognition of promissory estoppel as a means of circumventing the Statute in Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 139.
390. This fear has been a strong 'consideration in those cases in which courts refused
to countenance the circumvention of the Statute under any circumstances. See, e.g., Kahn v.
Cecelia Co., 40 F. Supp. 878, 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); Tanenbaum v. Biscayne Osteopathic
Hoasp., Inc., 173 So. 2d 492, 495 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965), aff'd, 190 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 1966).
391. See Metzger & Phillips, supra note 338, at 82.
392. See supra notes 339-40 and accompanying text.
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that was beyond the Statute's scope.3 93 Moreover, that a writing
satisfying the Statute exists does not indicate necessarily the true
existence of a contract between the parties. The writing might be a
forgery,39 4 or might be a draft that parties optimistically signed in
advance, looking forward to an agreement that failed to material-
ize.39  Finally, memoranda satisfying the Statute are often incom-
plete;396 thus, a perjurious promisee conceivably could convince a
judge or jury of the existence of contract terms to which the prom-
isor never actually assented.39 7 All of these possibilities have led
one commentator to observe that "there is a very serious doubt as
to what protection the statute really does afford. Despite the lofty
words about its glory that are so often pronounced, its protection,
in most cases, is more illusory than real.""9 "
Proponents of the expansion of promissory estoppel into the
Statute of Frauds context, in sum, have convincing responses to all
judicial fears concerning the abrogation of the Statute. Perhaps,
the chief fear concerns the loss of the evidentiary function that the
writing requirement serves. 99 The reliance that the promissory es-
toppel doctrine requires, however, likewise can serve this eviden-
tiary function. 40 0 As one author notes "it is almost inconceivable
that anyone should materially change his position, so as to satisfy
all the elements of an estoppel, on the expectation of recouping
himself on a 'framed' contract. 4 01 Another fear concerns the loss
of the channeling and cautionary functions that the Statute's writ-
ing requirement serves.40 ' The channeling function of the Statute
encourages knowledgeable parties to reduce their agreements to
393. See Summers, supra note 208, at 460.
394. J. WHIT & R. SUMMERS, supra note 27, § 2-8, at 73.
395. Id.
396. Id. § 2-3, at 57 (sales contract context). The various incarnations of the Statute
never have required that a memorandum sufficient to satisfy the Statute's writing require-
ment be a complete integration of the parties' agreement. J. CALAmARI & J. PERILLO, supra
note 20, § 19-27 & n.70.
397. J. WmT & R. SUMMERS, supra note 27, § 2-8, at 72-73 (sales contract context).
398. Summers, supra note 208, at 460. See also J. WHIrr & R. SUMMERS, supra note
27, § 2-8, at 73 (The Uniform Commercial Code's writing requirement is "so far from any
kind of guarantee against successful perjury that it is inappropriate even to call it a means
to fraud prevention at all.").
399. See supra notes 319-24 and accompanying text.
400. See infra notes 423-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts' recognition of promissory estoppel's evidentiary function. See
also Note, supra note 208, at 710-11.
401. Summers, supra note 208, at 459-60.
402. See Note, supra note 215, at 182; see also J. CALAMARI & J. PERLLO, supra note
20, § 19-1, at 673.
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written form, and thus provides courts with a handy basis for dis-
tinguishing between enforceable and unenforceable agreements.
403
The cautionary function of the writing requirement discourages
parties from entering into ill-considered agreements by forcing
them to reduce their agreement to writing and impressing upon
them the seriousness of their actions. 4  While the promissory es-
toppel reliance requirement cannot serve either of these func-
tions,405 significant grounds exist for concluding that the writing
requirement also is inadequate as a channeling and cautionary
device.4 0
Before the Statute can serve the channeling and cautionary
functions, the parties must be aware of its existence and of its ap-
plicability to their agreement-a prerequisite often absent in eve-
ryday transactions.0 7 An empirical study of actual business prac-
tice relating to the reduction of oral agreements to written form
that the Yale Law Journal presented in 1957 indicated that the
Statute plays a relatively insignificant role in inducing business-
men to put their agreements in written form.40 8 Firms generally
put their agreements in writing because they consider such devo-
tion to the written word sound business policy.40 9 Parties often put
their agreements in writing simply to avoid problems of interpreta-
tion or to prevent each other from denying the existence of the
agreement.410 Even if the parties are aware of the Statute's writing
requirement, they may refrain from creating a writing because one
403. See Note, supra note 215, at 170-71; see also Fuller, supra note 304, at 800-01 (A
formality like the writing requirement can provide a simple, external test for
enforceability.).
404. See Fuller, supra note 304, at 800; Note, supra note 215, at 170.
405. But see Note, supra note 208, at 710. Since promissory estoppel only imposes
liability for promises on which the promisor should foresee injurious reliance it, therefore,
arguably fulfills a cautionary function because "[Il]iability thus is not imposed for breach of
impulsive promises made under circumstances in which legal consequences are, or should
be, unexpected." Id.
406. The drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code apparently were not concerned
with the channeling and cautionary functions of the writing requirement, since the various
alternative methods they provided for satisfying the Statute in Code cases all concern the
evidentiary function of the Statute. See Edwards, supra note 351, at 218.
407. See supra note 333. For more recent evidence of the truth of this assertion, see
The Statute of Frauds and the Business Community: A Re-Appraisal in Light of Prevail-
ing Practices, 66 YALz L.J. 1038, 1057-58 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Yale Study], which
indicates that the Sales Act's requirement of written evidence of sales contracts for $500 or
more had very little to do with whether businessmen reduced their agreements to written
form.
408. See id.; see also Note, supra note 267, at 592.
409. Yale Study, supra note 407, at 1064.
410. See Note, supra note 267, at 593 n.16.
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of the parties relies on the other's promise either to put their
agreement in writing or to refrain from raising the Statute as a
defense, or because both mistakenly believe that they have satis-
fied the writing requirement."11
The Yale Study also raised significant questions concerning
the identity of the individuals or groups most likely to benefit from
the Statute's writing requirement. According to the study, large
manufacturers are more likely to demand written evidence of oral
agreements than their smaller competitors 412 because of the differ-
ence in the nature of large- and small-scale business operations413
and the comparatively lesser bargaining power that smaller compa-
nies enjoy. 41 4 Another reason that those operating smaller concerns
are less writing-conscious may be that the small firms are less
knowledgeable than their larger competitors about the Statute's
existence and its applicability. The Statute, therefore, may be most
likely to affect adversely those parties least likely to know of its
requirements, least able to secure compliance with the require-
ments of which they are aware, and least capable of absorbing any
losses associated with their reliance if others successfully use the
Statute to bar their claims.41 5
The foregoing discussion suggests that the channeling and
cautionary functions attributed to the Statute's writing require-
ment may be largely illusory since they are at odds with the reali-
ties of prevailing business practice; therefore, additional impetus
exists for protecting a party's reliance on an oral promise within
the ambit of the Statute. As Justice Stephen observed long ago,
"[laws ought to be adjusted to the habits of society, and not to
aim at remoulding them. '418 This observation seems particularly
true if actual experience with a rule indicates that it has had little
real effect in shaping human behavior despite over three centuries
of existence. The Statute's failure to fulfill its channeling and cau-
tionary functions, the possible elimination of the original justifica-
tions for the Statute by subsequent legal developments,4 17 and
courts' wide recognition of the Statute's potential for working in-
411. Id. at 597.
412. See Yale Study, supra note 407, at 1047.
413. Id. at 1051.
414. Id. at 1051-55.
415. Metzger & Phillips, supra note 338, at 103.
416. Stephen & Pollock, supra note 327, at 6.
417. See supra notes 329-32 and accompanying text.
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justice 18 combine to present a compelling case for circumvention
of the Statute via promissory estoppel in appropriate cases, if not
its outright repeal.419
Two recent developments should serve to accelerate the grow-
ing judicial trend420 toward defeating the Statute's writing require-
ment via promissory estoppel. The first, and least controversial, is
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts' express recognition in sec-
tion 139421 that courts appropriately may utilize promissory estop-
pel to circumvent the Statute. The second development is the
emergence of the notion of promissory estoppel as a theory of re-
covery independent of contract.
In addition to the obvious "respectability" conferred by the
quasi-official sanction of the Restatement (Second), section 139 in-
cludes evidentiary and remedial provisions4 2 that should allay ju-
dicial fears concerning this use of promissory estoppel and should
enhance the possibility that the future development of the doctrine
will proceed in a more systematized, rational fashion. Subsection
139(2)(c) 42 3 of the Restatement (Second) expressly considers the
evidentiary value of reliance by directing courts to consider the ex-
tent to which the promisee's reliance or other evidence introduced
at trial corroborates the existence of the alleged oral promise. This
418. See supra notes 333-36 and accompanying text.
419. Parliament repealed the bulk of the original Statute in 1954, retaining the writing
requirement only for contracts for the sale of land and promises to answer for the debt,
default, or miscarriage of another. Law Reform (Enforcement of Contracts) Act, 1954, 2 & 3
Eliz. 2, ch. 34. See also supra note 192 and accompanying text.
420. See supra notes 354-64 & 369-75 and accompanying text.
421. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 139, reads as follows:
Enforcement by Virtue of Action in Reliance
(1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or
forebearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce the
action or forbearance is enforceable notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds if injustice
can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach is
to be limited as justice requires.
(2) In determining whether injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the prom-
ise, the following circumstances are significant-
(a) the availability and adequacy of other remedies, particularly cancellation and
restitution;
(b) the definite and substantial character of the action or forbearance in relation to
the remedy sought;
(c) the extent to which the action or forbearance corroborates evidence of the mak-
ing and terms of the promise, or the making and terms are otherwise established by
clear and convincing evidence;
(d) the reasonableness of the action or forbearance;
(e) the extent to which the action or forbearance was foreseeable by the promisor.
422. See infra notes 425-30 and accompanying text.
423. See supra note 421.
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provision should ensure wider acceptance of promissory estoppel in
the Statute of Frauds context by satisfying the evidentiary pur-
poses that the writing requirement ordinarily served and by obvi-
ating the possibility that courts will refuse to recognize an estoppel
because of fears that the alleged oral agreement may be ficti-
tious. 424 Section 139 also expressly treats the issue of the proper
measure of damages in promissory estoppel cases-a subject which
has generated considerable confusion and inconsistency since the
initial formal recognition of the doctrine.4 25 By stating that the
"remedy granted for breach is to be limited as justice requires,' 2 6
section 139(1) expressly authorizes the use of reliance-based dam-
ages in promissory estoppel cases. 2 ' This not only provides for the
judicial discretion necessary to deal effectively with promissory es-
toppel's remedial dilemmas,428 but also should enable courts to re-
tain whatever measure of the channeling function the writing re-
quirement provides 42 9 by limiting recovery under oral promises to
reliance damages. The judicial position espoused in section 139(1)
should encourage knowledgeable parties to continue reducing their
agreements to written form and should represent a proper balance
between the abrogation of the Statute that complete enforcement
of oral promises would cause, and the injustice that would result
from rote denial of recovery for failure to comply with the stric-
tures of the Statute. 30
The second and more controversial support for using promis-
sory estoppel to circumvent the Statute comes from the emergence
of authorities suggesting the doctrine's possible status as an inde-
pendent theory of recovery.4' 1 Some recent cases suggest that the
Statute does not bar claims premised upon promissory estoppel
since such claims are not contractually based and, therefore, are
beyond the Statute's scope. 32 Such a suggestion represents a sig-
424. See supra notes 400-01 and accompanying text.
425. See supra notes 265-81 and accompanying text.
426. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 139(1) (1981).
427. But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 139 comment d (1981). This
comment provides that "when specific enforcement is available under the rule stated in §
129 [providing specific enforcement of land sales contracts when courts can avoid injustice
only by specific performance], an ordinary action for damages is commonly less satisfac-
tory... ." Id.
428. See supra notes 265-81 and accompanying text.
429. See supra notes 402-15 and accompanying text.
430. See Note, supra note 255, at 1242.
431. See supra notes 295-308 and accompanying text.
432. See, e.g., R.S. Bennett & Co. v. Economy Mechanical Indus., 606 F.2d 182, 188
(7th Cir. 1979) (permitting plaintiff to assert promissory estoppel claim notwithstanding
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nificant theoretical departure from the courts' traditional rationale
in using estoppel to circumvent the Statute's operation-the pre-
vention of injustice that otherwise would result from the Statute's
operation.33 While little practical difference arguably exists be-
tween allowing promissory estoppel to "substitute for" the Statute
and treating the doctrine as an independent theory of recovery, the
rationale of the latter theory is pregnant with significant implica-
tions concerning the fate of other traditional "contract" defenses
such as the parol evidence rule. As Grant Gilmore observed,
[S]ome of the recent cases are beginning to suggest that liability under § 90
or the doctrine of promissory estoppel or however it is described is somehow
different from liability in contract. Thus, it may be, defenses based on the
statute of frauds or the contract statute of limitation or the paroI evidence
rule-all these being looked on as contract-based defenses-are no longer
available if the underlying theory of liability-§ 90 or an analogue-is not
contract theory at all.
4
Treating promissory estoppel as an independent theory of recov-
ery, furthermore, could provide judges with an obvious, albeit tech-
nical, device for circumventing the Statute in situations in which
mechanical application of the Statute otherwise would produce
harsh results. Finally, by giving promissory estoppel independent
theory status, judges would avoid charges of judicial usurpation of
legislative power and abrogation of the Statute's writing
requirement. 3 5
V. PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AND THE PAROL EVIDENCE RuLE.
A. The Cases
While, as the foregoing discussion plainly indicates, promis-
sory estoppel has gained widespread legitimacy as a device for cir-
cumventing the Statute of Frauds, the same is not true in the parol
evidence context. Upon survey of extant judicial authority on the
subject, several things become abundantly clear. First, very few
cases exist in which the issue of promissory estoppel's applicability
to the parol evidence rule ever has arisen. Second, the fundamental
attribute that all of the cases in which the issue has arisen share is
a paucity of significant judicial analysis on the estoppel issue. Last,
Statute's bar to contract recovery); N. Litterio & Co. v. Glassman Constr. Co., 319 F.2d 736,
738-40 & n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Janke Constr. Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 386 F. Supp. 687,
696-97 (W.D. Wis. 1974), aff'd, 527 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1976).
433. See supra notes 347-48 and accompanying text.
434. G. GnLMOR, supra note 203, at 66 (emphasis added).
435. See supra notes 376-89 and accompanying text.
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and perhaps most significantly,"" very few cases exist in which a
court has refused to consider convincing evidence of an extrinsic
promise in situations in which such refusal, in the court's judg-
ment, would work a serious injustice on the party relying on the
extrinsic promise. In one of the earliest cases to consider the appli-
cability of promissory estoppel in the parol evidence context, how-
ever, the court did refuse to consider such convincing evidence.
In Berverdor, Inc. v. Salyer Farms3 7 the California Court of
Appeals held the trial court in error for admitting parol evidence
of an omitted lease condition since the written lease was "on its
face, full and complete and no fraud, mistake, imperfection, illegal-
ity or ambiguity was proved. '43 The appellate court rejected any
application of equitable estoppel because the defendants had failed
to prove the misrepresentation of fact that the doctrine required.
The court then rejected application of promissory estoppel, al-
though it acknowledged that promissory estoppel properly could
be founded on a promise of future performance. The court ob-
served that "we have been cited no case and we have been unable
to find any case which in any way aids in the application of that
doctrine to the case at bar. 43 9 Given the court's form-oriented ap-
proach to the parol evidence rule, its views on the unenforceability
of the extrinsic agreement, and the realization that the court de-
cided Berverdor nearly three months before the California Su-
preme Court's landmark Monarco decision on promissory estop-
pel's applicability to the Statute of Frauds,44 ° that the court gave
436. See infra notes 580-83 and accompanying text.
437. 97 Cal. App. 2d 459, 218 P.2d 138 (1950).
Plaintiff-lessor sued defendant-lessees for the last year of rent due under a three-year
farm lease. Defendants acknowledged their failure to pay, but argued that the written lease
was subject to a parol condition that the lessor would excuse rent payments if it became
unprofitable for the lessee to pay. Id. at 460, 218 P.2d at 139-40. The trial court allowed
defendants to introduce certain letters evidencing the alleged condition in support of this
contention. Plaintiff's managing agent had signed the letters and had sent them to defen-
dants prior to the execution of the lease. Id. at 461, 218 P.2d at 140. The trial court also
allowed defendants to introduce evidence of certain conversations with plaintiff's agent who
died shortly after execution of the lease; the most important of these conversations focused
on defendants' concerns that the lease did not contain the agreed upon rent adjustment
provision and on the agent's assurances that this omission was unimportant. Id. The trial
court further allowed defendants to introduce evidence that in the year when they did not
pay the rent insufficient water was available to support a profitable crop. Id. The trial court
rendered judgment for plaintiff in a reduced amount, and both parties appealed.
438. Id. at 464, 218 P.2d at 142.
439. Id.
440. See supra notes 369-72 and accompanying text. The California Supreme Court
decided Monarco on August 1, 1950. The California appeals court decided Berverdor on
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defendants' estoppel arguments relatively short shrift is not
surprising.
Nonetheless, the treatment that the defendants received in
Berverdor stands in rather stark contrast to the treatment afforded
parties relying on alleged oral agreements in much earlier Califor-
nia Statute of Frauds cases. In Seymour v. Oelrichs,441 for exam-
ple, the court allowed a party who had relied upon an alleged oral
promise to reduce a wholly oral ten-year employment contract to
writing to prove the existence of that contract. In Berverdor, on
the other hand, the court denied defendants the opportunity to
prove the existence of a single term of an otherwise written con-
tract, even though defendants had credible written evidence sup-
porting the existence of that term, were arguably no less reasona-
ble in relying on the agent's promises and assurances than their
counterpart in Seymour, and had suffered a significant injustice as
a result of their reliance.
While the scant attention the Berverdor court paid to defen-
dants' promissory estoppel arguments, perhaps, is excusable since
the promissory estoppel doctrine had not departed yet from its
traditional roles in any dramatic way when the court decided the
case, later cases in which litigants sought to apply promissory es-
toppel in parol evidence cases unfortunately fail to provide any
greater judicial analysis of the issue. For example, in Mack v. Earle
M. Jorgensen Co.442 the court found that the parties' written con-
tract represented a complete integration of their agreement and
that the parol evidence rule barred any proof of alleged oral
promises. The court refused to allow proof of the promises under
the umbrella of promissory estoppel, but did not reject outright
the possibility that the reliance doctrine could, in some circum-
stances, operate to circumvent the parol evidence rule. Instead, the
court concluded that "the evidence presented precludes the appli-
cation of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, ' '443 observing that
"We are not aware of any decision applying the doctrine of promis-
sory estoppel where, as in the instant case, the alleged oral agree-
May 10, 1950.
441. See discussion supra notes 356-60 and accompanying text.
442. 467 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1972). In Mack a terminated manufacturer's representa-
tive sought to introduce proof of oral assurances that his employer would not discharge him
as long as he performed adequately. He alleged that various officers of the defendant com-
pany made these assurances after the company acquired his original employer and before he
signed a written contract of employment containing a thirty-day termination clause. Id. at
1178-79.
443. Id. at 1179.
14391983l
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
ment or promise was followed by a written contract, the terms of
which are in direct conflict with the alleged oral agreement or
promise."444 Thus, the perceived conflict between the alleged oral
assurances and the written contract served, in the eyes of the
court, to prevent any further consideration of the estoppel issue
because "[iun such a situation, we seriously doubt whether the
promisee could successfully argue that his reliance on the promise
was justifiable. '445 Of course the alleged oral promises conceivably
were not inconsistent with the written terms, but rather repre-
sented a condition upon the terms. Viewed in this light, the plain-
tiff's reliance seems more reasonable. The court's finding of incon-
sistency and its ultimate resolution of the case may reflect the
court's doubts about whether the parties ever made the alleged
promises.446 Furthermore, the facts as presented by the court evi-
dence no particular reliance by the plaintiff-no foregone alterna-
tive employment opportunities or other such substantial indicia of
reliance that would produce injustice if the court refused to en-
force the defendant's promise. Perhaps, given facts more conducive
to a promissory estoppel claim the court might have considered its
application to a parol evidence case.447
While the Seventh Circuit in Mack hinted at a willingness to
apply promissory estoppel in certain parol evidence cases, the Su-
preme Court of Alaska unceremoniously discarded the applicabil-
ity of the doctrine in Johnson v. Curran.448 The court in Johnson
444. Id.
445. Id.
446. The court, when discussing plaintiff's allegation that defendant's vice president
made the alleged promise on the day plaintiff signed the written contract, stated that plain-
tiff "claims that Dellinger [the vice president] told him that he wouldn't be terminated as
long as he did a good job." Id. (emphasis added). The court followed this statement with a
discussion noting that plaintiff signed the written contract without objection, even though
he had insisted on scratching out another provision which related to credits for orders
booked before termination and which defendant originally included in the same paragraph
as the termination clause. Id.
447. The validity of this suspicion is borne out by the court's subsequent decision in
Ehret Co. v. Eaton, Yale & Towne, Inc., 523 F.2d 280 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
943 (1976). See infra notes 484-96 and accompanying text.
448. 633 P.2d 994 (Alaska 1981). In Johnson plaintiffs brought suit against a nightclub
owner who fired them despite the fact that their eight-week written employment contract
(an American Federation of Musicians standard form contract) provided for two weeks more
employment. Defendant, in an uncontroverted affidavit in opposition to the plaintiff's mo-
tion for summary judgment, asserted that a band member misrepresenting himself as the
band's leader orally had assured her, before she signed the contract, that the agreement was
subject to termination on two week's notice if the band did not draw well. Id. at 995. Defen-
dant argued that the writing at best was a partial integration, that it was ambiguous, and
that, in any event, evidence of the parol agreement should be admissible because of fraud in
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affirmed the trial court's refusal to admit parol evidence of a termi-
nation clause not contained in the parties' standard form contract.
While the court recognized that evidence of fraud is admissible
even when a writing is a complete integration, the court held that
the fraud exception to the rule did not apply because defendant
failed to show that plaintiff's misrepresentation induced the defen-
dant to enter the contract. 9 More important for our purposes, the
court summarily dismissed defendant's promissory estoppel argu-
ment, noting that "the rule has no applicability in the factual con-
text presented in the instant case; promissory estoppel is a princi-
ple applicable to situations where a promise unsupported by
consideration is sought to be enforced and thus has no direct rele-
vance to the case at bar. ' 450 The court apparently did not have any
doubts about the credibility of the defendant's assertions since it
"assumed" that the defendant's assertions were true.4 51 The defen-
dant's reliance losses, however, were not of the sort likely to pre-
sent a particularly compelling case for relief. This consideration,
the court's narrow conception of promissory estoppel, and its
rather mechanical approach to the parol evidence rule make the
scant attention afforded the promissory estoppel argument more
understandable, if not more defensible.
In at least one more case in which the promissory estoppel is-
sue surfaced, the court not only sidestepped the estoppel question,
but also refused to grant relief on any other basis. In Clark Oil &
Refining Corp. v. Leistikow 452 the court found that defendant's
promissory estoppel argument presented no Statute of Frauds
problem, but observed that "there is ...difficulty with this de-
fense as it relates to the parol evidence rule" since the leases in
question were clear as to the duration of the agreement and con-
tained an integration clause requiring -modifications to be in writ-
ing and signed by the lessor's vice president.458 Rather than ad-
dress the issue of whether a party can use promissory estoppel to
circumvent the parol evidence rule, the court concluded that the
the inducement and promissory estoppel. Id. at 995-96.
449. Id. at 997.
450. Id. at 996.
451. Id. at 997-98.
452. 69 Wis. 2d 226, 230 N.W.2d 736 (1975). In Clark Oil two service station lessees
raised promissory estoppel as a defense to an eviction action that followed the expiration of
the parties' written lease agreement. The lessees argued that the lessor's agents orally prom-
ised that they could remain dealers as long as their performance was satisfactory, and that
they relied upon plaintiff's promise by leaving long-standing former employment.
453. Id. at 237-38, 230 N.W.2d at 743.
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defendant's allegations were insufficient to raise a promissory es-
toppel claim. The defendants, according to the court, had not
shown that the court could avoid injustice only by enforcing the
plaintiff's promises. The court also expressed doubts about
whether foregoing prior employment constituted reliance of a "def-
inite and substantial character." 45 The quoted language plainly
addresses the requirements of section 90 as manifested in the Re-
statement. 55 While the Restatement (Second) since has dropped
the definite and substantial reliance requirement, 456 and other
courts have found foregoing prior employment to be sufficient reli-
ance for a promissory estoppel claim, 57 the heart of the Clark Oil
court's refusal to confront the promissory estoppel issue or to em-
ploy any other legal device to protect the defendants' reliance
probably lies with its conclusion that defendants failed to demon-
strate sufficient injustice to justify enforcing plaintiff's oral prom-
ise. Defendants, after all, could have entered into a new lease at a
higher rate if they were willing to pay for it. Furthermore, defen-
dants did not stand to lose a substantial investment in the
franchise. Given the absence of a compelling claim for relief, the
court, not surprisingly, eschewed defendants' invitation to apply
promissory estoppel to the parol evidence rule.
While the courts in the foregoing cases denied application of
promissory estoppel in the parol evidence context and refused to
admit proffered extrinsic evidence on any other grounds, a number
of cases exist in which courts declined formal use of promissory
estoppel to circumvent the parol evidence rule, but found indepen-
dent bases for enforcing parol promises that engendered significant
reliance. For example, in Wojciechowski v. Amoco Oil Co." s plain-
tiff, a gas station franchisee, sought to enjoin the termination of a
written "trial franchise" agreement drafted in conformity with the
Petroleum Marketing Practices Act [PMPA].4 59 Plaintiff argued
that defendant's agents induced him to enter the trial agreement
by making oral misrepresentations that the PMPA required that
defendant treat him as a trial franchisee 460 and by orally promising
that defendant would renew plaintiff's franchise if plaintiff "per-
454. Id. at 239, 230 N.W.2d at 744.
455. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
456. See supra notes 309-12.
457. See, e.g., Hunter v. Hayes, 533 P.2d 952 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975).
458. 483 F. Supp. 109 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
459. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2806 (Supp. IV 1980).
460. 483 F. Supp. at 111, 114.
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formed adequately."'" Defendant's witnesses disputed plaintiff's
version of these events, but the court concluded that plaintiff "was
a more credible witness. '46 2 The court, nonetheless, rejected plain-
tiff's argument that defendant's promise to continue his franchise
if he performed adequately gave rise to a claim based upon promis-
sory estoppel. Promissory estoppel, according to the court, "pro-
vides no help to plaintiff's claim [because the oral promises] were
made prior to the written contract. '463 Therefore, the court con-
cluded, "the parol evidence rule nullifies the salutory [sic] effects
of the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
'4 "
Despite its holding on promissory estoppel, the Wojciechowski
court did not want to deprive plaintiff of his significant investment
in the franchise. Consequently, it held that defendant's misrepre-
sentations constituted a fraud that prevented the creation of a trial
franchise under the PMPA.465 Thus, defendant could not termi-
nate plaintiff's franchise until defendant conformed with the more
stringent PMPA requirements for terminating regular
franchises.46 6 Regarding the misrepresentations that PMPA re-
quired defendant to treat plaintiff as a trial franchisee, the court
acknowledged the general rule that fraud cannot arise from mis-
representations of law, but held that defendant's misstatements
concerning the PMPA's requirements fell within a recognized ex-
ception to the general rule predicated upon defendant's intentional
misrepresentation, the relationship of trust between the parties,
and defendant's superior knowledge and skill.46 7 To defendant's
objection that its promise relating to renewal of the franchise could
not constitute fraud because it represented acts Amoco was to do
in the future, the court responded that "if [defendant] had a pre-
461. Id. at 114.
462. Id.
463. Id. at 115.
464. Id. Wojciechowski relied heavily on McConnell v. L.C.L. Transit Co., 42 Wis. 2d
429, 167 N.W.2d 226 (1969), which concerned an alleged oral promise to a man employed as
a general manager that the company would not discharge him as long as the business earned
an annual profit. His written employment contract, however, clearly gave the employer the
right to terminate him upon payment of an agreed sum as liquidated damages. The McCon-
nell court did not reach the promissory estoppel issue because plaintiff asserted that defen-
dant made many of the alleged promises after the parties signed the agreement. Thus, the
parol evidence rule did not bar evidence of their existence and of their role in inducing the
plaintiff to forego other employment opportunities. Id. at 437, 167 N.W.2d at 229-30. The
Wojciechowski court, therefore, correctly concluded that McConnell was "of little help to
plaintiff." 483 F. Supp. at 115.
465. 483 F. Supp. at 114-15 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 2803(b)(1) (Supp. V 1981)).
466. Id. at 115 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 2802 (Supp. V 1981)).
467. Id. at 114-15.
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sent intention not to continue the franchise even if the perform-
ance was adequate, then this would constitute actionable fraud."""8
The court then concluded that "there is sufficient proof at this
juncture in the litigation to show that defendant misrepresented
its intention.
'46 9
Walker v. KFC Corp.470 is similar in thrust, if not in method-
ology, to Wojciechowski. The plaintiff in Walker had purchased a
restaurant franchise from defendant franchisor. Plaintiff claimed
that defendant made numerous fraudulent parol representations
concerning the viability of the franchise and its intentions concern-
ing the franchise and the plaintiff. Plaintiff brought suit on numer-
ous theories, including breach of contract, promissory estoppel,
and fraud. When the jury found for plaintiff on the promissory es-
toppel and fraud claims, defendant moved for a judgment n.o.v.,
arguing (1) that the existence of a contract between the parties
precluded any recovery under promissory estoppel and (2) that, in
any event, promissory estoppel was inapplicable to promises pre-
ceding a written contract because of the parol evidence rule.47 1
On the first point, the court acknowledged the general rule
that existence of a valid contract prevents any recovery based on
estoppel, 4 2 but noted that "defendants provide no authority for
the proposition that the mere existence of a contract between two
parties precludes a recovery based on promises that were not part
of the contract.' 34 The court then proceeded to hold the oral
promises as separate from the contract and to award recovery to
plaintiff. The court concluded that since the jury found for defen-
dant on the breach of contract claim, it necessarily based its ver-
dict on promises that "were not bargained for and that were not
included in the contract.
'47 4
On defendant's second argument, the court noted with ap-
proval the instructions to the jury providing that evidence of ex-
trinsic terms was inadmissible for purposes of plaintiff's contract
and estoppel claims unless the jury found that the written contract
468. Id. at 115 (citing 37 AM. Jun. 2d Fraud § 59 (1968)).
469. Id.
470. 515 F. Supp. 612 (S.D. Cal. 1981).
471. Id. at 616.
472. Id.; see, e.g., Guaranty Bank v. Lone Star Life Ins. Co., 568 S.W.2d 431, 434 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1978); Pasadena Assocs. v. Connor, 460 S.W.2d 473, 481 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
The emergence of promissory estoppel as an independent theory of recovery, however,
would render such a rule obsolete. See Metzger & Phillips, supra note 3, at 549.




either failed to reflect the parties' real intention due to fraud, mis-
take, or accident, or that the parties did not intend their writing to
be an exclusive statement of their agreement.475 The preceding lan-
guage seems to paint the court's refusal to set aside the jury's ver-
dict as standing for the relatively unexceptionable proposition that
parties may prove and courts may enforce on promissory estoppel
grounds those parol promises unsupported by consideration and
extrinsic to an incomplete, or fraudulently induced, written con-
tract.476 The court, however, achieved this result in an interesting
fashion. The jury, rather than the trial judge, ruled on the parol
evidence question, an approach that emasculates the parol evi-
dence rule and that virtually guarantees enforcement of parol
promises that the jury believes the parties actually made.47
In two other cases courts nimbly maneuvered around the
question of whether a court may use promissory estoppel to pro-
tect significant reliance on extrinsic promises that the parol evi-
dence rule otherwise bars, but, nonetheless, found other legal justi-
fication for protecting such reliance. In Prudential Insurance Co.
of America v. Clark,47 8 for example, the court allowed beneficiaries
of a life insurance policy issued to a soldier killed in a helicopter
crash in Vietnam to recover for his death despite war risk and avi-
ation exclusion clauses in the policy. Prudential's agent induced
the insured to drop a prior policy that contained neither exclusion
by promising to obtain a similar policy. The insured died after
filing an application and prepaying the premium, but before find-
ing out that the policy contained the exclusionary clauses. Pruden-
475. Id. at 616-17.
476. For another recent case taking a similar approach, see Kramer v. Alpine Valley
Resort, Inc., 108 Wis. 2d 417, 321 N.W.2d 293 (1982). In Kramer, a school teacher/artisan
leased space in a commercial complex, reduced his teaching load to half-time, and made a
significant investment in labor and materials to construct a workshop in reliance upon parol
promises that the complex would be open all year and would attract sizeable walk-through
traffic. Id. at 420, 321 N.W.2d at 294-95. Although his written lease agreement contained
neither of these promises, the Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected defendant's argument that
the existence of an unambiguous contract between the parties precluded plaintiff's resort to
promissory estoppel, holding that "where the contract fails to embody essential elements of
the total business relationship of the parties ... the existence of a contract does not bar
recovery under promissory estoppeL" Id. at 421-22, 321 N.W.2d at 295. The parol evidence
rule, the court held, did not prevent proof of the alleged extrinsic promises because the
written lease agreement "did not embody the entire business relationship" of the parties
and the extrinsic promises "in no way" varied or contradicted "anything in the lease agree-
ment." Id. at 426, 321 N.W.2d at 297-98.
477. On the traditional role of the judge in parol evidence cases, see supra notes 30-38,
46 & 50 and accompanying text.
478. 456 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1972).
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tial initially paid the claim, then sued for return of the payment,
alleging oversight and mistake." 9 The court treated the agent's
promise as a separate promise independent of the written policy
and enforced it on the basis of promissory estoppel, observing that:
[T]his verdict recognized a duty of Prudential, dehors the writing, to act in
an honorable and upright way in accordance with its agent's promise. Thus,
application of promissory estoppel in no way trammels upon the parol evi-
dence rule. Involved here is a separate enforceable promise and not a vari-
ance or modification of the terms of the policy.
48'
Similarly, in Hohenstein v. S.M.H. Trading Corp.481 a
stevedore firm's officer made an undisputed oral promise that the
cargo vessel which the firm selected to carry the plaintiff shipper's
cargo had sufficient capacity to store the shipper's entire cargo.
The parties, however, did not incorporate this promise into their
written contract. Subsequently, the shipper had to make other ar-
rangements when the stevedore firm could not load all the ship-
per's cargo in the provided vessel. The court observed that "were
this not complicated by an integrated writing constituting 'the'
contract, there would be no doubt that this inquiry [about the ca-
pacity of the selected vessel] and response and reliance thereon
would constitute a classic case analogous to 'promissory estop-
pel.' ,,482 Rather than confront the estoppel issue, however, the
court held that a fair reading of the written contract revealed a
commitment by the stevedore that it could and would load all of
the plaintiff's cargo on the specified vessel. 8 t
While the equities of the cases and the courts' sense of justice
may explain the decisions in the foregoing cases and the courts'
failure to devote any significant attention to promissory estoppel's
possible application to ,circumvent the parol evidence rule, three
cases furnish more formal, albeit quite limited, support for the reli-
ance doctrine's operation in the parol evidence context. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit's opinion
479. Id. at 934-35.
480. Id. at 937 (emphasis added). For a case in which the parties never raised promis-
sory estoppel arguments, but in which the court employed similar reasoning to circumvent
the parol evidence rule, see Service Iron Foundry, Inc. v. M.A. Bell Co., 2 Kan. App. 2d 662,
669-70, 588 P.2d 463, 470-71 (1978) (sales agent who controlled insolvent principal held to
have made independent express warranty to disappointed buyer of pollution control device;
parol evidence rule inapplicable to sales agent who was not a party to written sales
contract).
481. 382 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1967).
482. Id. at 535.
483. Id. at 536.
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in Ehret Co. v. Eaton, Yale & Towne, Inc.4 " contains a curious
admixture of both equitable and promissory estoppel principles. In
Ehret, the plaintiff sales representative for the defendant manu-
facturer signed a "Commission Sales Agreement" that contained a
"duration of agency" clause which gave either party the right to
terminate the contract upon thirty days' notice. The contract fur-
ther provided that in the event of termination the principal would
pay commissions only on orders that it accepted prior to termina-
tion and that were deliverable within three months from the termi-
nation date. 85 Plaintiff, prior to signing, expressed concern about
the termination provision because the nature of the defendant's
products required the plaintiff to engage in substantial develop-
ment work prior to the consummation of a sale. In response to
such concern, defendant's General Sales Manager in a letter ac-
knowledged the possible effect of the clause, but assured plaintiff
that "in those few cases where the contract has been cancelled by
us we have always been much more liberal than provided for in the
contract.' ' 4 He further assured plaintiff that "this discussion is
probably academic only." [I]n the very unlikely event of cancella-
tion, you will have to rely on receiving extremely fair treat-
ment.' ' 48 7 After receiving these assurances, plaintiff signed the
agreement. Eleven months later defendant requested that plaintiff
sign a new contract reflecting that defendant had changed its
name. The new contract contained the same termination clause
and an integration clause cancelling all prior agreements. Twenty-
six months after plaintiff signed the new contract, defendant noti-
fied plaintiff that it was terminating the agreement and intended
to construe the termination clause literally.4"
Plaintiff filed suit for breach of contract, claiming that the
General Sales Manager's letter entitled it to better treatment than
defendant had given. Plaintiff succeeded in winning a jury verdict
at trial. On appeal, defendant argued that the new contract con-
tained the entire agreement between the parties, but the court up-
held the trial judge's holding that defendant's representations "es-
topped" it from asserting its rights under the termination clause.' 8'
The court's language initially pertains to equitable estoppel, as the
484. 523 F.2d 280 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1976).




489. Id. at 283-84.
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court refers to the "representations" in the General Sales Man-
ager's letter and plaintiff's reliance thereon, and notes that al-
lowing defendant "to disclaim its representations after receiving
the benefits therefrom . . . would have the fraudulent effect that
an estoppel was designed to prevent."'4 °0
While defendant's statements that it always had been "more
liberal" in past termination cases and that the new contract was
necessary to reflect its name change were plainly representations of
fact that could be the proper subject for an equitable estoppel, de-
fendant's assurance of "extremely fair treatment" plainly is a
promise of future performance and, thus, the proper subject of a
promissory estoppel action. 91 Promissory estoppel further enters
into the court's reasoning in the following confused statement:
The question of damages was submitted to the jury on the theory of a possi-
ble breach of contract to give the plaintiff extremely fair treatment. Support
for the treatment as an enforcible [sic] promise of the promise which, as a
result of the plaintiff's reliance, creates an estoppel is supported by Restate-
ment, Contracts, § 90 and Restatement 2d, Contracts, § 90 (Tent. Draft No.
2, 1965). Following this view, admission of the "extremely fair treatment"
letter is not in conflict with the parol evidence rule as the defendant con-
tends. An estoppel is an equitable remedy with its own independent force.
4
11
Of course, section 90 deals exclusively with promissory estoppel
and has nothing whatever to do with equitable estoppel, a point
that may have eluded the court. Later discussion by the court on
the damage issue, however, clearly indicates that the court is en-
forcing the "extremely fair treatment" promise as a promise.493
Following this tentative endorsement of promissory estoppel,
the Ehret court blunted the impact of its decision by advancing a
more conventional, if not more convincing, rationale for admitting
490. Id. at 283. The dissent concurred with the majority's "finding of equitable estop-
pel," but disagreed with its interpretation of the parties' agreement. See id. at 285-86
(Swygert, J., dissenting).
491. On the importance of the "fact/promise" distinction and its role in the evolution
of promissory estoppel, see supra notes 217-21 and accompanying text.
492. 523 F.2d at 283-84.
493. See id. at 284 (quoting Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 26 Wis. 2d 683, 701, 133
N.W.2d 267, 276 (1964), a famous § 90 case discussed supra notes 291-304 and accompany-
ing text) for the following statement:
We recognize that there is authority in jurisdictions other than Illinois for the proposi-
tion that the promise which becomes the basis for the estoppel is not to be enforced as
a promise, and that damages, if awarded, "should be only such as in the opinion of the
court are necessary to prevent injustice."
The court, however, subsequently concluded that "in the circumstances of this case, this
latter theory produces the same result as determining damages under the contract." 523
F.2d at 284.
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the General Sales Manager's letter: the court claimed that the lan-
guage in the duration of agency clause was ambiguous, and noted
that admitting parol evidence is proper in determining the mean-
ing of contract terms.9 4 Thus, the court in a classic instance of
judicial legerdemain 49 5 has "put the cart before the horse" by ad-
mitting an extrinsic term to show an ambiguity that then justifies
the term's admission.'9 While few conclusions unequivocally
emerge from the welter of confusion that Ehret represents, one
thing seems plain enough: despite its unclear reasoning, the Ehret
court protected plaintiff's reliance on an extrinsic promise the exis-
tence of which defendant did not dispute and the terms of which
contradicted an unambiguous clause in the parties' contract.
The Philo Smith & Co. v. USLIFE Corp.97 decision exhibits
similar judicial confusion concerning the elements of equitable and
promissory estoppel. In Philo Smith the court dismissed plaintiffs'
contract and quantum meruit claims, holding that the Statute of
Frauds and the parol evidence rule barred the claims. Plaintiffs'
promissory estoppel claim, however, went to the jury, with the trial
494. 523 F.2d at 284.
495. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
496. On the subject of the "interpretation" exception to the parol evidence rule, see
supra notes 145-52 and accompanying text.
497. 420 F. Supp. 1266 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), afl'd per curiam, 554 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1977)
(construing New York law). In Philo Smith two partners sued to recover a finder's fee re-
sulting from a corporate acquisition. The partners, one James Rutherford and Rodney
Hawes, over a period of several years, signed two successive fee agreements to assist defen-
dant in the acquisition of All American Life & Financial Corporation [All American]. Prior
to signing the first agreement, Hawes objected to its proposed termination date. Defendant's
chief executive officer assured Hawes that the agreement would be extended if necessary.
With this assurance, Hawes signed. Id. at 1269. The acquisition fell through and Hawes took
no further action relating to the USLIFE acquisition of All American. Near the expiration
date of the agreement, defendant's CEO told Hawes he was still interested in acquiring All
American and sent him a copy of a new fee agreement, which extended the termination
date. Hawes again expressed concern about the termination date, but after receiving assur-
ances that defendant would extend the date if they still wanted to acquire All American, the
plaintiffs signed. Hawes again met with the CEO near the termination date of the second
agreement and suggested that defendant extend the December 31, 1972, termination date.
Crosby replied that they would "take care of the paper work if we get anything going after
the first of the year," id. at 1270, but shortly thereafter told Hawes' former employer that he
had no intention of entering another agreement because he was unhappy with Hawes' per-
formance. Id.
Some five months after the expiration date of the.second agreement the prospects for
the acquisition suddenly brightened and defendant's CEO called Rutherford, who had been
working continuously on the acquisition, and asked him to arrange a meeting with All
American. Rutherford agreed to do so, but suggested that the fee agreement be updated, to
which Crosby replied there would be no problem. USLIFE ultimately consummated the
acquisition, but refused to pay defendants a finder's fee.
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court ultimately granting a directed verdict in defendant's favor.""
The court noted that plaintiffs' promissory estoppel claim faced
"serious obstacles" in the forms of the Statute and the parol evi-
dence rule,499 but acknowledged that the claim possibly could sur-
mount these obstacles when it stated that plaintiffs "had to estab-
lish the presence of the elements of promissory or equitable
estoppel if they were to avoid the combined effect of the statute of
frauds and the parol evidence rule." 500
The Philo Smith court listed five elements that plaintiffs must
show before courts will apply promissory estoppel. First, plaintiffs
must show "an oral promise ... made contemporaneously with or
subsequent to the making of a written agreement." 50 1 Second,
plaintiffs must show that "the promise was fraudulently made." ' 2
Third, "defendant must have anticipated that the plaintiffs would
rely on the oral promise and such reliance must have been reasona-
ble on the plaintiffs' part."503 Fourth, "plaintiffs must have relied
on [the] oral promise by engaging in acts which are 'unequivocally
referable' to the oral promise."50 4 Last, "plaintiffs must have suf-
fered substantial injury as a result"505 of their reliance. This list is
highly objectionable. The first element leaves no real guidance as
to the court's view about the effect that the parol evidence rule
would have on promissory estoppel claims predicated upon
promises made prior to the execution of the writing.506 While the
third and fifth elements properly reside under the umbrella of
promissory estoppel, the second element's requirement that the
promise be "fraudulently made" sounds more like equitable estop-
pel,50 7 and the "unequivocally referable" test of the fourth element
498. Id. at 1274.
499. Id. at 1271.
500. The Court observed that the "impact of the statute of frauds on this case is
stengthened by the effect of the parol evidence rule," since the parties had executed two
integrated written agreements. Id.
501. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
502. Id. (citations omitted).
503. Id. at 1272 (citations omitted).
504. Id. (citations omitted).
505. Id. (citations omitted).
506. For Corbin's views on the worth of the "contemporaneous" concept in the inte-
gration context, see supra note 69 and accompanying text. Of course, the parol evidence rule
should play no role whatsoever in the enforcement of extrinsic promises made subsequent to
an integration. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
507. See supra notes 215-16 and accompanying text. Of course, equitable estoppel
would be inappropriate here because the plaintiffs alleged reliance on promises, not misrep-
resentations of fact by the defendant.
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smacks of the equitable doctrine of part performance."°'
Plainly, requiring relying promisees to meet such stringent re-
quirements in order to raise successfully a promissory estoppel
claim not only is questionable from the standpoint of traditional
principles of promissory estoppel, but also presents an insurmount-
able obstacle in many parol evidence situations. Given the stacked
list of elements, the court's finding that plaintiffs had failed to
show that any of defendant's promises met the requisite ele-
ments °' is hardly surprising. The heart of the decision probably
rests on the court's determination that "the plaintiffs have com-
pletely failed to demonstrate any injury resulting from acts of reli-
ance or that any acts of reliance were 'unequivocally referable' to
any oral promises." 510 Only the initial aspect of the court's deter-
mination should be relevant. The reliance of many promisees likely
is equally referable to the parties' written agreement.,11 The re-
quirement of substantial injury stemming from the reliance, unlike
the "unequivocally referable" requirement, is a universal element
of any formulation of the promissory estoppel doctrine. Perhaps
the best explanation of the result in Philo Smith, if not of its rea-
soning, lies with the court's conclusion that plaintiffs had not suf-
fered substantial injury as a result of reliance. If the court had em-
ployed the standard enunciated by section 139 of the Restatement
(Second),5'12 it would have found that no "injustice" would result
from denying enforcement to defendant's promises and the same
result would have occurred. 5 '
508. See supra note 348 for the allegation that part performance is nothing more than
an earlier, limited variant of the doctrine of equitable estoppeL One commentator doubts
that any conduct could meet the "unequivocally referable" test and observes that acts which
traditionally serve as evidence of part performance are nothing more than evidence of sub-
stantial reliance by the plaintiff. Note, supra note 216, at 286. Of course, under promissory
estoppel the promise must cause the promisee's reliance. Boyer, supra note 222, at 470-71.
The exact degree of causal relationship required, however, remains unclear. One author sug-
gests that the promise at issue must play a "major role" in inducing reliance, but need not
be the only causal factor. Comment, Promissory Estoppel in Washington, 55 WASH. L. REv.
795, 805 (1980). See also Miller v. Lawlor, 245 Iowa 1144, 1155, 66 N.W.2d 267, 274 (1954)
(unnecessary for plaintiff seeking to circumvent Statute of Frauds via promissory estoppel
to show reliance solely based on defendant's promise; sufficient that plaintiff would not have
acted without promise).
509. 420 F. Supp. at 1272.
510. Id.
511. For a discussion of this point as it relates to the evidentiary value of reliance in
parol evidence cases, see infra note 554 and accompanying text.
512. For the text of § 139, see supra note 421.
513. On appeal, the Second Circuit did little to clarify the trial court's decision. It
affirmed the lower court's decision, but only addressed the Statute of Frauds issue, limiting
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Five years after the Philo Smith decision, Triology Variety
Stores, Ltd. v. City Products Corp. 14 presented the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York with the op-
portunity to rectify Philo Smith's legacy of conceptual disarray.
Unfortunately, the court was only partially successful. In Triology,
plaintiff filed suit seeking injunctive relief and damages. Plaintiff
alleged five causes of action, three sounding in contract and two
premised on promissory estoppel. The court dismissed the contract
claims for, among other things, failure to comply with the Statute
of Frauds, but allowed plaintiff's promissory estoppel claims to
stand. 15 The court noted that the defendant "relies heavily" on
Philo Smith in support of its motion to dismiss, but rejected Philo
Smith's applicability and criticized its reasoning. The court re-
jected Philo Smith's requirement that reliance furnishing the basis
for promissory estoppel be "unequivocally referable" to the alleged
agreement516 by observing that it had not found approval either by
the Second Circuit or by the New York State courts, and by cor-
rectly noting that such a requirement more appropriately was asso-
its holding to the plaintiff's failure to prove substantial injury and expressing doubts about
the lower court's other holdings. See Philo Smith & Co. v. USLIFE Corp., 554 F.2d 34 (2d
Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
514. 523 F.Supp. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (construing New York law). In Triology defen-
dant City Products Corporation, a franchisor of "Ben Franklin" stores, secured a ten-year
lease, including options to renew for either an additional ten-year period or two successive
five-year periods, on certain premises located in New York City. City Products subsequently
entered two contracts with plaintiff Triology Variety Stores. The first contract was a
franchise agreement conferring upon plaintiff's owners the right to use the "Ben Franklin"
name and to sell franchised goods to the public. The second contract was a sublease of the
premises that defendant previously leased for the store. The sublease was to expire sixteen
days prior to the expiration of City Products' lease. The parties renewed both the lease and
sublease at the end of the first ten-year period for an additional five years. In November of
1978, with twenty-six months remaining on the lease and sublease, an investor, after City
Products screened and approved him, purchased Triology and entered into a new franchise
agreement with a termination date of December 31, 1983. Prior to the purchases, the inves-
tor expressed concern about a clause in the franchise contract that allowed the franchisor to
terminate the franchise in the event that the franchised store moved to a new location. The
investor feared that this clause could cause his business to terminate at the end of the sub-
lease if City Products failed to renew the lease and sublease. He, therefore, sought and
allegedly received promises from various agents and employees of City Products that as long
as the franchise remained in good standing City Products would renew the sublease. City
Products, however, later refused to renew either the lease or the sublease. 523 F. Supp. at
693-94.
515. Id. at 694-96. Notably, the court's action in dismissing the plaintiff's contract
claims but allowing his promissory estoppel claims to survive is consistent with treating
promissory estoppel as a theory of recovery independent of contract. See Metzger & Phil-
lips, supra note 3, at 510, 512.
516. See supra notes 504, 508 & 510-11 and accompanying text.
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ciated with the doctrine of part performance. The court similarly
rejected Philo Smith's fraud requirement5 17 with the observation
that "New York State and federal courts have frequently applied
the doctrine of promissory estoppel in the absence of a finding of
fraud. 5 18 In the end, the court found that plaintiff and its owner
"have set forth a valid claim of substantial injury for which it
would be unconscionable to deny them the benefits of the promises
upon which they allegedly relied.
5 1 9
Plainly, Triology serves to clarify the elements of promissory
estoppel under New York law. Since the court's discussion solely
concerns promissory estoppel as a means of defeating the Statute
of Frauds, however, it sheds no light on the court's views about
whether promissory estoppel likewise may serve to defeat the parol
evidence rule. Arguably, no significant parol evidence question may
be present in Triology.5 20 Promissory estoppel's future as a device
for circumventing the parol evidence rule in the Southern District
of New York, then, clearly awaits further judicial clarification.
Although the foregoing cases do not lend much significant sup-
port for the proposition that promissory estoppel is a worthy can-
didate for recognition in the parol evidence context, a number of
considerations indicate a greater role for the doctrine in future pa-
rol evidence cases. The following section sets forth the arguments
militating in favor of so expanding the reliance principle and at-
tempts to anticipate and respond to counter-arguments that oppo-
nents likely will raise to any such expansion. The section, further-
more, briefly outlines the manner in which promissory estoppel's
extension into the parol evidence context should proceed. This lat-
ter effort is, by nature, particularly exploratory and is only an at-
517. See supra notes 502 & 507 and accompanying text.
518. 523 F. Supp. at 698 (footnote omitted).
519. Id.
520. Certainly, conventional arguments support the proposition that the admission of
evidence concerning defendant's promises would not violate the parol evidence rule. City
Product's oral promises concerning the written sublease, which the new owner acquired
when he purchased Triology, were made subsequent to the initial execution of the sublease;
potentially therefore, introduction of evidence of these promises might not contravene the
parol evidence rule. See supra note 72 and accompanying text; see also supra note 513. The
oral promises concerning the written franchise, although clearly made prior to the execution
of the writing, could have represented a "collateral" agreement that was separate and dis-
tinct from the franchise contract. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. Alternatively,
the franchise contract arguably was not a complete integration of the parties' agreement on
the franchisor's obligations concerning renewal of the sublease. Whether the court failed to
discuss the parol evidence issue for one of these reasons or because defendant simply failed
to raise it, is unclear.
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tempt to raise some of the issues that future courts and commenta-
tors must clarify.
B. Should Promissory Estoppel Apply to Parol Evidence
Cases?
The parol evidence rule and the Statute of Frauds, as men-
tioned earlier, are strikingly similar. The same underlying policies
support both doctrines:52 1 prevention of perjury by excluding pre-
sumptively untrustworthy oral testimony5 22 and the desire to give
judges increased control over the jury.5 2 Both are rules of form
524
whose efficacy as such some commentators have questioned.52 5 The
criticisms directed at the Statute and the rule are remarkably simi-
lar. Scholars criticize both for causing injustice because they may
prevent proof of agreements that the parties actually made.52 6
Both, critics note, have been the source of an enormous volume of
litigation.2 7 Similarly, observers argue that the reasons for adopt-
ing the Statute and the parol evidence rule no longer are compel-
ling.528 Finally, the courts have meted out similar treatment to
both the Statute and the rule: erosion by numerous judicially-cre-
ated exceptions 529 and frequent manipulation by judges seeking
just results.530 In sum, critics of both legal doctrines are abundant
and these critics frequently suggest consigning the Statute and the
rule to oblivion.3 1
The similarities between the Statute and the rule, the judicial
trend of circumventing the Statute by promissory estoppel, and
the historically expansionist nature of the reliance doctrine suggest
that the parol evidence rule is a likely candidate for the applica-
tion of promissory estoppel principles. Certainly, the reasoning
521. Wallach, supra note 17, at 653.
522. See supra notes 27-28 & 320-21 and accompanying text; see also J. CALAMARI & J.
PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-3, at 109-10.
523. See supra notes 32-38 & 322-25 and accompanying text; see also Sweet, supra
note 21, at 1053.
524. See J. CALAmAEI & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 3-3, at 108; see also Sweet, supra
note 21, at 1053-54.
525. See infra notes 559-63 and accompanying text.
526. See supra notes 184-89, 327 & 333-36 and accompanying text. Seavey, supra note
209, at 924 ("refusal to admit such evidence causes the Statute of Frauds and the parol
evidence rule to be a trap").
527. See supra notes 164 & 328 and accompanying text.
528. See supra notes 167-73, 190 & 329-31 and accompanying text.
529. See supra notes 124-52 & 339-40 and accompanying text.
530. See supra notes 153-61 & 341 and accompanying text.
531. See supra notes 190 & 332 and accompanying text.
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that justified estoppel's use in the Statute of Frauds context is ap-
plicable equally in parol evidence cases. The argument that estop-
pel's use to circumvent the Statute was necessary to prevent the
Statute from serving as an agent of injustice, an argument at the
heart of early estoppel cases involving the Statute,52 similarly
could serve to justify estoppel's use in preventing the parol evi-
dence rule from operating as an agent of injustice.3 " As one recent
commentator observed, "[i]f it is reasonable to rely on an entirely
oral agreement, it must also be reasonable in some cases to rely on
assurances that a writing is not necessary to preserve a particular
term of [an] agreement." 53 ' Furthermore, the authors' inclusion of
section 13911 5 in the Restatement (Second) "indicates an increas-
ing willingness to subordinate form to substance, where justice re-
quires," 536 a tendency which led one observer to conclude that "it
seems inevitable that another bastion of form-over-substance, the
parol evidence rule, eventually will fall under similar attack. 5 37
Several other considerations also militate in favor of promis-
sory estoppel's expansion into the parol evidence context. As previ-
ously observed, a general trend exists toward liberality in the en-
forcement of the parol evidence rule itself,3 8 a trend which
indicates a generally increased judicial willingness to admit evi-
dence of terms extrinsic to written contracts and a diminished
level of judicial concern for the doctrine's rule-of-form aspects.53 9
The courts' observed tendency to manipulate the rule to obtain
just results further supports promissory estoppel's expansion." °
This tendency should make at least some courts consider applying
a doctrine such as promissory estoppel, which openly and avowedly
seeks just ends. An expansion of promissory estoppel's scope would
be consistent with many observed tendencies in twentieth century
contract law in general,5 1 and with the modern fate of rules of
form in particular.4 2 Finally, if promissory estoppel ultimately
532. See supra notes 347-48 and accompanying text.
533. See supra notes 184-89 and accompanying text.
534. Knapp, supra note 5, at 78.
535. See supra notes 421-30 and accompanying text.
536. Knapp, supra note 5, at 78.
537. Id.
538. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
539. See infra notes 558-65 and accompanying text.
540. See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
541. See supra notes 207-08, 210, 213 & 287-88 and accompanying text.
542. See, e.g., Sweet, supra note 21, at 1054 ("Rules of form have a poor performance
record in American law.").
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gains recognition as a theory of recovery independent of con-
tract,543 courts could argue that the parol evidence rule, a creature
of contract, is simply inapplicable to claims premised on promis-
sory estoppel.""
Given the similarities between the parol evidence rule and the
Statute of Frauds, many of the concerns raised in criticism of
promissory estoppel's circumvention of the Statute also should ap-
ply to extensions of the doctrine into the parol evidence context.
Of course, the rebuttal arguments that support the use of promis-
sory estoppel in the Statute of Frauds context apparently outweigh
the concerns, and these arguments should prove equally persuasive
when applied to the parol evidence rule. Indeed, because of the
difference in the roles that the Statute and the rule play, propo-
nents of promissory estoppel's application to parol evidence cases
face an easier task than the proponents of the doctrine's applica-
tion in the Statute of Frauds context. The judicial fears concerning
abrogation of the Statute that observers often cite as a source of
the resistance which promissory estoppel's incursion into the terri-
tory of the Statute has encountered ' 5 should not be as great an
obstacle to estoppel's circumvention of the judicially created parol
evidence rule. The only major statutory manifestation of the rule is
section 2-202 of the Uniform Commercial Code.MS The Code's sec-
tion 1-103 facilitates estoppel's application to the Statute of
Frauds;547 this section could justify promissory estoppel's applica-
tion to the Code's parol evidence rule just as easily.
Nonetheless, application of promissory estoppel to the parol
evidence rule is certain to provoke judicial fears, similar to the
concerns raised in the Statute of Frauds context," 8 concerning the
loss of the protection that the rule affords written contracts. These
fears include the increased threat of perjury, the loss of significant
evidentiary value, the elimination of the rule's channeling and cau-
tionary functions, the undermining of the rule's role as a source of
predictability and certainty in commercial transactions, and the
loss of the rule's capability of protecting the parties' intent to
543. See supra notes 297-308 & 431-35 and accompanying text.
544. See supra note 434 and accompanying text.
545. See supra notes 376-80 and accompanying text.
546. See supra notes 99-106 and accompanying text.
547. See supra notes 387-89 and accompanying text. See also J. WHrr & R. SUMMERS,
supra note 27, § 2-11 (Judicially created exceptions to the parol evidence rule are still valid
under § 1-103 except as specifically precluded by the language of § 2-202.).
548. See supra notes 390-91 and accompanying text.
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finalize their agreement in an integrated writing. If the primary
motivation for such fears is the prospect of perjury, the doubts ju-
rists voiced about the efficacy of the Statute's writing requirement
as a device for preventing perjury are equally applicable to the pa-
rol evidence rule. The writing as easily could be a forgery in a parol
evidence case 54 as in a Statute of Frauds case. 550 Given the num-
ber of exceptions to both the Statute and the rule, a dishonest
plaintiff as easily could "frame" a contract within an exception to
the rule as he could within an exception to the Statute. 51 Argua-
bly, less danger of perjury exists in parol evidence cases than in
Statute of Frauds cases; in Statute of Frauds cases the basic issue
concerns the existence of a contract, generally a given in parol evi-
dence cases in which the central issue is whether the parties may
vary or supplement an existing written contract with alleged ex-
trinsic terms.
552
While the existing writing, then, provides a convenient point
of reference against which a court may measure the believability of
the proffered extrinsic term in parol evidence cases,55 s a promisee's
reliance often may provide substantially less evidentiary value in
parol evidence cases than in Statute of Frauds cases.55 Certainly,
in some parol evidence cases the nature of the promisee's reliance
plainly will be referable to the existence of the proffered extrinsic
term; in many cases, however, reference to the parties' written con-
tract may explain the parties' reliance equally well. Any sensible
application of promissory estoppel in the parol evidence context
plainly should consider the evidentiary value of the promisee's reli-
ance in determining whether granting relief premised on reliance is
appropriate. 5 5 Notably, Corbin's view of integration, which has
been influential in current interpretations of the parol evidence
rule, already has eroded substantially whatever special evidentiary
protection the rule once afforded written contracts. 5 Thus, little
real residual protection likely remains that application of promis-
549. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
550. See supra note 394 and accompanying text.
551. See supra notes 392-98 and accompanying text.
552. See Note, supra note 15, at 984.
553. Id. Since some formulations of the parol evidence rule concern prior written
terms, some parol evidence cases may exist in which the parties unquestionably agreed to
the proffered extrinsic term at least at some point in the negotiation process. See supra
notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
554. See supra notes 400-01 and accompanying text.
555. See infra notes 595-97 and accompanying text.
556. See supra notes 96-115 and accompanying text.
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sory estoppel to circumvent the rule would erode.
Commentators who believe that the parol evidence rule prop-
erly functions as a rule of form55' 7 likely will view any incursion by
promissory estoppel into the rule's province as a development that
deleteriously will affect the rule's ability to fulfill the normal rule-
of-form functions . 5 Although this undeniably would occur, critics
raised similar objections to estoppel's circumvention of the Statute
of Frauds. Proponents of this extension of the doctrine largely
overcame the objections by noting that the Statute did not work
well as a rule of form559-questioning its efficacy either as a cau-
tionary560 or channeling device.561 These arguments are more per-
suasive when applied to the parol evidence rule, which has no sig-
nificant role as a cautionary device and whose channeling
abilities 62 critics question.5 63 Modern interpretations of the rule,
in any event, have reduced dramatically its potential to operate as
a rule of form.5 " Finally, under contemporary versions of promis-
sory estoppel, partial enforcement of extrinsic agreements through
reliance-based damage awards is available. This option can pre-
serve a modest channeling function for the parol evidence rule in
much the same manner as it has done for the Statute of Frauds. 65
Critics of the doctrine's extension also may argue that applica-
tion of promissory estoppel in parol evidence cases would under-
mine the rule's vaunted, but often criticized,5 6 role as a source of
predictability and certainty in commercial transactions.8 This ar-
gument's veracity depends upon whether the rule as currently ap-
plied provides some real measure of stability. In view of the nu-
merous ways by which courts now circumvent the rule, questions
exist about whether the rule truly provides commercial transac-
tions with a significant measure of predictability.
56 8
The last and most significant challenge to using promissory es-
557. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
558. Observers who view parol evidence's rule-of-form functions as significant also
must view as deleterious the numerous existing means for circumventing the rule and its
frequent distortion by the courts.
559. See Sweet, supra note 21, at 1053.
560. See supra note 345 and accompanying text.
561. See supra notes 406-07 and accompanying text.
562. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
563. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
564. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
565. See supra notes 429-30 and accompanying text.
566. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
567. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
568. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
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toppel to circumvent the parol evidence rule arises because the
rule's modern defenders justify it for its role in protecting the par-
ties' intent to finalize their agreement in an integrated writing. 69
The effect that circumventing the rule via promissory estoppel
would have on its ability to perform this admittedly salutary func-
tion depends on how a particular court determines the parties' in-
tent to integrate their agreement. In a jurisdiction that adopts a
Willistonian approach to integration, courts focus on the writing
itself as the major consideration in determining the parties' intent
to integrate. Formal recognition of promissory estoppel as a device
for circumventing the rule in appropriate cases could provide the
courts in such a jurisdiction with doctrinal justification for admit-
ting proof of extrinsic terms to which they believe the parties actu-
ally agreed, even though those terms are such that similarly situ-
ated parties might "naturally and normally" have included in the
writing.5
70
Admission of such terms under the ambit of estoppel could
serve to minimize the rule-of-form aspects of the Willistonian ap-
proach, which otherwise can operate to frustrate the parties' true
intent in the name of their presumed intent.57 1 Plainly, if properly
applied, promissory estoppel would in some cases facilitate admis-
sion of extrinsic terms to which the parties in fact did agree. The
rule otherwise would bar such evidence. Thus, promissory estop-
pel's application could effectuate the parties' actual intent. Courts,
however, that consciously follow the Willistonian approach, as op-
posed to courts that simply follow Williston out of blind adherence
to precedent, arguably do so because they still perceive either that
the rule so interpreted serves a valuable function as a rule of
form,72 or that the rule provides written contracts with a degree of
deserved protection. Such a court would be loath to circumvent the
parol evidence rule via estoppel because doing so would erode the
rule's perceived ability to perform this valuable function.
Courts embracing Corbin's views on integration already at-
tempt to determine the parties' subjective intent; these
courts-willing to consider all available evidence on the issue of
intent and to base admission solely on the basis of the evidence's
569. See supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
570. See supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text.
571. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
572. Even the Willistonian approach represents a diminution of the rule-of-form as-
pects of the parol evidence rule when compared with the now defunct "four corners" doc-
trine. See Wallach, supra note 17, at 656-60.
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credibility57s-already largely have abandoned the parol evidence's
rule-of-form aspects. 7 4 In these jurisdictions, the issue becomes
whether promissory estoppel really could offer any utility to such a
court. The proponent of an alleged extrinsic term seeking to justify
its admission on the grounds of estoppel presumably would have to
offer the court convincing evidence of the existence of the term.
Conceivably, the proponent also would have to offer evidence of
either a promise to incorporate the term into the writing or an as-
surance that incorporation into the writing is unnecessary to pre-
serve the term as an element of the parties' agreement.575 A court
adopting the Corbin approach as easily could conclude that the
writing was a partial integration of the parties' agreement. Such a
court would then admit evidence of the proffered term on this
more traditional ground without using promissory estoppel.
The Corbin-following court, however, could not handle simi-
larly a proffered term that plainly "contradicts" the writing but to
which the court, nonetheless, believes the parties assented. Some
courts might be willing to follow Corbin's lead to its logical conclu-
sion and reject such a writing on the grounds that it lacks final-
ity.5"6 Others, however, might feel constrained by the longstanding
general rule that only "consistent" extrinsic terms may supplement
partially integrated writings. If the proffered term contradicted
the writing, then the court either would have to reject the term on
the basis of inconsistency or resort to some difficult, though far
from uncommon, 78 judicial gymnastics aimed at depicting the
proffered term as consistent with the writing. The availability of
promissory estoppel as a means of circumventing the parol evi-
dence rule, in such a case, could provide doctrinal rationale for ad-
mitting contradictory extrinsic terms that the court, nonetheless,
believes the parties intended to stand. The court thus would avoid
frustrating the parties' true intent by excluding such a term and
would obviate the need for judicial subterfuge justifying admission
by pretending consistency.579
573. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
574. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
575. See infra notes 595-97 & 599 and accompanying text.
576. Corbin advocated abandonment of the "partial integration" idea on the ground
that parties rarely intend to consider an incomplete writing final. See 3 A. CoRBmN, supra
note 48, § 581, at 441. See also J. CALAmmu & J. PmILLO, supra note 20, § 3-2, at 101 n.16.
577. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the pitfalls associ-
ated with this issue, see supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
578. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
579. But see Mack v. Earle M. Jorgenson Co., 467 F.2d 1177, 1179 (7th Cir. 1972).
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In addition to these concerns for the potentially deleterious
effects on the salutary functions of the rule, two other, more prag-
matic, problems exist that proponents of the change must confront
before promissory estoppel ultimately gains formal judicial recog-
nition in parol evidence cases. First, few cases exist in which the
courts have discussed promissory estoppel's availability in the pa-
rol evidence context; furthermore, these cases offer scant support
for the idea that courts may utilize estoppel in proper circum-
stances, to circumvent the parol evidence rule. The scarcity of such
cases, however, is due in part to the proposition's novelty and the
consequent unfamiliarity of courts and counsel with the arguments
that support it. Furthermore, although the few cases in which
courts have raised the promissory estoppel issue provide little au-
thority for the proposition's viability, none of these cases evidences
any thorough judicial analysis of the various arguments either in
favor of, or against, circumventing the parol evidence rule by es-
toppel. Thus, while the proponents of estoppel's eventual intrusion
into the sphere of the parol evidence rule cannot show convincing
precedent in favor of their proposition, they need not confront any
well-considered authority in opposition to it.
The second problem, however, is a more troubling argument
that opponents could advance both to explain the current failure
of promissory estoppel principles to make significant inroads into
the parol evidence context and to argue that any future formal rec-
ognition of estoppel as a device for circumventing the parol evi-
dence rule is unlikely: certain de facto aspects of the parol evi-
dence rule's operation exist that conceivably could render
superfluous any application of promissory estoppel. If, as some of
the rule's critics assert, the only genuine issue in most parol evi-
dence cases is whether the parties actually agreed to the alleged
extrinsic term580 and most courts in such cases seek "just" results
by selecting as authority whichever formulation of the rule and its
numerous exceptions reach the just result,581 then a serious ques-
tion arises concerning whether a controversial doctrine such as
promissory estoppel offers any advantages. Certainly, an excellent
explanation of why promissory estoppel, which has evidenced an
historical tendency toward ever-increasing intrusion into the prov-
580. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
581. See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text. For a well-known assertion that
this process of reasoning backwards to justify tentatively formed conclusions is actually de-




inces of traditional contract law, has yet to gain significant formal
recognition in the parol evidence context is that many courts long
have afforded protection to parties relying on oral promises. Al-
though rigorous application of the parol evidence rule would bar
proof of these promises, courts reach just results by manipulating
the rule itself.2
Several rejoinders to the argument of superfluousness are
available to proponents of estoppel's intrusion into parol evidence
rule cases. First, from an historical standpoint, judicial protection
of reliance in a variety of contexts via various manipulations of
traditional contract principles preceded the first Restatement's
formal recognition of promissory estoppel 85 Promissory estoppel
provided a clearer doctrinal explanation for the results in these
contexts and probably could provide a similar service in many pa-
rol evidence cases. Thus, the availability of other, less straightfor-
ward means of protecting reliance did not prevent ultimate recog-
nition of promissory estoppel's applicability in other legal contexts,
and no compelling reason exists to suspect that it will do so for the
parol evidence rule.
Second, by openly admitting that they will use promissory es-
toppel to circumvent the strictures of the parol evidence rule when
necessary to avoid injustice, courts could provide the parol evi-
dence rule with a much needed measure of conceptual clarity.
Apart from the general benefits associated with conceptual clar-
ity,584 formal recognition of the reliance principle in parol evidence
cases could reduce the inconsistency that characterizes the parol
evidence rule's current operation and thereby enhance the predict-
ability that the rule affords. These benefits would help cure aspects
of the rule that have been frequent targets of criticism.5 85 Clearly,
the availability of estoppel would have a beneficial effect on judi-
cial treatment of the various exceptions to the rule, which are
themselves the product of judicial dissatisfaction with the rule's
potential for injustice588 and serve as a frequent source of inconsis-
tent judicial application.587 Courts whose judicial arsenal included
582. See, e.g., the cases discussed supra notes 470-83 and accompanying text.
583. See supra notes 223-37 and accompanying text.
584. "[A] body of law is more rational and more civilized when every rule it contains is
referred articulately and definitely to an end which it subserves, and when the grounds for
desiring that end are stated or are ready to be stated in words." Holmes, supra note 192, at
469.
585. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
586. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
587. See supra notes 130, 132, 137 & 149 and accompanying text.
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promissory estoppel as a device for furthering justice in parol evi-
dence cases simply would have little need to indulge in the circui-
tous, and intellectually dishonest, process of torturing the facts of
a case to bring the case within the ambit of an established excep-
tion to the rule. If ultimate results in parol evidence cases clearly
arise from the court's perceptions of the situation's equities rather
than from the arcana of the parol evidence rule, then predictability
and certainty would result from the consequent focusing on the
real issues involved.
Last, not all courts have indulged in manipulation of the parol
evidence rule to further the interests of fairness. Some courts
mechanically apply the rule to prevent proof of extrinsic terms
that the court may believe the parties actually agreed to and in-
tended to supplement the writing.5 88 To the extent that such judi-
cial behavior reflects timidity, rule-orientation rather than result-
orientation, or an unwillingness to participate in the subterfuges in
which more result-oriented courts indulge, the formal extension of
promissory estoppel's reach into the parol evidence context could
provide such courts with an acceptable doctrinal justification for
avoiding injustice.
The rudiments of a version of promissory estoppel suitable for
application in parol evidence cases already exist in section 139 of
the Restatement (Second), which allows courts to enforce oral
promises despite their failure to conform to the Statute of
Frauds.85 9 Section 139 and its attendant comments bear witness to
its drafters' careful consideration of the multiplicity of factors that
a court should consider carefully before employing promissory es-
toppel to circumvent a rule of form such as the Statute or the pa-
rol evidence rule. A comment to the section admonishes courts
that parties seeking to take advantage of the section should bear a
greater burden than their counterparts seeking relief under section
90.590 The second subsection of section 139 lists numerous factors
that are "significant" in "determining whether injustice can be
avoided only by enforcement of the promise. "591 Most of these con-
siderations have some relevance in parol evidence cases as well; the
relevant factors include "the definite and substantial character of
588. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
589. See supra note 421.
590. "Like § 90 this Section states a flexible principle, but the requirement of consid-
eration is more easily displaced than the requirement of a writing." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF CoNracrs § 139 comment b (1981).
591. See supra note 421.
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the action or forbearance in relation to the remedy sought,"59 "the
reasonableness of the action or forbearance,"593 and the "extent to
which the action or forbearance was foreseeable by the
promisor."' 9e
Of particular relevance in parol evidence cases, however, is
"the extent to which the action or forbearance corroborates evi-
dence of the making and terms of the promise, or the making and
terms are otherwise established by clear and convincing evi-
dence."5 95 While the corroboration element may not have as much
practical utility in parol evidence cases as it does in most Statute
of Frauds cases,59 the drafters could modify the subsection for pa-
rol evidence cases to allow the existing writing to serve as a yard-
stick against which courts may test the credibility of the proffered
extrinsic term. 9 7 In addition, any formal promulgation of a parol
evidence-rule version of promissory estoppel could admonish
courts to consider the degree of formality surrounding the execu-
tion of the writing, the relative sophistication of the parties, and
any evidence indicating that the writing is the product of an abuse
of unequal bargaining power. Such factors are of obvious potential
relevance in reestablishing the environment in which the parties
made their agreement, and have some bearing not only on the de-
gree of credibility the court should afford evidence of alleged ex-
trinsic terms, but also upon the justice of the result sought by the
proponent of the extrinsic term. In any event, these factors argua-
bly play a sub rosa role in many courts' decisions regardless of
whether courts afford them formal recognition.5 98
Several other observations can be made about the form prom-
issory estoppel is likely to assume in parol evidence cases and the
impact its application is likely to have on the operation of the pa-
rol evidence rule. First, presumably courts that presently restrict
592. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 139(2)(b) (1981).
593. Id. § 139(2)(d).
594. Id. § 139(2)(e).
595. Id. § 139(2)(c). Such an approach is obviously consistent with those proposals for
reformation which suggest that courts compel proponents of extrinsic terms to prove their
existence by "clear and convincing" evidence. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
596. See supra note 554 and accompanying text.
597. See supra note 553 and accompanying text. Since these factors merely play an
admonitory role rather than serving as conclusive determinants of the availability of relief,
inconsistencies between the writing and the proffered extrinsic term should engender a mea-
sure of judicial wariness. Such inconsistencies, however, should not serve as a bar to enforce-
ment if the court, nonetheless, believes in the legitimacy of the extrinsic term. See supra
notes 576-79 and accompanying text.
598. See supra notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
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promissory estoppel's application in Statute of Frauds cases to
those cases concerning ancillary promises would impose similar re-
strictions on its application in parol evidence cases. Thus, these
courts probably would insist on proof of a promise to incorporate
the alleged extrinsic term into the writing or a promise not to raise
the parol evidence rule as a defense to subsequent proof of such a
term. Such a limitation of the reliance doctrine's application in the
parol evidence context, however, would be subject to the same crit-
icisms that critics have lodged against the limitation in the Statute
of Frauds context.5 99 Courts, therefore, should avoid such limita-
tions. Second, as previously observed,60 0 the potential for partial
enforcement of an extrinsic term, which modern versions of prom-
issory estoppel afford, could allow the parol evidence rule to con-
tinue to perform a channeling function, albeit at a reduced level.
Last, the extension of promissory estoppel into the parol evidence
rule's domain would not operate necessarily to deprive judges of
the rule's jury control aspects, which allow the courts-without ap-
pearing to rule on the credibility of the party proffering evi-
dence601-to exclude from jury consideration evidence of extrinsic
terms whose credibility the court doubts. A court could maintain
some jury control because while the issues of whether the promisor
made a promise that he reasonably should expect to induce reli-
ance and whether the promise actually induced reliance are ques-
tions of fact for the jury, the issue of whether enforcement of the
promise is the only way to avoid injustice is a discretionary ques-
tion of policy for the court to decide.60 2 Thus, a court that remains
unconvinced in the face of evidence that the jury has found con-
vincing still retains a point of entry to judicial corrective action,
albeit at a later stage in the proceedings. 03
599. See supra notes 358-70 and accompanying text.
600. See supra note 565 and accompanying text.
601. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
602. Gruen Indus., Inc. v. Biller, 608 F.2d 274, 280 (7th Cir. 1979); Kramer v. Alpine
Valley Resort, Inc., 108 Wis. 2d 417, 422, 321 N.W.2d 293, 296 (1982); Hoffman v. Red Owl
Stores, Inc., 26 Wis. 2d 683, 698, 133 N.W.2d 267, 275 (1965). At least one court has held
that there is no right to a jury trial in promissory estoppel cases because promissory estop-
pel is an equitable doctrine. See C & K Eng'g Contractors v. Amber Steel Co., 23 Cal. 3d 1,
11, 587 P.2d 1136, 1141, 151 Cal. Rptr. 323, 328 (1978). For a discussion of C & K and a
criticism of its holding, see Note, supra note 208, passim.
603. While this obviously concerns judicial subterfuge of the sort this Article criticizes,





The parol evidence rule long has been the deserving recipient
of criticism-criticism aimed at the confusion surrounding its ba-
ses in policy, the inconsistencies in its formulation, and the vagar-
ies in its application. Several extant considerations suggest that
the rule is both a likely and a proper candidate for the meliorating
ministrations of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Prominent
among these considerations are the inherently expansionist nature
of the reliance principle, the already well-established tendency of
courts to circumvent the Statute of Frauds using promissory estop-
pel, the numerous similarities between the Statute and the rule,
the modern trend toward liberality in the interpretation and appli-
cation of the rule, and the possibility that promissory estoppel
eventually will gain recognition as a separate theory of recovery
independent of contract. 04
An examination of the issues related to any eventual intrusion
by promissory estoppel into the domain of the parol evidence rule
indicates that the consequences attendant to such a development
generally would be salutary in nature. Estoppel could enhance the
effectuation of the parties' true intent in a written contract, an ob-
jective shared by modern formulations of the parol evidence rule,
and could minimize the injustice associated with mechanical appli-
cations of the rule. Estoppel also could provide a better doctrinal
explanation for the results courts reach in many parol evidence
cases than the traditional parol evidence rubric that courts cur-
rently employ affords. Such doctrinal clarity would result in the
focusing of judicial attention in parol evidence cases on the real
issues that ultimately will determine whether a court will give legal
effect to an extrinsic promise, a consequence likely to provide a
much needed measure of clarity and predictability in the adminis-
tration of the parol evidence rule. Finally, promissory estoppel's
application in parol evidence cases would be consonant with the
tendency of twentieth century contract law to elevate substance
over form in the pursuit of just results, a tendency of which the
reliance principle is merely one manifestation. Thus, although the
extant evidence is admittedly far from conclusive and exercises in
prediction are fraught with obvious perils, one addressing the parol
604. For a discussion of the numerous factors upon which such an eventuality de-
pends, see Metzger & Phillips, supra note 3, at 553-56.
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evidence rule might borrow from Lord Tennyson and say:
There's a new foot on the floor, my
friend,
And a new face at the door, my
friend,
A new face at the door. 0 5
605. A. TENNYSON, The Death of the Old Year, in THE WORKS OF ALFRED LORD TEN-
NYSON 62 (1896).

